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Abstract
By the end of 2013, the number of internet-connected mobile devices is expected
to exceed that of humans. Omnipresent and context-aware, mobile devices enable
people to communicate and exchange data anytime and almost anywhere. The
myriad of ”digital footprints” that mobile devices leave can be used to infer a large
amount of personal information about their owners. For instance, the IP address
can be used to infer a coarse-grained location of the device, the temporary identi-
ﬁers used in cellular networks can be used to track people’s whereabouts and infer
numerous personal details. Similarly, online social networks often force members
to share some personal information with all other users or service providers, de
facto exposing users to unwanted proﬁling by advertisement companies and other
private and state agencies. At each layer of the network stack, there is some in-
formation that can be used to track and proﬁle mobile users; it is therefore crucial
to investigate the privacy challenges present at diﬀerent layers and design privacy
protection mechanisms that work across these layers.
In this thesis, we take a top-down approach on privacy in mobile networks by
(i) studying the issues present in diﬀerent network layers – the application, IP
and link layers – and (ii) by proposing protection mechanisms and quantifying
the extent of private information leakage. First, we look at the application layer,
where we design protocols to protect users’ personal data from third-party entities
and other unauthorized users. In particular, we focus on two relevant problems:
meeting scheduling and optimal meeting location determination. For these two
problems, we propose and evaluate privacy-preserving protocols that are both
practical and more eﬃcient than the existing approaches. Second, we study
the privacy challenges that arise in the network and link layers, by quantifying
the exposure of social community information in a large on-campus experiment.
In addition, we evaluate the eﬀect of the reconstructed community information
on the inference of social ties among the participants to the experiment. For
the ﬁrst time in the same experiment, we compare the reconstruction accuracy
of a realistic eavesdropper, who has only access to packet headers exchanged
among the mobile devices, with that of a malicious application or entity that has
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access to the on-device data. Third, by taking a cross-layer approach, we design
and evaluate a mobile social-networking application that enables users to share
diﬀerent kinds of personal information in a privacy-aware and inobtrusive way.
In particular, we show how existing information-sharing policies are ineﬀective in
correctly predicting users actual sharing behavior; then, based on a probabilistic
decision-making framework, we demonstrate how machine learning can be used to
automatically decide whether and how much to share – based on the users’ context
and past behavior. Our results indicate that the proposed machine-learning-based
approach is more comprehensive and practical than existing automated solutions
and, at the same time, it is more eﬀective than ﬁxed policy-based rules – all while
requiring a minimal eﬀort from the users.
Keywords: Mobile networks, privacy, meeting scheduling, encryption, social com-
munities, decision-making, user-study, machine learning
Riassunto
Entro la ﬁne del 2013, si prevede che il numero di dispositivi mobili connessi
ad Internet sorpassera` il numero di persone. Onnipresenti e sensibili al contesto
dell’utente, i dispositivi mobili permettono alle persone di comunicare e scambiare
dati in qualsiasi momento ed in quasi ogni luogo. La miriade di “impronte digi-
tali” che questi dispositivi lasciano possono essere usati per inferire una grande
quantita` di informazioni personali sui loro proprietari. Ad esempio, l’indirizzo
IP puo` essere utilizzato per dedurre la posizione approssimativa del dispositivo,
l’identiﬁcativo temporaneao impiegato nelle reti di telefonia cellulare puo` venir
sfruttato per tener traccia degli spostamenti delle persone and per inferire nu-
merosi dettagli personali. Analogamente, gli online social networks obbligano
spesso i loro iscritti a condividere alcune informazioni personali con tutti gli altri
membri, esponendo di fatto gli utenti ad analisi comportamentali condotte da
compagnie pubblicitarie ed altre agenzie, sia private che pubbliche. Su ogni layer
dello stack di rete, vi sono delle informazioni che possono venir utilizzate per
tener traccia e fare proﬁling di persone; diventa quindi cruciale l’investigazione
delle sﬁde nell’ambito della privacy su diﬀerenti layers, cos`ı come lo sviluppo di
meccanismi di protezione della privacy che lavorino trasversalmente fra diversi
layers.
Nella presente tesi, viene preso un’approccio top-down rispetto alla privacy
nelle reti mobili. In primo luogo, viene presentato lo studio delle sﬁde presenti su
diversi layers dello stack di rete – link, IP e applicativo. In secondo luogo, vengono
proposti meccanismi di protezione e quantiﬁcata l’estensione della fuga di dati pri-
vati. In primo luogo, ci focalizziamo sul layer applicativo, dove sviluppiamo pro-
tocolli per proteggere i dati personali degli utenti da parti terze e utenti non autor-
izzati. In particolare, ci concentriamo su due problemi rilevanti: pianiﬁcazione di
attivita` e determinazione di una localita` ottimale. Per questi due problemi, pro-
poniamo e esaminiamo protocolli che preservano la privacy e sono sia pratici che
piu` eﬃcienti di soluzioni esistenti. In secondo luogo, proponiamo uno studio sulle
sﬁde della privacy che si manifestano sui layers network e link, dove quantiﬁchi-
amo l’estensione dell’esposizione di informazioni private riguardanti le communita`
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sociali delle persone in un’ampio esperimento condotto sul campus universitario.
In aggiunta, esaminamo l’eﬀetto della ricostruzione delle comunita` sulla capacit di
inferenza del tipo di relazioni sociali fra i partecipanti. Vengono comparati, per la
prima volta nello stesso esperimento, l’accuratezza dell’inferenza eﬀettuata da un
origliatore esterno (il quale non ha accesso ai dati contenuti sul terminale mobile)
con quella di un’applicazione maligna o entita` che ha accesso ai dati presenti sul
terminale. In terzo luogo, basandoci su un’approccio trasversale attraverso diversi
layers, sviluppiamo ed esaminiamo un’applicazione sociale per terminali mobili
che permette agli utenti di condividere informazioni personali in modo rispettoso
della privacy e non intrusivo. In particolare, mostriamo come le regole di con-
divisione esistenti sono ineﬃcienti nel predire correttamente il comportamento
dell’utente quando condivide l’informazione; in seguito, basandoci su una strut-
tura probabilistica decisionale, dimostriamo come il machine-learning puo` essere
utilizzato per decidere in modo automatico se e a che dettaglio l’informazione
verra` condivisa con altri – a seconda del contesto attuale e del comportamento
nel passato. I nostri risultati indicano che il sistema proposto e´ piu` completo e
pratico rispetto a sistemi esistenti ed e´, allo stesso tempo, piu` eﬃcace di sistemi
basati su policies ﬁsse – il tutto richiedendo uno sforzo minimale all’utente.
Parole chiave: Reti mobili, privacy, pianiﬁcazione di attivita`, crittograﬁa, comu-
nita` sociali, presa di decisione, studi con persone, machine learning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The way we connect to the Internet has signiﬁcantly changed in the course of
the last decade. Traditional, desktop-based operating systems such as Microsoft
Windows represented more than 93% of all Internet-connected devices back in
2000, whereas today, they only represent a small fraction (29%)[66]. Mobile ter-
minals, including smartphones and tablets, represent nowadays 66% of the total
number of Internet-connected devices, marking a clear shift from desktop-based
to mobile Internet access with multiple co-existing hardware/software vendors
and ecosystems.
Mobile devices have evolved from simple “wireless telephones” to powerful
computing devices. In addition to basic call and messaging functionality, they
enable users to obtain contextualized services and to share information at an
unprecedented scale; from location-based queries to services based on shared
interests and physical co-presence, mobile devices are now both enablers and
gatekeepers of our digital lives.
The amount and diversity of data stored on mobile devices is rapidly increas-
ing, coming from embedded sensors (such as GPSs, gyroscopes, accelerometers,
barometers, hygrometers, magnetometers and thermometers [137]), wireless inter-
faces (cellular, WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC) and from the users themselves (contacts,
agenda, media). Mobile applications, developed by both device manufacturers
and third-party companies, process large amounts of data in order to present
relevant and timely information to the user [73]. For example, mobile social net-
works may use location data and wireless interfaces in order to infer the type
of place and presence of physically co-located neighbors; similarly, banks and
cashiers may require access to the NFC sensor in order to authorize a transaction
and to verify the identity of the owner.
Although third-party applications need access to certain data, it is extremely
important to limit it to only the information that is strictly necessary for each
1
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application to serve its purpose. Moreover, information needs to be protected
from not only unauthorized access but from abusive (but authorized) access and
proliferation as well. The former being concerned with information security, the
latter point represents a more recent and equally important aspect of personal
life: information privacy. We refer to “abusive” access as any kind of access to
personal information that is authorized but with a diﬀerent purpose or extent
than the one for which it is intended. This deﬁnition is compliant with the
European Data Protection Directive1, where it is stated that (article 6, par. 1,
al. (b) and (c)):
... personal data must be:
b) collected for speciﬁed, explicit and legitimate purposes2 and not
further processed...
c) adequate, relevant and not excessive3 in relation to the purposes
for which they are collected ...
This is in contrast with an “unauthorized” access, which is an access to any
information about the individual for which the entity is not entitled. For example,
an application that provides local weather forecast could be authorized to access
location data at a city-level granularity, only once every two hours but if such an
application accesses continuous location updates – once per minute at street-level
granularity – it may constitute a case of abuse of access to personal information, as
the accessed data is excessive with respect to the purpose. Therefore, it represents
a threat to the privacy and it should not be allowed such an unrestricted access
to personal information.
The combination of multiple types of information with a diverse set of appli-
cations and services makes the mobile device an extremely palatable target for
unscrupulous monitoring, interception, tracking and social analysis [75, 81, 107,
120, 38, 105, 22, 16]. In order to protect the mobile users from attacks on their
privacy, the research community, as well as private companies including Google,
Apple and Microsoft, have been studying approaches and mechanisms that would
limit the access to personal information on mobile devices. The reality, however,
is that most of these mechanisms are either insuﬃcient or lack appropriate ﬁne-
grained functionalities. For instance, the Wall Street Journal [151] found out
that, back in 2010, 55% of the 101 scrutinized applications for Android and iOS
sent out unique phone IDs without the users’ awareness or consent, whereas 47%
sent the users’ locations as well. A year later, Android was again under scrutiny
1Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
31995L0046:en:NOT
2Emphasis added by the author.
3Emphasis added by the author.
3because of alleged violations of users’ privacy due to the usage statistics-collection
software developed by Carrier IQ [150]: The application, transparent and impos-
sible to remove for the users, was recording the keystrokes of the users at all
times, including when they sent messages and typed passwords. A similar dis-
covery on iOS put Apple under close examination for collecting, without users’
knowledge, their whereabouts as a time-stamped record containing the mobile
device’s location coordinates, as well as all the received signal strengths of the
nearby base stations and WiFi access points [7]. These discoveries point out that
attacks on mobile users’ privacy are real and they concern a signiﬁcant fraction
of the available mobile applications. Therefore, it is crucial to enable users to
control and limit, in a more eﬀective way, the information that their devices
are leaking. However, the privacy protection mechanisms should not hinder the
adoption of novel applications and services, as privacy does not constitute a goal
per se but rather a necessity. Hence, these mechanisms should be as transparent
and unobtrusive as possible for the mobile users.
From a broad perspective, studies and mechanisms concerned with privacy
on mobile devices can be described in terms of the following three dimensions:
1. Evaluation of privacy leaks and protection mechanisms: This category en-
compasses studies that either (i) quantify the extent of the exposure of
personal information of mobile users (without taking any action to control
it) or (ii) develop mechanisms that protect the users’ privacy by actively
policing access to information and thus limiting the exposure. An example
of the latter is visible in Android, iOS and Windows Phone, where access to
private information has to be granted by the user, either at the installation
time of the application or when requested for the ﬁrst time.
2. Centralized and distributed mechanisms: This category includes architec-
tural aspects of the privacy mechanisms that involve either a direct, peer-
to-peer communication among mobile devices or a client-server approach
where the devices are coordinated by a central entity that oversees all com-
munications among the devices. For instance, most of the current mobile
social networks and micro-blogging services such as Facebook, Google+ and
Twitter opted for a centralized approach, where the service provider stores
all personal information and allows users to specify criteria-based access
policies.
3. Network layers at which the mechanisms operate: This category comprises
functional aspects of the protection mechanisms that work at either of the
ISO/OSI network layers, in particular the link and network (IP) layers,
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as they are lowest layers that contain personal4 or personally identiﬁable5
information, such as a name, a biometric sample or an IP or MAC address.
The three above-mentioned dimensions cover a large realm of possible research
directions in the ﬁeld of privacy and mobile computing. The aim of this thesis
is, on the one hand, to explore the breadth of the privacy challenge in mobile
networks in diﬀerent yet correlated dimensions. On the other hand, we propose
novel mechanisms that would go in the depth of some speciﬁc problems in order
to minimize the leakage of personal information for the users.
Our studies span the three dimensions described above, including the eval-
uation, the deﬁnition of novel protection mechanisms and the design of system
and network architectures to support them. In addition to the ﬁndings and re-
sults of this thesis, we also consider the experimental validation of the proposed
mechanisms and the real-world evaluation of information leakage as a fundamen-
tal asset. That is why all our results are based on either real deployment and
user-studies of the proposed mechanisms – implemented as prototypes – or make
use of real data from oﬃcial state agencies and repositories.
Contributions
In this thesis, we address both the practical and theoretical aspects of privacy in
mobile networks across the application and network layers of the ISO/OSI stack.
First, we study, develop and evaluate novel, eﬃcient privacy-preserving protocols
for speciﬁc applications present on current mobile devices. Second, we quantify
the leakage of hidden behavioral patterns from co-location information that can
be inferred from the network layer data, such as the membership of individuals
to speciﬁc social communities and the types of relationships among them. Third,
we design and evaluate a novel cross-layer system that assists users while sharing
personal information on mobile devices, by mimicking their own behavior and
minimizing undesired information leakage.
Our main contributions are as follows.
1. On the application layer, we identify two signiﬁcant and recurring chal-
lenges in mobile computing: meeting scheduling and optimal meeting loca-
tion determination. For these two problems, we propose privacy-preserving
protocols that provide strong privacy guarantees while retaining a good
performance in terms of computation time and memory eﬃciency – two
4Article 2, al. a), of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:NOT
5Memorandum M-07-16 of the Executive Oﬃce of The President, Oﬃce of Management
and Budget, May 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/
fy2007/m07-16.pdf
5aspects that are extremely important for resource-constrained mobile de-
vices. In particular, for the meeting scheduling problem, we design three
novel meeting scheduling algorithms that take advantage of the homomor-
phic properties of well-known cryptosystems, in order to privately and ef-
ﬁciently compute common user availabilities. We also formally outline the
privacy requirements in such scheduling applications, and we implement our
solutions on real mobile devices. The experimental measurements and an-
alytic results show that the proposed solutions not only satisfy the privacy
properties but also fare better, in regard to computation and communica-
tion eﬃciency, compared to other well-known solutions. With respect to
the optimal meeting location problem, we propose privacy-preserving algo-
rithms for determining such a location for a group of users. We perform a
thorough privacy evaluation of the proposed approaches, under both pas-
sive and active adversarial models, by formally quantifying privacy-loss in
this setting. Like for the meeting scheduling evaluation, we implement and
experimentally evaluate the proposed protocols. We show that they are
eﬃcient and can be executed with ease by current mobile devices in just
a few seconds. Moreover, the protocols are scalable on the server-side for
multiple concurrent executions.
2. On the network layer, we evaluate the exposure of mobile users to social
community inference attacks, and we quantify the extent of such exposure
by means of a large network deployment on the EPFL campus. During
a four-month trial, 80 participants carried mobile devices and were eaves-
dropped on by an adversarial wireless mesh network on a university campus.
We experimentally evaluate the accuracy of reconstructing the communities
of mobile users by an adversary that owns a set of wireless sniﬃng stations.
In addition to studying the users’ behavior at the community level, we in-
vestigate the susceptibility of their pairwise social relationships to inference
attacks as well. In particular, we show that an external adversary control-
ling a wireless mesh network can reconstruct the social communities better
than an experimenter who has access to co-location data stored on the
mobile devices. Our ﬁndings shed light on the potential threat of mobile
users to unwarranted or unwanted proﬁling from mobile cellular network
operators.
3. Combining both network and application layers, we design and evaluate
a ”smart“ information-sharing system for mobile social networks. In par-
ticular, our machine-learning-based system designed in (i), called SPISM ,
decides in a (semi-)automatic fashion whether to share information (and
the level of detail of the information to be shared) with other users or ser-
vices, based on contextual features and past behavior. The decision-making
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis in terms of the main domains of its chapters.
The black-colored chapters are positioned according to their main contribution,
whereas the grey-colored chapters are placed according to the domains that they
involve.
core is supported by an active learning method that enables SPISM to ei-
ther decide automatically – whenever the conﬁdence in the decision is high
enough – or to rely on the user’s input otherwise. SPISM can work with
any existing (mobile) online social network and can be used transparently
by users, because it can operate at the operating system level, ﬁltering
all requests for personal information and replying according to the user’s
behavior. We show that SPISM signiﬁcantly outperforms both individual
and general user-deﬁned sharing policies, achieving up to 90% of correct
sharing decisions, with only a limited cost for the user in terms of initial
setup, thanks to active learning. Moreover, we provide insight onto the
main reasons behind the sharing decisions, and we show that the type of
the requested information, in addition to the social ties of the requester, is
an inﬂuential feature in the decision process.
Thesis Outline
The structure of the thesis follows the three main contribution areas described
above. Figure 1.1 represents the positioning of the diﬀerent chapters with re-
spect to the dimensions to which they contribute. We introduce the application-
layer protection mechanisms in Part I; in particular, we devote Chapter 2 to the
meeting-scheduling problem and solutions, whereas in Chapter 3 we deﬁne and
present our solutions to the optimal meeting-location problem. In Part II we
7discuss the network-layer aspects of privacy in mobile networks, starting with
the privacy of social communities in Chapter 4 and following with the privacy
of social relationships in Chapter 5. In Part III, we present the cross-layer ap-
proaches for privacy and, in particular, in Chapter 6 we present our adaptive
information-sharing system for mobile social networks.
Publications
Chapter 2 is based on the results presented in [21, 18], whereas Chapter 3 rests
on the results contained in [20, 19]. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 contain the ﬁndings
presented in [22, 17]. Finally, Chapter 6 is based on the results contained in [16].

Part I
Application-Layer Privacy
Protection
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Chapter 2
Privacy-Preserving Meeting
Scheduling
Mobile devices are used increasingly to store and manage users’ personal infor-
mation, as well as to access popular third-party context-based services. Very
often, these applications need to determine common time availabilities among a
set of users, in order to enable colleagues, business partners and people to meet.
As personal and professional time constraints are often considered as private
information, it is crucial to enable users to preserve the privacy of their sched-
ules while they use such applications. In this chapter, we propose practical and
privacy-preserving solutions to the server-based scheduling problem for mobile
devices. In order to privately and eﬃciently compute common user availabilities,
our three novel algorithms take advantage of the homomorphic properties of well-
known cryptosystems. We also formally outline the privacy requirements in such
scheduling applications and we implement our solutions on real mobile devices.
The experimental measurements and analytical results show that the proposed
solutions not only satisfy the privacy properties but also fare better, in regard to
computation and communication eﬃciency, compared to other well-known solu-
tions. Finally, we assess the utility and expectations of the proposed solutions,
in terms of privacy and usability, by means of a targeted survey and user-study
of mobile-phone users.
Chapter Outline In Section 2.1, we introduce the activity scheduling problem and
contrast our approach to existing ones. We then present the system architecture
and problem deﬁnition in Section 2.2. We formalize the privacy requirements
for the scheduling problem in Section 2.3 and outline our algorithms in Section
2.4. We present a comparative analysis and implementation results in Section
11
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2.5, and we summarize the results of our user-study in Section 2.6. We discuss
the extensions of our schemes in Section 2.7, and we present the related work in
Section 2.8. We summarize this chapter in Section 2.9.
2.1 Introduction
Users rely increasingly on mobile devices such as smartphones, netbooks and
lightweight internet tablets to access information while on the move [39], and
very often they use the same equipment to store personal information about
their daily schedules and activities [34]. Although many context and data shar-
ing applications such as Google Maps, Facebook and Twitter are popular, activity
management and synchronization applications are also gaining more and more
attention [74]. Applications such as Microsoft Outlook [110], Apple iCal [5] and
Nokia Ovi [118] are available on mobile devices, and they all oﬀer time and ac-
tivity management services. One desirable feature in such applications is activity
scheduling : Colleagues can schedule meetings at common available time slots;
groups of friends can organize parties on weekends, and people unbeknownst to
each other can engage in dating based on their common free/busy hours.
One concern in such scheduling applications is that often users prefer not to
share all personal information with everyone. For example, they may only want
to share common availabilities, but not details about other records. They may
also have reservations about sharing personal information with third-party service
providers. Therefore, privacy of personal information, vis-a`-vis service providers
and peers, is paramount to the success of such scheduling applications. For
instance, a well-known service that allows users to ﬁnd all common availabilities
is Doodle [45]. However, Doodle does not provide privacy: Each user and the
doodle server see the free/busy state of all the users, and the private information
that is leaked to all users and the central server is well beyond just the common
available slots. Cultural, religious and many other private information can be
easily inferred from availability patterns. Even if pseudonyms are used instead
of real names, the server and all peers still know what time slots are available for
everyone and how many users are free or busy.
Privacy-preserving scheduling problems have been extensively studied in the
past by researchers from the theoretical perspective, for instance, by modelling
them as set-intersection problems [93, 41], distributed constraint-satisfaction prob-
lems [155, 158, 143, 142], secure multi-party computation problems [79, 46] and
by framing them in the e-voting context [92]. Traditionally, there are two possi-
ble approaches to scheduling problems: distributed and centralized. Distributed
solutions do not rely on a third-party provider (thus they prevent information
from being revealed to the provider), but have several limitations. For instance,
due to the frequent and intensive message exchanges among peers, scalability
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and computational complexity is an issue when dealing with a large number of
(resource-limited) mobile devices; moreover, the need for sequencing among peers
and the unpredictability of scheduling results (if a user interrupts the protocol)
are two additional drawbacks. The centralized approaches, such as cloud-based
computing, are better in terms of scalability, communication cost, complexity,
synchronization and resilience but usually do not provide privacy, because users
are required to transmit their personal information to the provider.
We provide simple, practical and feasible solutions to the scheduling problem
which, in addition to ensuring reasonable privacy guarantees, are easily inte-
grated with existing operational models and mobile service providers. In this
chapter, we follow a centralized approach for addressing the problem of eﬃcient
and privacy-preserving scheduling. In the proposed schemes, users are able to de-
termine common time slots, without revealing any other information to either the
other participants or to the central scheduling server. By building on other works
in related domains, we formally deﬁne the basic privacy requirements for users in
a scheduling scenario. We then propose three novel privacy-preserving schedul-
ing algorithms that take advantage of the homomorphic properties of asymmetric
cryptosystems. We implement the proposed algorithms on a test-bed of Nokia
mobile devices and perform extensive experiments in order to verify their com-
putation and communication overhead. Moreover, we explain how the system
can be further made resilient to collusion and other well-known active attacks.
Finally, we present the modalities and results of a targeted user-study on mobile-
phone users, focused on both privacy and usability aspects of our applications.
To the best of our knowledge, we believe this is the ﬁrst implementation and
extensive testing of privacy-preserving scheduling schemes on commercial mobile
devices.
2.2 System Architecture
In this section, we outline the network and adversary model and formally deﬁne
the scheduling problem.
2.2.1 Network Model
We assume that there is a total of N users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, that want to schedule
an activity (meeting, party) at a common available time slot. Each user has a
private schedule xi represented by a string of bits xi = [bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,m], where
each bit bi,j ∈ {0, 1} expresses the availability of user ui in a particular time slot
j; bi,j = 1 means that user ui is available at time slot j, whereas bi,j = 0 means
that the user is not available.1 We assume that the length m of xi, i.e. the time
1In general, however, users may assign not only a binary value (available or busy) for each
time slot, but they could express preferences [50, 59]. For example, bi,j ∈ 0, . . . , 10 where bi,j = 0
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horizon of the individual schedules, is constant for all users. The value of m can
either be pre-decided by the participants or ﬁxed by the application.
Moreover, we assume that each user’s device is able to perform public key
cryptographic operations and that there is a semi-honest [67] (as detailed in Sec-
tion 2.2.2) third-party performing the scheduling computations. The latter must
be able to communicate with the users and run public key cryptographic functions
as well. For instance, a common public-key infrastructure using the RSA [134]
cryptosystem could be employed. All communications between a user and the
third-party server will be encrypted with the latter’s public key for the purposes
of conﬁdentiality of the schedules with respect to other users, for authentication
and integrity protection. Thus, all users know the public key of the server but
nobody, except the server, knows the corresponding private key. For simplic-
ity of exposition, in our algorithms we do not explicitly show the cryptographic
operations involving the server’s public/private key.
We assume that the N users share a common secret, which is used to derive
(i) a fresh common key pair (KP ,Ks), where Kp is the public key and Ks is
the private key, and (ii) a fresh bit permutation function σ = [σ1, . . . , σm] before
initiating the scheduling operation. This could be achieved, for example, through
a secure credential establishment protocol [29, 32, 101]. Thus, these keys and
permutations are derived and known to each member of the group but not to the
server. We refer to the encryption of a message M with the group public key as
EKP ,r(M) = C, where r is a random integer that is eventually needed, and to
the decryption of the encrypted message C as DKs(C) = M . The permutation
σ, although not strictly required, is used in order to randomize the order of bits
sent to the server. This prevents the server from gaining any knowledge about
which time slot is being evaluated in each computation.
2.2.2 Adversarial Model
Server The third-party server is assumed to execute the scheduling protocols
correctly, but it tries to learn any information it can from the input it gets by the
users and the computations it performs. The server can accumulate the knowl-
edge about users in each computation it performs. We refer to this adversarial
behavior as semi-honest. In most practical settings, where service providers have
a commercial interest in providing a faithful service to their customers, the as-
sumption of a semi-honest server is generally suﬃcient. More details about the
semi-honest model can be found in [67].
means that user ui is busy in the time slot j, whereas its preference would increase if bi,j ≥ 1.
For simplicity of exposition, we assume a binary value here. We later discuss a more general
case with non-binary costs in Section 2.7.
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Inverse 
function f--1
Common 
schedule 
availabilities Y
A(f(x1),..f(xN))
Figure 2.1: Functional diagram of the privacy-preserving activity scheduling
(PPAS) protocol, where each user sends his own transformed schedule availabili-
ties to the scheduling server and obtains the aggregate availabilities. The schedul-
ing server obliviously performs the aggregated availabilities, without knowing the
individual user schedules.
Users Users also want to learn private information about other users’ schedules
and, in addition to the passive eavesdropping attacks, users could act maliciously
by generating fake users, manipulating their own schedules or by colluding with
other users or the scheduling server. Initially, we assume that users are honest but
curious (or semi-honest), and afterwards we present more active (or malicious)
types of user adversaries in Section 2.7.2.
Although, as mentioned, the semi-honest adversarial model is suﬃcient in
most practical settings, considering the commercial interest of service providers
and the mutual trust among participants, it does not include possible malicious
behavior by the server or users. For instance, the server could collude with the
participants or generate fake participants in order to obtain private information
of the participants. Similarly, users might collude with other users or try to mali-
ciously modify their schedules in order to disrupt the execution of the protocol or
to gain information about other users’ schedules. We address such active attacks
by both users and server in Section 2.7.2, and we describe how such attacks can
be thwarted by using existing cryptographic mechanisms.
2.2.3 Centralized Scheduling Algorithm
Given a group of N users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, each with private schedules xi =
[bi,1, . . . , bi,m], the scheduling problem is to ﬁnd time slots j such that ∀i = 1 . . . N ,
bi,j = 1, i.e. all users are available in the same time slot j. We refer to an
algorithm that solves the scheduling problem as a scheduling algorithm. Figure 2.1
shows a functional diagram of a generic privacy-preserving scheduling protocol,
where the scheduling algorithm A is executed by a server. Formally, a scheduling
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Figure 2.2: A generic scheduling protocol. Users ﬁrst send their transformed
schedules fi to the server, which then performs the scheduling algorithm A on
the received data and sends the encrypted output f(Y ) back to each user.
algorithm A accepts the following inputs and produces the respective outputs:
• Input: a transformation of individual schedules
f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m), ∀i = 1 . . . N.
where f is a one-way public transformation function (based on secret key)
such that it is hard (success with only a negligible probability) to determine
the input of the function without knowing the secret key, just by observing
the output.
• Output: a function f(Y ), Y = y1, . . . , yj , . . . , ym where:
yj =
{
Y ES if bi,j = 1, ∀i = 1 . . . N
NO otherwise
such that each user is able to compute Y = f−1(f(Y )) using its local data. As
we will see later on, we use the well-known cryptosytems ElGamal [49], Paillier
[124] and Goldwasser-Micali [69] as our transformation and output functions f .
A centralized scheduling process works as follows. Each user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}
computes fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) and sends it to the third-party server, which then
executes the scheduling algorithm A on the received inputs fi, ∀i, and produces
f(Y ) = A(f1, . . . , fN ). Finally, the server sends f(Y ) to each user who then
obtains Y = f−1(f(Y )). Figure 2.2 shows one execution of such a generic cen-
tralized scheduling process.
2.3 Privacy Deﬁnitions
As mentioned earlier, in this chapter we follow a centralized approach to solve
the privacy-preserving scheduling problem. In other words, we assume that a
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Table 2.1: Table of symbols.
SYMBOL DEFINITION 
( )LNKAdv A  Linkability advantage 
( )IDTAdv A  Identifiability advantage 
D (C) Decryption of a ciphertext C 
EK,r (m) 
Encryption of a message m using the key K and 
a random number r 
KP Shared public key of the N users 
KS Shared private key of the N users 
m Number of slots of each individual schedule 
N Number of users 
xi=[bi,1,..,bi,m] 
Schedule of user ui, where bi,j is the availability 
at time slot j 
1[ ,.. ], m? ? ??  Schedule permutation function 
third-party, given users’ individual private schedules, computes their common
availabilities (time slots). The privacy provided by a centralized scheduling algo-
rithm can be deﬁned in terms of the following two components: a) User-privacy
and b) Server-privacy. Hereafter, we formally deﬁne each of these components.
The symbols used throughout the chapter are summarized in Table 2.1.
User-privacy
The user-privacy of any centralized scheduling algorithm A measures the proba-
bilistic advantage that any user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N} gains towards learning the private
schedules of at least one other user uj , j = i, except their common availabilities,
after all users have participated in the execution of the algorithm A. In order to
accurately measure users’ privacy, we need to compute the following two advan-
tages. First, we measure the Identiﬁability Advantage, which is the probabilistic
advantage of an adversary in correctly guessing a schedule bit (which is not a
common availability) of any other user. We denote it as AdvIDTui (A). Second,
we measure the Linkability Advantage, which is the probabilistic advantage of an
adversary in correctly guessing that any two or more other users have exactly the
same corresponding schedule bit (not a common availability bit) without neces-
sarily knowing the values of those bits. We denote this advantage as AdvLNKui (A).
We make the following straightforward observation.
Observation 1. If an adversary has identiﬁability advantage over two corre-
sponding schedule bits of two diﬀerent users, this implies that it has linkability
advantage over those two bits as well. However, the inverse is not necessarily
true.
We semantically deﬁne the identiﬁability and linkability advantages using
a challenge-response methodology. Challenge-response games have been widely
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used in cryptography to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. We now de-
scribe such a challenge-response game for the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTui (A)
of any user ui participating in the algorithm A as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and fi =
f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Challenger computes f(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN ) with the users
and sends f(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Challenger randomly picks a user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, as the adversary.
4. ui picks j ∈ {1 . . . N}, s.t. j = i and sends it to the challenger.
5. Challenge: the challenger picks a random time slot p ∈ {1 . . .m}, s.t., ∃bk,p =
0 for at least one k ∈ 1, . . . , N . Challenger then sends (j, p) to the user ui.
This is the challenge.
6. Guess: User ui sends b
′
j,p ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger as a response to his
challenge. If b′j,p = bj,p, the user ui (adversary) wins; otherwise, he loses.
The identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTui (A) can be deﬁned as
AdvIDTui (A) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [b′j,p = bj,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣ (2.1)
where Prui [b
′
j,p = bj,p] is the probability of user ui winning the game (correctly
answering the challenge in the challenge-response game), computed over the coin
ﬂips of the challenger, b′j,p is ui’s guess about the schedule of user uj in the time
slot p and bj,p is uj ’s true availability. We note that Eq. 2.1 deﬁnes the probabilis-
tic advantage of ua in a single execution of the challenger-adversary game, and
therefore it does not capture the additional knowledge that could be gained by
repeated executions of the same game with diﬀerent subsets of the participants.
This assumption is formalized in Deﬁnition 2.4. An external attacker, having no
access to the output of the algorithm, has obviously no advantage at all. Thus,
we focus on the non-trivial case with participating users only.
Similarly, we describe the challenge-response game for the linkability advan-
tage AdvLNKui (A) of any user ui as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and fi =
f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Challenger computes f(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN ) with the users
and sends f(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Challenger randomly picks a user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, as the adversary.
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4. ui picks h, j ∈ {1 . . . N}, s.t. j = h, j = i, h = i and sends (h, j) to the
challenger.
5. Challenge: Challenger randomly picks a time slot p ∈ {1 . . .m}, s.t., ∃bk,p =
0 for at least one k ∈ 1, . . . , N . Challenger then sends (j, p) and (h, p) to
the user ui. This is the challenge.
6. Guess: User ui decides if bj,p = bh,p or not. User ui sets b
′ = 1 if he decides
bj,p = bh,p and b
′ = 0 if he decides bj,p = bh,p. User ui sends b′ to the
challenger as a response to his challenge. If bj,p = bh,p and b
′ = 1 or if
bj,p = bh,p and b′ = 0, the user ui (adversary) wins; otherwise, he loses.
The linkability advantage AdvLNKui (A) can be deﬁned as
AdvLNKui (A) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [((bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1) ∨ ((bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
where Prui [.] is the probability of user ui winning the game, computed over
the coin ﬂips of the challenger. As for the identiﬁability advantage, an external
attacker has no linkability advantage at all.
We now deﬁne the user-privacy of the scheduling algorithm A on a per-
execution basis as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1. An execution of the centralized scheduling algorithm A is user-
private if both the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTui (A) and the linkability advan-
tage AdvLNKui (A) of each participating user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is negligible.
A function f(x) is called negligible if, for any positive polynomial p(x), there
is an integer B such that for any integer x > B, f(x) < 1/p(x) [67].
Deﬁnition 2.1 says that a particular execution of the scheduling algorithm is
user-private if and only if users do not gain any (actually, negligible) additional
knowledge about the schedule bits of any other user, except the schedule bits
that have a value 1 for all users (common availabilities).
Server-privacy
The server-privacy of any (centralized) scheduling algorithm A measures the
probabilistic advantage that the server (which executes the scheduling algorithm
A and observes the inputs from the users) gains towards learning the private
schedules of at least one user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}. As in the case of user-privacy, we
need to compute the following two advantages. First, the advantage of the server
in guessing correctly any schedule bit of any user participating in the scheduling
algorithm, called as Identiﬁability Advantage and denoted as AdvIDTS (A). Sec-
ond, the advantage of the server in guessing correctly that any two (or more)
participating users have exactly the same corresponding schedule bits without
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necessarily knowing the values of those bits, called the Linkability Advantage and
denoted as AdvLNKS (A).
The server identiﬁability and linkability advantages are deﬁned in a similar
fashion as the user advantages. The challenge-response game for the server iden-
tiﬁability advantage AdvIDTS (A) is deﬁned as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and the
server privately collects fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Server computes f(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN ) with the users and
sends f(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Server picks i ∈ {1 . . . N} and sends it to the challenger.
4. Challenge: Challenger randomly picks a time slot p ∈ {1 . . .m}. Challenger
then sends (i, p) to the server. This is the challenge.
5. Guess: server sends b′i,p ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger as a response to his
challenge. If b′i,p = bi,p, the server (adversary) wins; otherwise, he loses.
The identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTS (A) is deﬁned as
AdvIDTS (A) =
∣∣∣∣PrS [b′j,p = bj,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣ (2.2)
where PrS [b
′
j,p = bj,p] is the probability of the server winning the game, computed
over the coin ﬂips of the challenger.
The challenge-response game for the server linkability advantage AdvLNKS (A)
is deﬁned as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and the
server privately collects fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Server computes f(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN ) with the users and
sends f(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Server picks h, j ∈ {1 . . . N}, s.t. j = h and sends (h, j) to the challenger.
4. Challenge: Challenger randomly picks p ∈ {1 . . .m} and then sends (j, p)
and (h, p) to the server. This is the challenge.
5. Guess: Server decides if bj,p = bh,p or not. Server sets b
′ = 1 if he decides
bj,p = bh,p and b
′ = 0 if he decides bj,p = bh,p. Server sends b′ to the
challenger as a response to his challenge. If bj,p = bh,p and b
′ = 1 or if
bj,p = bh,p and b′ = 0, the server (adversary) wins; otherwise, he loses.
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The linkability advantage AdvLNKS (A) is deﬁned as
AdvLNKS (A) =
∣∣∣∣PrS [(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1) ∨ (bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
where PrS [.] is the probability of the server winning the game, computed over
the coin ﬂips of the challenger.
The server-privacy of the scheduling algorithm A on a per-execution basis can
then be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.2. An execution of the centralized scheduling algorithm A is server-
private if both the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTS (A) and the linkability advan-
tage AdvLNKS (A) of the server is negligible.
Now, it is reasonable to assume that in practice users will be able to perform
multiple executions of the scheduling algorithm with possibly diﬀerent partici-
pating sets of users. This is especially true if such an algorithm is oﬀered, for
example, as a service by mobile service providers to their subscribers. Thus,
privacy of the scheduling algorithm should be deﬁned over multiple executions.
First, we deﬁne a private execution as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.3. A private execution is an execution which does not reveal more
information than what can be derived from its result and the prior knowledge.
Based on how memory is retained over sequential executions, we deﬁne two
types of algorithm executions, namely, independent and dependent:
Deﬁnition 2.4. An independent (respectively, dependent) execution is a single
private execution of the scheduling algorithm deﬁned in Section 2.2.3 in which no
(respectively, some) information of an earlier and current execution is retained
and passed to a future execution.
The information retained can include past inputs to the algorithm, interme-
diate results (on the server) and the outputs of the algorithm. Based on the type
of executions, we deﬁne a privacy-preserving scheduling algorithm as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.5. A scheduling algorithm A is execution (respectively fully) privacy-
preserving if and only if for every independent (respectively all) execution(s):
1. A is correct; All users are correctly able to compute yj = 1, ∀j = 1 . . .m if
and only if bi,j = 1, ∀i = 1 . . . N .
2. A is user-private in every execution.
3. A is server-private in every execution.
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A fully privacy-preserving algorithm is a much stronger (and diﬃcult to
achieve) privacy requirement. In this work, similar to earlier eﬀorts, we focus
on achieving execution privacy. The following observation gives the relationship
between fully privacy-preserving and execution privacy-preserving scheduling al-
gorithms.
Observation 2. Any scheduling algorithm A, as deﬁned in Section 2.2.3, is
execution privacy-preserving if it is fully privacy-preserving. However, the inverse
is not true.
Next, we outline our centralized scheduling algorithms.
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Figure 2.3: SchedElg protocol.
2.4 Privacy-Preserving Scheduling Algorithms
In this section, we present our three privacy-preserving scheduling algorithms.
For each algorithm, we ﬁrst outline the basic cryptographic properties that are
used, and then we describe and show their operational mechanisms in detail. We
ﬁnally state the privacy guarantees provided by each of the algorithms.
2.4.1 SchedElG
Our ﬁrst privacy-preserving centralized scheduling scheme is based on the El-
Gamal [49] cryptosystem. The security of the ElGamal encryption relies on the
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), which assumes that it
is computationally infeasible to obtain the private key Ks given the public key
(g, h), where g is a generator of a multiplicative cyclic group G of prime order q
and h = gKs mod q.
Our protocol SchedElG uses the homomorphic property of the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem in order to allow the scheduling server to compute the aggregated avail-
abilities by working only on the encrypted individual schedules. For instance, it
can be veriﬁed that the ElGamal scheme satisﬁes:
D(EKP ,r1(m1) · EKP ,r2(m2)) = D((gr1 ,m1hr1) · (gr2 ,m2hr2)) = D(gr, (m1 ·m2)hr)
= m1 ·m2
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where r = r1 + r2 ∈ Zq is a random integer. Moreover, being a probabilistic
encryption scheme, it follows that if r1 = r2, EKP ,r1(m) = EKP ,r2(m).
For the SchedElG algorithm, we assume that the meeting participants rep-
resent their availabilities in the following way: b∗i,j = 1 if bi,j = 1, but b
∗
i,j = R
(where R ∈ Zq, R > 1 is a random integer) if bi,j = 0.
Scheme
The privacy-preserving scheduling protocol SchedElG is shown in Figure 2.3.
All users ﬁrst select the sequence of time slots according to the permutation σ,
i.e., σj , ∀j = 1..m, and then encrypt individually the corresponding schedule
availabilities, i.e., Ei = [Ei,σ1 , . . . , Ei,σm ] where Ei,σj = EKP ,ri,j (b
∗
i,σj
). Then,
each user sends its Ei privately to the scheduling server that performs the mul-
tiplication
∏N
i=1Ei,σj of all users’ encrypted schedules Ei,σj , for j = 1, . . . ,m.
The results of such operation are the (encrypted) aggregated availabilities of
all users for each time slot j. Next, the server replies with the aggregated en-
crypted result Esched back to each user. Each slot in Esched contains a product
of the individual time-slot bits encrypted with the users’ common session key.
Finally, each user decrypts the result and obtains the aggregated availabilities
[y1 = B∗σ1 , . . . , y
m = B∗σm ] of all users ui for each time slot σj . If B
∗
σj = 1, it
means that all users are available at time slot σj ; if B
∗
σj > 1, then at least one
user is not available and therefore σj is not a suitable time slot. The following
result shows the correctness and privacy properties of SchedElG.
Lemma 2.1. The protocol SchedElG is correct and execution privacy-preserving.
Proof. Correctness From Section 2.2.3, we know that any scheduling algo-
rithm should output f(Y ), on inputs f1, f2, . . . , fN , where fi = f(b1,1, . . . , bi,m),
such that each user is able to privately compute Y = f−1(f(Y )), where Y =
y1, . . . , yj , . . . , ym. The output bit yj , ∀j should be such that it should take some
value v if and only if all users are available. Otherwise, the output bit yj never
takes value v and should take some other value, indicating that at least one user
is not available. From Figure 2.3, we can see that, provided the homomorphic
properties of the ElGamal cryptosystem are correct, we have that (with over-
whelming probability) yj = 1 if and only if bi,j = 1, ∀i, i.e., all users are available.
Otherwise we have yj = R, where R > 1 is some random number. Thus, SchedElg
is correct.
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Privacy
In order to be user-private, the identiﬁability and linkability advantages deﬁned
in Section 2.2 must be a negligible function. Formally, we need that
AdvIDTui (SchedElG) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [b′j,p = bj,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣ < 1p(N)
AdvLNKui (SchedElG) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1) ∨ (bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
<
1
p(N)
where Prui [b
′
j,p = bj,p] and Prui [(bj,p = bh,p)∧ b′ = 1)∨ (bj,p = bh,p)∧ b′ = 0)] are
the probabilities of a user ui winning the challenge-response games, and p(N) is
any positive polynomial function of N . Without loss of generality, we assume that
the Challenger chooses user u1 as the Adversary. Moreover, as the computation
of the availabilities for all time slots are identical, we provide the proof for one
time slot p only.
Hereafter we provide the privacy proofs for both client- and server-privacy,
by computing the respective identiﬁability and linkability advantages.
• User identiﬁability advantage
After Step 4 of the challenger-response game, u1 knows (i) its own schedule
bit b1,p and (ii) the non-trivial result of the algorithm B
∗
p = b
∗
1,p · . . . · b∗N,p >
1, i.e. there is at least one user that is not available in the time slot p.
Therefore, the identiﬁability advantage becomes
AdvIDTui (SchedElG) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [b′j,p = bj,p|B∗p > 1, b1,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣
where
Prui [b
′
j,p = bj,p|B∗p > 1, b1,p]
=
1∑
k=0
Pr(b′j,p = bj,p|B∗p > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(b1,p = k|B∗p > 1)
=
1∑
k=0
1∑
z=0
Pr(b′j,p = z ∧ bj,p = z|B∗p > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(b1,p = k|B∗p > 1)
=
1∑
k=0
1∑
z=0
Pr(b′j,p = z|B∗p > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(bj,p = z|B∗p > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(b1,p = k|B∗p > 1)
Given that the Challenger chooses a time slot p where ∃bq,p = 0, q ∈
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{1, . . . , N}, we have
Pr(b′j,p = 0|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 0) = Pr(b′j,p = 1|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 0) = 1/2
Pr(bj,p = 0|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 0) = Pr(bj,p = 1|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 0) = 1/2
Pr(b′j,p = 0|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 1) = Pr(bj,p = 0|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 1)
=
∑N−1
m=1 C
N−1
m ·m
(2N−1 − 1) · (N − 1) =
2N−2
2N−1 − 1
Pr(b′j,p = 1|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 1) = Pr(bj,p = 1|B∗p > 1, b1,p = 1)
=
∑N−2
m=1 C
N−1
m ·m
(2N−1 − 1) · (N − 1) =
2N−2 − 1
2N−1 − 1
which implies
Prui [b
′
j,p = bj,p|B∗p > 1, b1,j ] =
a
2
+ (1− a) · 2
2(N−2) + (2N−2 − 1)2
(2N−1 − 1)2
where a = Pr(b1,p = 0|B∗p > 1). By including this result, we have that
AdvIDTui (SchedElG,N) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a
2
+ (1− a) · 2
2(N−2) + (2N−2 − 1)2
(2N−1 − 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
−1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where
γ =
22N−4 + 22N−4 − 2 · 2N−2 + 1
2N−2 − 2 · 2N−1 + 1 =
22N−3 − 2N−1 + 1
22N−2 − 2N + 1
=
(22N−2 − 2N + 1) + 1
2 · (22N−2 − 2N + 1) =
1
2
+
1
2(22N−2 − 2N + 1)
By combining the previous expressions, we obtain
AdvIDTui (SchedElG,N) =
∣∣∣∣a2 + (1− a) · γ − 12
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ 1− a22N−1 − 2N+1 + 2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 1− a2N+1(2N−2 − 1) + 2
∣∣∣∣ ∀N>2< 12N
which holds ∀0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Therefore AdvIDTui (SchedElG,N) is a negligible
function of the number of participants N , as it approaches zero faster than
the reciprocal of any polynomial, for large enough N [11].
• User linkability advantage
By deﬁnition we have
AdvLNKui (SchedElG)
=
∣∣∣∣Prui [(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1) ∨ (bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)|B∗p > 1, b1,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣
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From the above, we obtain
Prui [(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1) ∨ (bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)|B∗p > 1, b1,p] =
1∑
k=0
Pr[(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1|B∗p > 1, b1,p = k)] · Pr(b1,p = k|B∗p > 1)+
1∑
k=0
Pr[(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0|B∗p > 1, b1,p = k)] · Pr(b1,p = k|B∗p > 1)
which implies
Prui [(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1) ∨ (bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)|B∗p > 1, b1,p] =
a
2
+ (1− a) ·
⎧⎨
⎩
[(
2N−2
2N−1 − 1
)2
+
2N−3 − 1
2N−2
· 2
N−2 − 1
2N−1 − 1
]2
+
[
1
4
+
1
2
2N−2 − 1
2N−1 − 1
]2⎫⎬
⎭
where a = Pr(b1,p = 0|B∗p > 1). Similarly to the identiﬁability advantage,
it can be shown that AdvLNKui (SchedElG,N) is a negligible function of the
number of participantsN . As both identiﬁability and linkability advantages
are negligible functions (in the number of participantsN), SchedElG is user-
private.
• Server advantages
The server that is performing the computations on the encrypted sched-
ules does not know any user’s schedule bit, as all schedules have been en-
crypted by the users prior to being sent to the server with the users’ shared
public key, and only they know the corresponding private key. Therefore,
AdvIDTS (SchedElG) = Adv
LNK
S (SchedElG) = 0, i.e. SchedElG is server-
private. 
For illustration purposes, in Figure 2.4 we plotted the identiﬁability and link-
ability advantages of an adversary for SchedElg, compared with polynomially
(in terms of the number of participants N) decreasing functions 1/p(N). As
conﬁrmed by our analysis, the plot shows that both identiﬁability and linkabil-
ity advantages are lower than the considered polynomials 1/p(N), for the given
values of N .
2.4.2 SchedPa Algorithm
In this section, we deﬁne our second privacy-preserving scheduling scheme, which
is based on the Paillier cryptosystem [124]. The security of the Paillier encryption
scheme is based on the intractability of determining whether an integer r is an
n-residue mod n2, where n is a composite number. In our protocol, we use the
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Figure 2.4: Identiﬁability and linkability advantages of an adversary.
homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem to compute in a privacy-
preserving fashion the availability of all users involved in the scheduling process.
In particular, one can verify that the Paillier scheme satisﬁes the following:
D[EKP ,r1(m1) · EKP ,r1(m2) mod n2] = m1 +m2 mod n
D[EKP ,r(m1)
m2 mod n2] = m1 ·m2 mod n
where ri, r ∈ Z∗n are random numbers chosen by the encrypters, m ∈ Zn is the
message to encrypt and n = pq where p, q are two large primes. The randomness
in the encryption ensures that if r1 = r2, EKP ,r1(m) = EKP ,r2(m).
To adapt our scheme to the addition property of Paillier’s homomorphism,
we take the bit value bi,j in the computation instead of the original bit value bi,j
as follows: bi,j = 0 if bi,j = 1, and bi,j = r (where r ∈ Z∗n, r > 1 is a random
integer) if bi,j = 0.
Scheme
The corresponding privacy-preserving scheduling protocol is shown in Figure 2.5.
First, all users select the sequence of time slots according to the permutation σ,
i.e., σj , ∀j = 1, . . . ,m, and then encrypt individually the corresponding avail-
abilities, i.e. Ei = [Ei,σ1 , . . . , Ei,σm ] where Ei,σj = EKP ,ri,j (bi,σj ). Then, each
user sends its Ei privately to the scheduling server that performs the multiplica-
tion and exponentiation (
∏N
i=1Ei,σj )
R of all users’ encrypted schedules Ei,σj , for
j = 1, . . . ,m, in order to obtain the encryption of the value Vσj that is needed by
the users. Afterwards, the server sends the aggregated encrypted result Esched
back to each user. Each slot in Esched contains a randomly scaled sum of the
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Figure 2.5: SchedPa protocol.
individual time-slot bits bi,σj encrypted with the users’ common session key. Fi-
nally, each user decrypts the result and knows that if Vσj = 0, the time slot σj
is available for everybody. If Vσj > 1, then at least one user is not available.
Note that even if the server chooses R = 1, the privacy of the users is preserved
with bi,j . The following result shows the correctness and privacy properties of
SchedPa.
Lemma 2.2. The protocol SchedPa is correct and execution privacy-preserving.
Proof. Correctness From Section 2.2.3, we know that any scheduling algo-
rithm should output f(Y ), on inputs f1, f2, . . . , fN , where fi = f(b1,1, . . . , bi,m),
such that each user is able to privately compute Y = f−1(f(Y )), where Y =
y1, . . . , yj , . . . , ym. The output bit yj , ∀j should be such that it should take some
value v if and only if all users are available. Otherwise, the output bit yj never
takes value v and should take some other value, indicating that at least one user
is not available. From Figure 2.3, we can see that, provided the homomorphic
properties of the Paillier cryptosystem are correct, we have that (with overwhelm-
ing probability) yj = 0 if and only if bi,j = 1, ∀i, i.e., all users are available. The
value of yj = R, where R > 1 is some random number, otherwise. Thus, SchedPa
is correct.
Privacy
Hereafter we present the privacy proofs, both for user- and server-privacy.
• User advantages
The knowledge that any user ui has in the SchedPa game is the same as
in SchedElG. In particular, ui knows that Vp = R ·
∑N
k=1 bk,p > 0 and
therefore it knows that there is at least one user uk, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} that
is not available in the time slot p. Moreover, each user ui knows its own
schedule bi,p. As a consequence, Adv
IDT
ui (SchedPa) = Adv
IDT
ui (SchedElG)
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and AdvLNKui (SchedPa) = Adv
LNK
ui (SchedElG) and therefore SchedPa is
user-private.
• Server advantages
As in the SchedElG algorithm, the server performing the SchedPa algorithm
does not have access to any schedule bit and therefore SchedPa is server-
private. 
2.4.3 SchedGM Algorithm
In this section, we present our third privacy-preserving scheduling algorithm,
which is based on the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptographic scheme [69]. The
security of the GM encryption relies on the intractability of the quadratic resid-
uosity problem, i.e. on the infeasibility of determining whether or not an integer
r is a quadratic residue mod n when the Jacobi symbol for r is 1, given n = pq
where p, q are large primes. SchedGM makes use of the following homomorphic
property of the GM cryptosystem:
D[EKP ,r1(m1) · EKP ,r2(m2)] = m1 m2
The intuition behind the protocol is based on the work by Herlea et al. [79], in
which users privately establish a global bit mask (unknown to any user) and then
compare all the masked availabilities without knowing the true bit value bi,σj of
the other users. If all users have the same masked bit value for a given time slot
σj , then each user knows that everybody else has the same availability, which can
be inferred by looking at the private unmasked bit value bi,σj . Although initially
used in a distributed scenario, we extend the general idea to the centralized
scheme as well.
Assumption
Each user ui generates a private random bit mask si = [ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,m], ci,j ∈
{0, 1}, of the same length of the schedule xi.
Scheme
The privacy-preserving scheduling algorithm is shown in Figure 2.6. Each user
ﬁrst selects the sequence of time slots according to the permutation σ, i.e., σj ,
∀j = 1, . . . ,m, and then masks the corresponding schedule bits, i.e. bi,σj =
bi,σj  ci,j . Then, each user encrypts individually both its bit mask, i.e. E
c
i =
[EKP ,ri,1(ci,1), . . . , EKP ,ri,m(ci,m), and the masked availabilities, i.e. Ei = [Ei,σ1 , . . . , Ei,σm ],
where Ei,σj = EKP ,ri,j (b

i,σj
). Afterwards, each user ui sends its Ei and E
c
i to the
server, which computes the multiplication of the received Ei,σj with the encrypted
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Figure 2.6: SchedGM protocol.
masks of all other users uk, ∀k = i, obtaining Ei,σj = Ei,σj ·
∏
k =iEKP (ck,j),
∀i ∈ 1, . . . , N and ∀j = 1, . . . ,m. Afterwards, the server sends all individual
schedules, masked by a global mask c1,j  . . .  cN,j , to each user in a random
order. As a result, a user will not know his own schedule (masked with the global
mask), otherwise he would be able to determine the global mask. Finally, each
user decrypts the received messages and compares all masked individual sched-
ules. If for a given time slot σj they all have the same value, then each user ui
can infer whether the time slot σj is available by looking at its own schedule bi,σj .
The following result shows the correctness and privacy properties of SchedGM.
Lemma 2.3. The protocol SchedGM is correct and server-private.
Proof. Correctness From Section 2.2.3, we know that any scheduling algo-
rithm should output f(Y ), on inputs f1, f2, . . . , fN , where fi = f(b1,1, . . . , bi,m),
such that each user is able to privately compute Y = f−1(f(Y )), where Y =
y1, . . . , yj , . . . , ym. The output bit yj , ∀j should be such that it should take (with
overwhelming probability) some value v if and only if all users are available. Oth-
erwise, the output bit yj never takes value v and should take some other value,
indicating that at least one user is not available. In the case of SchedGM, each
f(yj) (output by the server) consists of N diﬀerent bits, one for each user, where
each bit is the corresponding bi,j (schedule bit j of user ui) masked by a global
mask. From Figure 2.6, we can see that yj = ”Y ES”, for a particular user ui,
if and only if all of the N bits in f(yj) are equal and bi,j = 1 (user ui is avail-
able), and yj = ”NO” otherwise. It is straightforward to see that all N bits in
f(yj) will be equal only in two cases: 1) bi,j = 1, ∀i (all users are available) or 2)
bi,j = 0, ∀i (all users are not available). Thus, yj = ”Y ES” if and only if all users
are available and yj = ”NO” for any other case. Thus, SchedGM is correct.
Privacy
Hereafter we present the privacy proofs, both for user- and server-privacy.
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• User identiﬁability advantage
As for the previous two algorithms, the identiﬁability advantage of any user
ui for the SchedGM protocol is deﬁned as
AdvIDTui (SchedGM) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [b′j,p = bj,p|r > 1, bi,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣
where 1 ≤ r ≤ 	N/2
 is the number of output elements that have the same
value. Note that in SchedGM each user gets N masked output values bi,p,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, for each time slot p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, but it cannot unmask
them as it does not possess the global mask. Therefore, any user knows
that there are r masked bit values of one kind and N − r of the other kind,
without knowing whether one or the other kind corresponds to bi,p = 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the Challenger chooses user u1
as the Adversary and we focus on the non-trivial case N > 2. By expanding
the ﬁrst term, we have
Pru1 [b
′
j,p = bj,p|r > 1, b1,p] =
1∑
k=0
Pr(b′j,p = bj,p|r > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(b1,p = k|r > 1)
=
1∑
k=0
1∑
z=0
Pr(b′j,p = z|r > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(bj,p = z|r > 1, b1,p = k) · Pr(b1,p = k|r > 1)
From the above, we obtain
Pr(b′j,p = 0|r > 1, b1,p = 0) =
1
2
· C
N
r · r
CNr ·N
+
1
2
· C
N
N−r · (N − r)
CNr ·N
=
1
2
Pr(b′j,p = 1|r > 1, b1,p = 0) =
1
2
Pr(b′j,p = 0|r > 1, b1,p = 1) = Pr(b′j,p = 1|r > 1, b1,p = 1) =
1
2
which implies
Prui [b
′
j,p = bj,p|r > 1, bi,p] =
1
2
and thus the ﬁnal result
AdvIDTui (SchedGM) = 0, ∀N > 2
• User linkability advantage
Hereafter we intuitively show that ∃N > 2|AdvLNKui (SchedGM) ≥ 1/p(N),
where p(N) is any positive polynomial function of N . After Step 4 of
the challenge-response game, the Adversary u1 knows (i) its own schedule
bit b1,p and (ii) the number r of masked schedules of one particular kind.
Even though u1 cannot determine with certainty whether the r elements
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Table 2.2: Client and server speciﬁcations.
 
Client (Nokia N810) Server 
Processor 
TI OMAP 2420,  
400 MHz 
Intel Centrino Duo 
T2500, 2 x 2.00 GHz 
RAM DDR RAM 128 MB DDR2 RAM 3 GB 
OS 
Maemo Linux OS2008 
(Diablo) 
Ubuntu 9.10,  
kernel 2.6.31.22 
correspond to the “available” or to the “busy” state, it knows that the
challenger picks the two other bits bh,p, bj,p, j = h = i, at random and
therefore it also knows that the lower the value r, the greater the probability
that any two bits in the sequence under consideration have the same value.
Intuitively, if r = 1 it means that there are N − 1 schedules of one kind
and only one schedule of the other kind. Therefore, the probability that
any two users have same schedule value is greater than, for instance, when
r = 	N/2
. Thus, the linkability advantage AdvLNKui (SchedGM) is not
less than 1/p(N), ∀N > 2, as ∃r ∈ {1, . . . , 	N/2
}|AdvLNKui (SchedGM) ≥
1/p(N) for some positive polynomial p(N).
• Server advantages
As in SchedElG and SchedPa, the server performing the SchedGM algo-
rithm does not have access to any schedule bit. Therefore, SchedGM is
server-private. 
2.5 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
In this section we present the system and implementation details related to our
three privacy-preserving scheduling algorithms. First, we describe the details
about the systems and platforms on which we developed and implemented our
applications. Second, we present the experimental measurements of the perfor-
mance of our applications (both on the client devices and on the server), and we
thoroughly discuss these results and compare the eﬃciency of all the algorithms.
2.5.1 Systems and Platforms
Clients and server systems The client application was run, tested and eval-
uated on the Nokia N810 devices. The server application was implemented and
evaluated on a laptop. The hardware and OS speciﬁcations are listed in Table
2.2
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Figure 2.7: Flowchart showing the initiation of a meeting scheduling request on
the client application. The function names (such as encrypt (elg/pa/gm) or
requestCommonSchedule (elg/pa/gm) that appear in this ﬁgure are intuitive
placeholders for the actual function names that are used in the client application.
Code speciﬁcations Our privacy-preserving scheduling applications were
developed with the Qt 4.0 framework [119], using QtCreator as the IDE. The
client application was ported to the N810 devices using the Maemo SDK on the
Scratchbox cross-compilation toolkit2.
Cryptographic libraries The libgcrypt standard GNU library3 was used
to implement the Elgamal and the RSA cryptosystems. Similarly, the libpaillier
library4 was used to implement the Paillier cryptosystem. For the Goldwasser-
Micali cryptosystem, we did not ﬁnd any existing available libraries, and therefore
we developed a new library, libgm, to implement the basic cryptographic opera-
tions. We intend to release our libgm library to the public under the GPL licence.
2.5.2 Software Architecture
Our privacy-preserving activity scheduling software consists of two applications:
the client and the server. The client application runs on the Nokia N810 mobile
device, and has a GUI to take inputs from the users. The server application runs
on the Intel-based PC and is managed through the standard Unix console.
2Details on the Scratchbox and Maemo SDK are available at
http://maemo.org/maemo release documentation/maemo4.1.x/node4.html.
3The documentation for libgcrypt is available at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation
/manuals/gcrypt/index.html
4Source code available at http://acsc.cs.utexas.edu/libpaillier/.
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Figure 2.8: Flowchart showing the server application structure when handling
meeting requests and replies from and to the clients. The function names (such
as RSA Decrypt or Process Elg) that appear in this ﬁgure are intuitive place-
holders for the actual function names that are used in the server application.
Client Application
The client application stores the schedules of the users and displays the list of
potential meeting participants for each user. This list is maintained and managed
by the user himself, who can choose the meeting participants before initiating the
meeting scheduling procedure. Each user can use the GUI to set his availabilities,
send a meeting scheduling request, reply to an ongoing meeting request or refuse
to participate in a received meeting request. To send a meeting scheduling re-
quest, the initiator ﬁrst selects one of the available privacy-preserving algorithms
(SchedElG, SchedPa or SchedGM ) and the intended meeting participants. Then,
the procedure is initiated by a click on the “Start meeting” button. Figure 2.7
shows a ﬂowchart of the application on the client device, when a user sends a
request to schedule a meeting.
Server Application
The server is a GUI-less application that interacts with the clients to handle
requests such as login and computation of common availabilities. The main server
class, ScServer, inherits QTcpServer and is used as the server socket. Figure 2.8
shows the server ﬂowchart structure.
More details about the inner structure of the server will be made available to
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Table 2.3: Eﬃciency and privacy comparison with the scheduling protocols
DisCSP [158], MPC-DisCSP2 [143] and SDC [79]
.
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the public, together with the source code, under the GPL licence.
2.5.3 Experimental Performance Evaluation
Before presenting the performance measurement details, let us ﬁrst perform a
comparative analysis of the asymptotic complexities of the proposed protocols, as
shown in Table 2.3. In order to compare our three algorithms with an equivalent
security, we set the bit-lengths of the ElGamal modulus q and the Paillier and
GM modulus n to 1024 bits. A time-slot availability would then be encrypted to
a 2-tuple of 1024-bit ciphertexts for ElGamal, to a 1024-bit ciphertext for GM
and to a 2048-bit ciphertext for the Paillier encryption scheme.
From Table 2.3 we can see that the SchedElG and SchedPa protocols are
very eﬃcient, both in terms of communication O(m), where m is the number of
time slots, and computation complexity O(m). Moreover, these two algorithms
provide strong privacy guarantees. SchedGM, on the contrary, is comparatively
less eﬃcient due to the greater number of exchanged messages (O(N ·m), where N
is the number of participants). From the privacy perspective, SchedGM reveals
more information: users can infer the ratio of free/busy participants for each time
slot without identifying those that are busy and those that are free. Because
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Figure 2.9: Frontend of the scheduling application on a Nokia N810.
in all schemes, the server operates only on encrypted data, it cannot gain any
knowledge about the users’ private schedules.
Distributed [143, 79] and hybrid [158] solutions proposed in the literature
are less eﬃcient from the communication standpoint as compared to the pro-
posed protocols. Moreover, the computational complexity of these schemes is
higher than SchedElG and SchedPa, and this undermines their applicability on
resource-constrained mobile platforms. Even though the hybrid approach [158]
has comparable computation complexity, it is not completely reliable from the
privacy point of view because it assumes that the server(s) can get clear-text
access to the individual availabilities.
We further evaluate the performance of SchedElg, SchedPa and SchedGM by
implementing the client component of the protocols and primitives on Nokia N810
mobile devices with a 400 MHz CPU and 128 MB RAM (Figure 2.9), and the
server component on a desktop computer with a 2 GHz CPU and 3 GB RAM.
The results of the experimentation are shown in Figure 2.10.
Client Encryption
As we can see from Figure 2.10, the time required to perform the scheduling op-
erations increases with the number of time slots for all the proposed algorithms,
which is intuitive. With respect to encryption performance, Figure 2.10(a) shows
that SchedElg is the most eﬃcient scheduling algorithm, requiring 4 seconds to
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Figure 2.10: Testbeb implementation performance measurements.
encrypt 45 time slots (a typical weekly schedule on a per hour basis). The same
task is accomplished by SchedGM and SchedPa, respectively, in 7 and 14 sec-
onds. These results might be explained by the following. First, the cryptographic
primitives for the ElGamal scheme are implemented in a standard well-optimized
library, libgcrypt, present in most Unix-based operating systems. SchedGM, on
the contrary, does not use a standard library and can be further optimized. Sec-
ond, the encrypted elements in SchedPa have twice the bit-length of those used
in the other two algorithms, and therefore the same operations (multiplications
and exponentiations) require more time.
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Client Decryption
Figure 2.10(b) shows the time required for decrypting the ﬁnal result (common
availabilities) of the scheduling algorithms at the client. Similarly to the encryp-
tion time, the fastest algorithm for the decryption is SchedElg, which takes 4
seconds in order to obtain the aggregated availabilities for a 45 time-slot period.
For the same number of time slots, SchedPa takes approx. 7 seconds, which is
almost twice longer than the best performance. The decryption times for both
SchedElg and SchedPa are independent of the number of participants. The per-
formance of SchedGM, due to the fact that the ﬁnal output of the algorithm is
a sequence of vectors instead of just a single aggregated vector, decreases with
the number of users, as well as with the number of time slots. Thus, for a rea-
sonable number of participants (e.g. N = 5), SchedGM is still practical enough
to be implemented on resource-constrained mobile devices, although it is not the
preferred solution.
Client Communication
Figure 2.10(c) shows the (application layer) data that each client exchanges dur-
ing one execution of the scheduling algorithm. In general, all the proposed
privacy-preserving scheduling algorithms have reasonable communication costs.
SchedElg and SchedPa are the most eﬃcient algorithms and they require 22 kB
of data in order to compute the aggregated availabilities of a 45 time-slot period,
whereas SchedGM requires 39 kB for the same result. As previously mentioned,
SchedGM uses a sequence of masked vectors in order to compute the ﬁnal avail-
abilities of the users, and therefore the amount of data is proportional both to
the number of users and time-slots.
Server Performance
The scheduling server’s performance is shown in Figure 2.10(d). As it can be
seen, the time required to perform the scheduling operations on encrypted values
increases with both the number of users and time slots. For instance, the running
time (in seconds) for the server implementation of the SchedElG algorithm is at
most 2 ·N ·m ·Tmul−ElG, where N is the number of clients, m the number of time-
slots and tmul−ElG is the time required to compute one multiplication operation
between two log(q)-bit integers (q is the order of the group in the ElGamal
encryption scheme). The running time for the SchedPa and SchedGM is, respec-
tively, at most N ·m · Tmul−Pai +m · Texp−Pai (where Tmul−Pai and Texp−Pai is
the time required to perform a multiplication and an exponentiation respectively
of two log(n2)-bit integers) and 3 ·N ·m ·Tmul−GM (where Tmul−GM is the time
required to perform a multiplication between two log(n)-bit integers).
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As it can be seen, even with a large number of users and time slots, the
amount of time required for the server-side scheduling operations is still below
0.2 seconds, which suggests that the load on the server is limited, which allows it
to eﬃciently handle multiple scheduling events, without incurring in huge com-
putational overhead.
2.6 User Study
In this section we present the modalities and results of the user study that we
carried out with our prototype meeting-scheduling application. The goal of this
study was to assess the sensitivity of the subjects to privacy issues in meeting-
scheduling applications, as well as to obtain feedback with respect to our proto-
type application.
2.6.1 Background
Based on the privacy- and usability-related questionnaire guidelines from ([33,
98]), we prepared and conducted a targeted user-study on 19 subjects, sampling
a population of university students (both undergraduate and graduate), non-
scientiﬁc personnel and people from a non-technical environment.
The entire study was divided into three phases, with two diﬀerent sets of
questions that were given in Phase 1 and Phase 3 respectively. In Phase 1, the
participants were asked to reply to a set of 20 questions before using the meeting
scheduling application. In Phase 2, they were asked to use our prototype appli-
cation to schedule meetings with the other participants both in a controlled and
uncontrolled setting; the ﬁrst time, we instructed them how to use the applica-
tion, and afterwards they were free to use it as they pleased. Finally, in Phase
3 the participants answered a second set of 14 post-experience questions, after
having used our prototype application.
The goal of Phase 1 of the study was to assess the participants’ level of adop-
tion of mobile technology and applications, and to get their opinion on privacy
issues in such applications. The participants were not told beforehand what kind
of mobile application they will be asked to use in Phase 2. During Phase 1,
the respondents answered the Pre-Experience A questionnaire, which comprises
20 questions on both generic technology topics (such as usage and ownership of
mobile devices, utilization of mobile social networks and calendar/agenda) and
more speciﬁc privacy-related questions (such as their online behavior and opin-
ions on information release). For instance, one statement related to users’ online
behavior and privacy is “I am willing to use my real name in online discussions
(forums, chat rooms, etc.)”, to which the respondents had to answer with either
Disagree, Tend to disagree, Tend to agree or Agree.
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After Phase 1 was completed, in Phase 2 we instructed the participants on
the speciﬁcs of our prototype scheduling application and how it works, in a step-
by-step fashion. We then asked them to execute one instance of the scheduling
process. Next, we told them to use the application as they please, without the
experimenters overseeing the process. The goal of Phase 2 was to show our
application and to let the participants use it autonomously, in order to get an
opinion for the Phase 3 of the study.
The goal of Phase 3 was to obtain feedback on diﬀerent performance and
privacy aspects of our prototype application. The respondents answered the
Post-Experience B questionnaire, which comprises 14 questions centered on our
application prototype, its perceived usefulness, eﬃciency, ease of use, and pri-
vacy. For example, the statement “I could easily identify who was/were the per-
son/people that were not available for a particular time slot” could be answered
by Disagree, Tend to disagree, Tend to agree or Agree.
Hereafter we provide the summary of the results and discussion on our user-
study.
2.6.2 Results
Phase 1
Technology Utilization In this ﬁrst part, we discuss the results concerning
the technology utilization habits of the respondents. With respect to mobile
applications, our results show that 63% the respondents browse the Internet with
a mobile device, whereas 53% of them use the mobile calendar/agenda application
on their devices in order to organize meetings. 86% of such meetings are scheduled
once or twice a week, and most of the time (89%) such meetings involve 2-4 people.
In order to reach a consensus, the meeting participants use e-mail 58% of the time
and the telephone for the remaining 42%. Social networks, such as Facebook
or Twitter, are used by 84% of the respondents, and 44% of them access such
services using their mobile devices. These results suggest that although meeting
scheduling and calendar management using mobile devices is already a reality,
people still struggle to reach a consensus in an eﬃcient way. In order to agree on
a common time slot by using e-mail, multiple rounds of interaction among the
meeting participants are required.
Privacy Attitudes In this second part, we discuss the privacy concerns of
the respondents when using everyday applications. In general, 63% of the respon-
dents tend to disagree or disagree with the statement “I would put photos/videos
of myself, my family and friends on the Internet”. When asked about third
parties sharing personal information about them, 89% of the respondents agree
that no third party should disseminate users’ private information without their
knowledge. With respect to privacy in online interactions, 63% feel that they
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Figure 2.11: Extract of the user-study questionnaire about people’s privacy atti-
tudes.
would prefer not to use their real name and use pseudonyms instead. Figure 2.11
shows other interesting privacy attitude results. In summary, our respondents
tend to by sensitive to the privacy issues related to the use of mobile applica-
tions, and thus eﬀectively controlling the access to and dissemination of personal
information is a valuable diﬀerentiator for mobile applications.
Scheduling Applications and Privacy The third part of the results show
the opinion of respondents about meeting-scheduling applications on mobile de-
vices. According to the results, 84% of the respondents are not aware of any
existing mobile application for meeting scheduling. Among those, 43% would be
quite (or a lot) interested in having such applications. With respect to privacy,
58% would be comfortable in sharing their basic schedule availabilities with the
other meeting participants, while none of them would be willing to share all the
details (such as place, time and subject) about these availabilities.
With respect to priorities in mobile meeting-scheduling applications, Figure
2.12 shows the choices of the respondents, ordered by the perceived priority (on a
scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is the top priority and 4 is the least priority). The ﬁgure
shows that privacy is perceived as the ﬁrst priority in mobile meeting-scheduling
applications 33% of the time. If we consider the cumulative result for the 1st
and 2nd priorities, privacy achieves a total of 77%. Although the ease of use of
the application is perceived as the top priority for 50% of the respondents, the
cumulative result for the 1st and 2nd priorities achieves 67%, which is 10% less
than privacy. The speed and the Graphical User Interface (GUI) have the least
priority for the users, where speed is only the third priority most of the time, and
the GUI is almost exclusively the least priority.
Overall, the results suggest that privacy is indeed perceived as being the top
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Figure 2.12: Extract of the user-study questionnaire about people’s priorities in
mobile scheduling applications.
or the second priority in meeting-scheduling applications, which is in line with the
concerns that the respondents had before using our application. From a software
developer standpoint, this means that both ease of use and privacy need to be
taken into account from the beginning of the application development process.
In particular, the privacy mechanisms should be implemented in a way that does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the usability or performance. The acceptance of meeting-
scheduling applications is thus highly inﬂuenced by the availability of eﬀective
and intuitive means for controlling privacy preferences.
Phase 3
User-Experience Figure 2.13 shows some interesting results about the perceived
user experience while using our prototype meeting-scheduling application on the
Nokia N810 devices. As it can be seen, almost 70% of the respondents agree
that they were able to perform the meeting scheduling task quickly by using our
application. Moreover, 95% of them agree that it was easy for them to learn to
use our application. Regarding the information presented on the screen, users
mostly agree that it was easy to ﬁnd all necessary information, such as the meeting
participants, the individual schedule and control buttons. Similar results have
been obtained for the organization of the user interface.
These results suggest that it is indeed possible to integrate simple privacy
mechanisms into mobile application, without incurring in signiﬁcant learning
overhead. A clean GUI with a transparent integration of privacy features proved
to be very eﬀective in this regard.
Privacy in Our Prototype Application In this last part, we discuss the
subject of privacy with respect to our prototype application, and how its im-
plementation was perceived by the respondents. Figure 2.14 shows some of the
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Figure 2.13: Extract of the user-study questionnaire about the user experience
for our prototype application.
results obtained from the user study. In general, all respondents tend to agree
or agree that it is important to not reveal any more information to the central
server than strictly necessary. When asked about the way privacy has been im-
plemented in our prototype application, 95% of them claim that they could not
identify the people who were available (or not) in a given time-slot. Concerning
the potential overhead due to the privacy mechanisms, 71% of the users feel that
having the privacy feature in such application did not make it more complicated
for them to use it; only 5% tend to agree with the opposite.
Regarding the third-party knowledge of the individual schedules, 74% agree
that they felt comfortable knowing that the central scheduling server did not
know their private schedules, and only 5% of them disagree. The users were told
about this feature during Phase 2 of the study. However, when the third-party is
the other meeting participants (and not the central server), 47% felt comfortable
knowing that their privacy was preserved. Nevertheless, this percentage increases
to 95% when considering responders who tend to agree with such statement, in
addition to those who agree.
In summary, this user-study has shown that the majority of the respondents
are concerned about their privacy in scheduling applications, and that they would
welcome eﬀective and simple means for protecting it and still enjoy such services.
Our prototype application has proven to be eﬀective in both providing a user-
friendly interface for the meeting scheduling participants, and a transparent way
to ensure that privacy of individual schedules is preserved. The results have also
shown that there is no signiﬁcant overhead for using privacy in such applications,
and that people appreciated having the ability to not disclose more information
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about their schedules than what was strictly necessary in order to compute the
available time slots.
2.7 Extensions
In this section, we show how SchedPa can be easily extended to the case where
user schedules are non-binary, i.e., each time slot is a non-negative cost Ci,j that
indicates ui’s preference for time-slot j. We also describe several active attacks on
the proposed scheduling schemes, such as collusion between users-server and data
modiﬁcations by the users, and how these attacks can be mitigated by using ex-
isting cryptographic mechanisms. Finally, we discuss some further enhancements
for the privacy of users’ schedules and how to implement them.
2.7.1 Non-Binary Schedules
The goal here is to ﬁnd, in a privacy-preserving fashion, the time-slot with the
minimum aggregated cost. The scheme works as follows:
1. Each user ui reorders his cost sequence Ci,1 . . . Ci,m using the shared per-
mutation σ and encrypts each cost Ci,σj in the sequence using the Paillier
cryptosystem with the shared group key KP . He then passes the result
(EKP ,ri,1(Ci,σ1) . . . EKP ,ri,m(Ci,σm)) to the server.
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2. The server computes the encrypted sum of costs EKP ,rj (R ·
∑N
i=1Ci,σj ), ∀j,
where R is a random integer (greater than one) chosen by the server.
3. The server selects a pre-determined user uk and passes a randomly ordered
(diﬀerent from σ) sequence of the encrypted aggregated costs to it. This is
to prevent uk from learning the aggregated cost function.
4. User uk decrypts all the elements passed from the server, and identiﬁes the
minimum aggregated cost.
5. User uk then queries the server for the index of the (encrypted) minimum
aggregated cost. The server then distributes the queried index to all users.
It can be easily shown that the above scheme is execution privacy-preserving.
2.7.2 Active Attacks
There are ﬁve kinds of possible active attacks on the scheduling schemes: (i)
collusion between the scheduling server and users, (ii) collusion among users, (iii)
fake user generation by the server, (iv) individual user schedule modiﬁcation and
(v) integrity and replay attacks.
In order to thwart the ﬁrst issue, the invited participants could agree to es-
tablish a shared secret by using techniques from threshold cryptography, such
as [146]. The server should then collude with at least a predeﬁned number of
participants in order to obtain the shared secret and learn the individual avail-
abilities. The second concern may arise if k colluding users set their schedules
to all-available, and try to learn the schedules of other users. Assuming that
N is the total number of participants and k the number of colluding ones, our
schemes would provide some level of schedule privacy to honest users, as long as
N − k ≥ 2. Only if all but one users collude, then they would be able to deter-
mine the schedule of the remaining user. In order for the third attack to succeed,
the server would need to generate fake users and convince the true participants
about the legitimacy of the fake users. In practice, this is a non-trivial task to
achieve, and thus the attack has a very slim chance of succeeding. Moreover, the
eﬀectiveness of such an attack could be further reduced by adopting the threshold
cryptographic scheme mentioned previously, because the server would then need
to generate k fake users and validate them as true participants.
The fourth attack is also not able to succeed in revealing the availability
of other meeting participants, as the best a malicious user can do is to set its
own schedule to all-available, and then guess the availabilities of the other N −
1 participants. Even if a malicious user attempts to modify its own schedule
with invalid values, such as negative values, the message domain restrictions of
cryptosystems (such as ElGamal and Paillier) would prevent such modiﬁcations.
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Figure 2.15: Extended algorithm scheme for revealing a single available time slot.
Thus, malicious attacks consisting of manipulating the ﬁnal result by using invalid
negative values as schedule values are not possible in the proposed protocols.
The last attack concerns the integrity and freshness of the encrypted sched-
ules. The participants are the only entities in the system that know the secret
that has been used to generate the public/private key pair, and therefore they are
the only ones that can generate and verify the integrity of the encrypted data.
Moreover, using the shared common secret, each participant could generate a
fresh nonce at each algorithm execution and send it (in encrypted form) to the
server during the scheduling process. The server would then forward these en-
crypted nonces to each participant, who could verify that all received nonces are
equal. If not all nonces are equal, then the participants know that there has been
at least one replay attack, and thus the schedule results are not to be trusted.
2.7.3 Single Available Time Slot
The output of conventional, non-privacy-preserving scheduling services (such as
Doodle [45] or Outlook [110]) consists of time slots in which all participating users
are available. The proposed schemes follow this paradigm and they provide, in an
eﬃcient and privacy-preserving way, all time-slots for which all users are available.
In some cases, however, it might be desirable to limit the disclosure of common
availabilities to only one time-slot, instead of the set of all available time-slots.
This would provide an additional layer of privacy for the individual schedules, as
the participants would be given a single feasible solution. Hereafter we describe
one simple way to adapt the proposed schemes to support this feature (Figure
2.15).
First, all users participating in the scheduling process perform Step 1 of the
respective algorithm (SchedElg, SchedPa or SchedGM ). Second, the server per-
forms Step 2 but it does not send the ﬁnal output to each user. Instead, it
randomly chooses a private time-slot permutation function θ = [θ1, . . . , θm] and
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applies it to the elements of the ﬁnal output vector(s) Esched. We call this new
vector(s) Eθsched. At this point, the schedules have been permuted twice, once by
the users prior to the encryptions (with σ) and once by the server (with θ).
Next, the server sends Eθsched to the user who started the activity scheduling
(the initiator), which then gets the common availabilities but in a doubly per-
muted order. The initiator is able to determine the available slots in this doubly
permuted time slot list, but he is not able to determine the time slots they cor-
respond to in the original schedule. The initiator selects one commonly available
time slot θk and securely sends the index θk to the server. Fourth, the server
(i) replaces all availabilities other than θk in E
θ
sched with random numbers, (ii)
reverts the permutation θ, and (iii) sends this new vector(s) Eˆsched to each user.
Finally, each user decrypts and reverts the initial permutation σ of the received
vector(s) and determines which time slot j is the only commonly available time
slot.
This simple solution that reveals only a single available time slot to all the
participants involves one extra message exchange between the initiator and the
scheduling server, as shown in Step 3 of Figure 2.15. Although the permuta-
tion θ performed by the server preempts the initiator from knowing the true
common availabilities, he might still want to maliciously modify the permuted
availabilities. However, the only action the initiator can do is to choose one of
the permuted time slots and communicate its index θk to the server, as it is the
server who will then revert the permutation θ and send the ﬁnal vector(s) Eˆsched
to all users.
2.8 Related Work
In the literature, the four most relevant bodies of work that address privacy
in scheduling or similar scenarios are based on techniques from private set-
intersection [93, 41], distributed constraint satisfaction [155, 158, 143, 142], secure
multi-party computation [79, 46] and e-voting [92]. Hereafter, we review the most
relevant aspects of such approaches.
In the private set-intersection domain, Kissner and Song [93] use mathematic
properties of polynomials to design privacy-preserving union, intersection and el-
ement reduction operations on private multisets by leveraging on the Goldwasser-
Micali homomorphic encryption scheme [69]. De Cristofaro and Tsudik [41] pro-
vide eﬃcient variations of private-set intersection protocols and present a com-
parison in terms of computational and communication complexity, adversarial
model and privacy. The authors also give informal deﬁnitions of client and server
privacy. However, PSI approaches are generally distributed, and an eﬃcient ex-
tension to an n-party protocol is challenging. In the meeting scheduling scenario,
for instance, a trivial extension of the 2-party PSI to n parties (by running a 2-
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party protocol between each pair of users) would undermine the privacy of users’
schedules as well; knowing the personal availability and the aggregate availability
is suﬃcient to infer the other party’s schedule.
Distributed constraint satisfaction approaches were investigated by Wallace
and Freuder [155]: they study the tradeoﬀ between privacy and eﬃciency and
show that the information that entities learn during the negotiation of a common
schedule has, in some cases, a tremendous impact on privacy. Details of an
accept/reject response are exploited by intelligent agents in order to successfully
infer the availabilities of other peers involved in the scheduling process. Similarly,
Zunino and Campo [163] design a scheduling system in which entities learn and
reﬁne their knowledge about user preferences by using a Bayesian network. Yokoo
et al. [158] use secret sharing among third-party servers in order to determine a
suitable agreement among entities in a collusion-resistant way.
Solutions based on secure multi-party computation were investigated in [46]
and a practical scheme was proposed in [79]. Herlea et al. [79], for instance,
design and evaluate a distributed secure scheduling protocol by relying on prop-
erties of the XOR operation over binary values, in which all users contribute to
the secrecy of individual schedules while ensuring the correctness of the results.
Although not a pure e-voting scheme, Kellerman and Bo¨hme [92] proposed an
event scheduling protocol that inherits several security and privacy requirements
from the e-voting context. However, a formal study of such properties and ex-
perimental performance results are missing in their work.
In contrast to most of the above solutions, we take a more centralized ap-
proach (with a single third-party server) for the privacy-preserving scheduling
problem. Our solutions overcome communication and computational complexi-
ties intrinsic to most distributed approaches discussed above, as well as ensure
that no private information (other than the resulting common availabilities) is
exposed. Moreover, our protocols can easily ﬁt into today’s popular provider-
consumer service architectures without incurring a huge communication cost on
the service-provider.
2.9 Summary
Activity-scheduling applications are increasingly used by people on-the-move in
order to eﬃciently and securely manage their time. In addition to privacy, which
is paramount, such services should also be practical and feasible to implement,
given the client-server paradigm that most providers use, and they should be as
transparent to the user as possible. In this chapter, we have provided a framework
for the formal study of privacy properties in such applications, and we have pro-
posed three novel privacy-preserving protocols that, in addition to guaranteeing
privacy, are more eﬃcient than similar solutions in terms of computation and com-
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munication complexities. Our implementation and extensive performance evalu-
ation on real mobile devices demonstrates that the proposed privacy-preserving
schemes are well suited to practical network architectures and services. Moreover,
a thorough user-study of the prototype application suggests that our algorithms
and software architecture are seamlessly integrated with the privacy-preserving
algorithms, in a way that does not impede the user from quickly and eﬀectively
utilizing our application.
Publications: [21, 18]

Chapter 3
Privacy-Preserving Location
Determination
As mentioned in the previous chapter, today’s highly-interconnected urban popu-
lation is increasingly dependent on mobile gadgets to organize and plan their daily
lives. In addition to popular schedule management applications on these devices,
such as Doodle mobile and Tymelie, various other urban applications and ser-
vices are also gaining signiﬁcance. Taxi-sharing applications, route-planning and
participatory sensing services are a few noticeable examples. These applications
most often rely on current (or preferred) locations of individual users or a group
of users, which jeopardizes their privacy; users do not necessarily want to reveal
their current (or preferred) locations to the service provider or to other, possibly
untrusted, users. In this chapter, we propose privacy-preserving algorithms for
determining an optimal meeting location for a group of users. We perform a
thorough privacy evaluation of the proposed approaches, under both passive and
active adversarial models, by formally quantifying privacy-loss in this setting. In
order to study the performance of the proposed approaches in a real deployment,
we implement and test their execution eﬃciency on Nokia devices. By means
of a targeted user-study, we attempt to get insight into the privacy-awareness of
users in location-based services and the usability of the proposed solutions.
Chapter Outline In Section 3.1, we introduce the location determination prob-
lem. We present the system architecture in Section 3.2 and the problem deﬁnition
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we formalize the privacy requirements and present
our algorithms. We then perform a comparative analysis and discuss the imple-
mentation results in Section 3.5, and we summarize the results of our user-study
in Section 3.6. We discuss the extensions of our schemes in Section 3.7, and we
present the related work in Section 3.8. We summarize this chapter in Section
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3.9.
3.1 Introduction
Advances in handheld device and smartphone technology, coupled with their
rapid proliferation in urban communities, have enabled users to be constantly
in connection with each other and to enjoy context-rich services on their de-
vices while on-the-move. Online service providers take advantage of this dy-
namic and ever-growing technology landscape by proposing novel and innovative
context-based services or by enhancing existing ones for the end-users. These
services heavily rely on the improved computing and context-sensing capabilities
of modern-day mobile devices and smartphones. Location-based services (LBS),
an example of one such type of context-based services, are used by millions of
mobile subscribers every day in order to obtain location-speciﬁc information and
services [52].
Two popular features of location-based services are location check-ins and
location sharing. By checking into a location, users can share their current loca-
tion with family and friends or obtain location-speciﬁc services from third-party
providers or businesses [58]. The obtained service does not depend on the loca-
tions of other users. Facebook, for instance, recently launched a check-in service
by which users can beneﬁt from on-the-spot discounts and deals from localized
businesses [51]. The other type of location-based services also becoming popu-
lar are those that rely on the sharing of locations (or location preferences) by a
group. According to a recent study [111], location sharing services are used by
almost 20% of all mobile phone users. One noticeable example of such a service
is the taxi-sharing application, oﬀered by a global telecom operator [123], where
smartphone users can share a taxi with other users at a suitable location by
revealing their departure and destination locations. Similarly, another popular
service [97] enables a group of users to ﬁnd the most geographically convenient
place to meet by minimizing the distance everyone has to travel. Several other
providers [108, 109] oﬀer variants of this service, either as on-line or stand-alone
applications.
One important, and often overlooked, concern in location-sharing-based ap-
plications is the privacy of the user’s location information or location preferences
vis-a`-vis the service provider and other, potentially untrusted, users. For instance,
such information can be used to de-anonymize users and their availabilities [70],
to track their preferences [62] or to identify their social networks [61]. For exam-
ple, in the taxi-sharing application, a curious third-party service provider could
easily deduce the home/work location pairs of users who regularly use their ser-
vice. Without eﬀective protection, even sparse location information has been
shown to provide reliable information about users’ private spheres, which could
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have severe consequences on their social, ﬁnancial and private lives [95]. Mali-
cious entities, if they get hold of this private information, could use it for all kinds
of nefarious activities [129]. Even service providers who legitimately track users’
location information in order to improve the oﬀered service can inadvertently
harm users’ privacy, if the collected data is leaked in an unauthorized fashion or
improperly shared with corporate partners. Thus it is clear that, in any location-
sharing-based service (LSBS), the disclosure of private locations to untrusted
third-parties and peers must be limited. Recent user studies [111] on location
information sharing in LSBSs, including the one we present in this chapter, show
that end-users express the same concern. Our study on 35 participants, including
students and non-scientiﬁc staﬀ, showed that a large percentage of users (nearly
88%) are extremely concerned about sharing their location information.
In this chapter, we study privacy issues in location sharing-based services and
propose practical, eﬃcient solutions for the same. In line with this goal, we focus
on a speciﬁc problem in LSBS, called the fair rendez-vous point (FRVP). Given
a set of user locations or location preferences, the FRVP problem is to choose
an optimal (or fair) location among the proposed ones such that the maximum
distance between this location and all other users’ locations is minimized. Our
goal is to provide practical, privacy-preserving techniques to solve the FRVP
problem, such that neither a third-party nor users can learn about other users’
locations; participating users learn only the optimal location. The FRVP problem
is not only an important prerequisite in most LSBSs but it also nicely captures
the signiﬁcant privacy threats that can arise because of location sharing in LSBSs.
In particular, we ﬁrst analytically model the privacy requirements in the
FRVP problem and propose two privacy-preserving solutions for the same. We
further evaluate the robustness and resilience of our schemes against various pas-
sive and active attacks and provide an in-depth privacy analysis of the proposed
solutions. By means of a prototype implementation on a testbed of Nokia mobile
devices, we analyze the eﬃciency and performance of the proposed algorithms on
real systems. We also extend our existing solutions and implementations [20] to
include cases where users could provide more than one location preferences and
could assign priorities to those preferences. Finally, by conducting a targeted
study of participants who used and interacted with our prototype, we attempt to
gain insight into the current level of privacy-awareness and privacy requirements
of LSBS users and, at the same time, verify the feasibility and acceptance of the
proposed solutions.
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3.2 System Architecture
We consider a system composed of two main entities: (i) a set of users1 (or mobile
devices) U = {u1, . . . , uN} and (ii) a third-party service provider, called Location
Determination Server (LDS). Each user’s mobile device is assumed to be able to
establish communication with the LDS, either in a P2P fashion or through a ﬁxed
infrastructure-based Internet connection. The mobile devices are able to perform
public-key cryptographic operations, and each user ui has means of determining
the coordinates Li = (xi, yi) ∈ N2 of his preferred rendez-vous location (or his own
location) by using a common coordinate system. We consider a two-dimensional
position coordinates system, but the proposed schemes can easily be extended
to other practical coordinate systems. For instance, the deﬁnition of Li can be
made fully compliant with the UTM coordinate system [154], which is a plane
coordinate system where points are represented as a 2-tuple of positive values
(distances in meters from a given reference point).
We deﬁne the set of the preferred rendez-vous locations of all users as L =
{Li}Ni=1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a ﬂat-Earth model and we consider
line-of-sight Euclidian distances between preferred rendez-vous locations. Even
though the actual real-world distance (road, railway, boat, etc.) between two
locations is at least as large as their Euclidian distance, the proportion between
distances in the real world is assumed to be correlated with the proportion of the
respective Euclidian distances. Location priorities, discussed in Section 3.7, can
be used for isolated or ranked locations.
We assume that each of the N users has his own public/private key pair
(KuiP ,K
ui
s ), certiﬁed by a trusted CA, which is used to digitally sign/verify the
messages that are sent to the LDS. Moreover, we assume that the N users share
a common secret that is utilized to generate a shared public/private key pair
(KMvP ,K
Mv
s ) in an online fashion for each meeting setup instance v. The private
key KMvs generated in this way is known only to all meeting participants, whereas
the public key KMvP is known to everyone including the LDS. This could be
achieved through a secure credential establishment protocol such as in [29, 32,
101].
The LDS executes the FRVP algorithm on the inputs it receives from the users
in order to compute the FRV point. The LDS is also able to perform public-key
cryptographic functions. For instance, a common public-key infrastructure using
the RSA cryptosystem [134] could be employed. Let KLDSP be the public key,
certiﬁed by a trusted CA, and KLDSs the corresponding private key of the LDS.
KLDSP is publicly known and users encrypt their input to the FRVP algorithm
using this key; the encrypted input can be decrypted by the LDS using its private
key KLDSs . This ensures message conﬁdentiality and integrity for all the mes-
1Throughout this chapter, we use the words users and devices interchangeably. The meaning
is clear from the context, unless stated otherwise.
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Table 3.1: Table of symbols.
SYMBOL DEFINITION SYMBOL DEFINITION 
AdvIDT Identifiability advantage Li 
Preferred rendez-vous location of user i,  
Li = (xi, yi) 
Advd-LNK Distance-linkability advantage Lfair Fair rendez-vous location 
Advc-LNK Coordinate-linkability advantage PS Positioning Service 
dij 
Euclidian distance between two 
points Li, Lj in the plane 
ua 
Attacker (a user participating in the PPFRVP 
protocol) 
DiM 
Maximum Euclidian distance of Li i 
to any other Lj, j ? i E(.) 
Encryption of (.) (the encryption scheme is 
clear from the context) 
f Public transformation function based on secret key (for privacy) 
ElG(.)/ 
Pai(.) 
Encryption of (.) using the ElGamal/Paillier 
encryption scheme 
g Optimization function ?, ? Element-permutation functions 
LDS Location Determination Server   
sages exchanged between users and the LDS. For simplicity of presentation, in
our protocols we do not explicitly show these cryptographic operations involving
LDS’s public/private key. A complete list of symbols can be found in Table 3.1.
The PS (or Positioning Services) is a service that allows users to determine
their preferred (or own) position by using a third-party localization service, if they
are not able to determine such positions locally on the devices. The PS is also
required to determine the geographic coordinates of a given POI within a region
(e.g. a known restaurant). In order to limit the information that the PS learns
about the users’ location requests, a private information retrieval technique, such
as [65], can be used. This would eﬀectively prevent the PS from knowing which
POIs the users have requested and thus protect their location privacy vis-a`-vis
the PS.
Adversarial Model
Location Determination Server The LDS is assumed to execute the algo-
rithms correctly, i.e., take all the inputs and produce the output according to
the algorithm. However, the LDS may try to learn information about users’
location preferences from the received inputs, the intermediate results and the
produced outputs. This type of adversarial behavior is usually referred to as
honest-but-curious adversary (or semi-honest) [68]. In most practical settings,
where service providers have a commercial interest in providing a faithful service
to their customers, the assumption of a semi-honest LDS is generally suﬃcient.
Users The participating users also want to learn the private location pref-
erences of other users from the output of the algorithm they receive from the
LDS. We refer to such attacks as passive attacks. As user inputs are encrypted
with the LDS’s public keyKLDSP , there is a conﬁdentiality guarantee against basic
eavesdropping by participants and non participants. In addition to these attacks,
participants may also attempt to actively attack the protocol by colluding with
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Each user i
Preferred 
rendez-vous location
Li (by GPS or PS)
Transformation 
function f
Location Determination Server
PPFRVP algorithm A
Fairness function g
f(Li)
f(Lfair) = g(f(L1),...,f(LN))
Inverse 
function f--1
Fair rendez-vous 
location Lfair
Figure 3.1: Functional diagram of the PPFRVP protocol, where the PPFRVP
algorithm is executed by an LDS.
other users or manipulating their own inputs to learn the output.
3.3 Problem Deﬁnition
In this work, we consider the problem of ﬁnding, in a privacy-preserving way,
the rendez-vous point among a set of user-proposed locations, such that (i) the
rendez-vous point is a point that is fair (as deﬁned in Section 3.4.1) with respect
to the given locations, (ii) each of the users gets to know only the ﬁnal rendez-
vous location and (iii) no participating user or third-party server learns private
location information about any other user involved in the computations. We refer
to an algorithm that solves this problem as Privacy-Preserving Fair Rendez-Vous
Point (PPFRVP) algorithm. In general, any PPFRVP algorithm A should accept
the inputs and produce the outputs, as described below.
• Input : a transformation f of private locations Li: f(L1)||f(L2)|| . . . ||f(LN ).
where f is a one-way public function (based on secret key) such that is hard
(success with only a negligible probability) to determine the input Li with-
out knowing the secret key, by just observing f(Li).
• Output : an output f(Lfair) = g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN )), where g is a fairness
function and Lfair = (xl, yl) ∈ N2 is the fair rendez-vous location that has
been selected for this particular set of users, such that it is hard for the
LDS to determine Lfair by just observing f(Lfair). Given f(Lfair), each
user should be able to compute Lfair = f
−1(f(Lfair)) using his local data.
Figure 3.1 shows a functional diagram of a PPFRVP protocol, where the
PPFRVP algorithm A is executed by an LDS. The fairness function g can be
deﬁned in several ways, depending on the preferences of users or policies. For
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Lopt,a=ga(f(L1)...f(L4))
Lopt,b=gb(f(L1)...f(L4))
Lopt,c=gc(f(L1)...f(L4))
(x3,y3)
(x2,y2)
(x4,y4)(x1,y1)
(a) General PPFRVP scenario, where dis-
tinct fairness functions ga, gb, gc output
three diﬀerent fair rendez-vous locations
Lopt,a, Lopt,b, Lopt,c, given the user-preferred
rendez-vous locations L1, . . . , L4.
3
MD
2
MD
1
MD
4
MD
(x2,y2)
(x3,y3)
(x1,y1) (x4,y4)
(b) PPFRVP scenario, where the fairness func-
tion is g = argmini(D
M
i ). The dashed arrows
represent the maximum distanceDMi from each
user ui to any user j = i, whereas the solid line
is the minimum of all such maximum distances.
The fair rendez-vous location is Lfair = L2 =
(x2, y2).
Figure 3.2: Possible PPFRVP problem solutions for the general g fairness function
3.2(a) and a speciﬁc, minimum distance-based g function 3.2(b).
instance, users might prefer to meet in locations that are close to their oﬃces,
and their employers might prefer a place that is closest to their clients. Figure
3.2(a) shows three diﬀerent optimal locations for three distinct fairness functions
g.
In Section 3.4.1 we describe one such fairness function that minimizes the
maximum displacement of any user to all other locations. Such function is glob-
ally fair and general enough, and it can be extended to include more constraints
and parameters.
3.4 Privacy-Preserving Location Determination
In the previous section, we have deﬁned the fundamental building blocks that
constitute a PPFRVP problem, both from a functional perspective (as in Figure
3.1) and from a privacy context. From a practical point of view, however, the
problem is to design speciﬁc solutions and protocols that can be implemented
on existing commercial mobile devices. In order to achieve the integration be-
tween resource-constrained mobile devices and the existing client-server network
paradigm, our solutions have to be eﬃcient in terms of computations and com-
munication complexities, while taking advantage of the increasingly available
communication bandwidth on mobile devices.
In this section, we present our solution to the PPFRVP problem. First, we
discuss the mathematical tools that we use in order to model the fairness func-
tion g and the transformation functions f .In the following subsections, we deﬁne
the fairness function g by taking advantage of the properties of three well-known
cryptographic primitives that are used to implement the transformation function
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f . These primitives, in turn, will guarantee that no private information about
the preferred locations of any user is leaked to any other user or third-party in-
volved in the computations. Finally, by merging the f and g components of the
PPFRVP algorithm, we design our complete PPFRVP protocol. We then ana-
lytically evaluate its privacy properties and its computation and communication
complexities.
In order to separate the optimization part of the PPFRVP algorithm A from
its implementation using cryptographic primitives, we ﬁrst discuss the fairness
function g and then the transformation function f .
3.4.1 Fairness Function g
In order to determine a fair rendez-vous location, there are several factors that
need to be considered. First, the optimality criterion needs to consider the spatial
constraints present in the problem. For example, a rendez-vous location Lfair =
(xl, yl) among N users U = {ui}Ni=1 might be fair when all users can reach Lfair
in a “reasonable” amount of time. Another criterion might be to minimize the
total displacement of all users in order to reach Lfair, or simply making sure that
no user is “too far” from Lfair with respect to another user. Second, computing
an fair rendez-vous location in a privacy-preserving way requires g to perform
optimization operations in an oblivious fashion. In this work, we achieve this
by using the properties of appropriate cryptographic schemes. Features such
as homomorphic encryption and semantic security are of particular interest, as
they allow operations on the plain text elements to be accomplished by oblivious
computations on encrypted elements.
In this work, we consider the fairness criterion that has been widely used in
operations research to solve the k-center problem. In the k-center problem, the
goal is to ﬁnd L1, . . . , Lk locations among N given possible places, in order to
optimally place k facilities, such that the maximum distance from any place to
its closest facility is minimized. For a two dimensional coordinate system, the
Euclidian distance metric is usually employed.
As the PPFRVP problem consists in determining the fair rendez-vous loca-
tion from a set of user-preferred locations, we focus on the k-center formulation
of the problem with k = 1. This choice is also grounded on the fact that not
choosing Lfair from one of the location preferences L1, . . . , LN might potentially
result in a location Lfair that is not suited for the kind of meeting that the
participants require. The solution can easily be extended or integrated with
mapping applications (on the users’ devices) so that POIs around Lfair are auto-
matically suggested for the meeting. Figure 3.2(b) shows an example PPFRVP
scenario modeled as a k-center problem, where four users want to determine the
fair rendez-vous location Lfair.
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The k-center formulation considers the Euclidian distances, but it does not
encompass other fairness parameters, such as accessibility of a place and the
means of transportation. In this work, we focus on the pure k-center formulation
as the essential building block of a more complete model, which we extend to
encompass multiple and prioritized preferences in Section 3.7.
Let dij ≥ 0 be the Euclidian distance between two points Li, Lj ∈ N2, and
DMi = maxj =i dij be the maximum distance from Li to any other point Lj . Then,
the PPFRVP problem can be formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The PPFRVP problem is to determine a location Lfair ∈ L =
{L1, . . . , LN}, where fair = argminiDMi
A solution for the PPFRVP problem ﬁnds, in a privacy-preserving way, the
fair rendez-vous location among the set of proposed (and user-desired) locations,
such that the distance from the furthest proposed location to the fair one is
minimized.
There are two important steps involved in the computation of the fair location
Lfair. The ﬁrst step is to compute the pairwise distances dij among all preferred
locations Li, Lj ∈ {L1, . . . , LN}. The second step requires the computations
of the maximum and minimum values of such distances. Before proceeding with
these computations, in the following subsection we examine the features provided
by the cryptographic functions that will ensure the privacy of individual user-
desired locations Li, ∀i = 1, . . . , N .
3.4.2 Transformation Functions f
The fairness function g requires the computation of two functions on the private
user-preferred locations Li: (i) the distance between any two locations Li = Lj
and (ii) the minimum of the maximum of these distances. In order to solve
the FRVP problem and to preserve privacy, we rely on computationally secure
cryptographic primitives. In our protocol, we consider three such schemes: the
Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) [24], the ElGamal [49] and the Paillier [124] encryp-
tion schemes.
There are several cryptographic schemes that can be used, but not all of
them provide the same features. We are interested in using secure schemes that
allow us to compute the Euclidian distance between two points in the plane and
the maximization/minimization functions. What makes these schemes useful
in our setting are their homomorphic encryption properties. Given two plain
texts m1,m2 with their respective encryptions E(m1), E(m2), the multiplicative
property (possessed by the ElGamal and partially by the BGN schemes) states
that E(m1)  E(m2) = E(m1 ·m2), where  is an arithmetic operation in the
encrypted domain that is equivalent to the usual multiplication operation in the
plain text domain. The additive homomorphic property (possessed by the BGN
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and the Paillier schemes) states that E(m1) ⊕ E(m2) = E(m1 +m2), where ⊕
is an arithmetic operation in the encrypted domain which is equivalent to the
usual sum operation in the plain text domain. Details about the initialization,
operation and security of the encryption schemes can be found in [49, 24, 124].
Hereafter we describe the main operational aspects the BGN scheme; in Section
2.4 we already described the properties for the ElGamal and Paillier encryption
schemes.
BGN Given two plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ Z∗T (where T < q and q is a large prime)
with their respective encryptions E(m1), E(m2), the BGN possesses the following
multiplicative and additive homomorphic properties
E(m1 ·m2) = e(E(m1), E(m2)) · hr1 mod n
E(m1 +m2) = E(m1) · E(m2) · hr mod n
where e : G × G → G1 is an admissible bilinear map, G,G1 are two bilinear
groups of composite order n = pq (p, q are two large primes), h, g are public,
h1 = e(g, h) and r ∈ Zn is a random integer. BGN is an elliptic curve-based
scheme and therefore much shorter keys can be used compared to ElGamal and
RSA. A 160-bit key in elliptic curve cryptosystems is generally believed to provide
equivalent security as a 1024-bit key in RSA and ElGamal [135]. However, due
to the construction of the BGN scheme, only one homomorphic multiplication on
each encrypted element is allowed, whereas an inﬁnite number of homomorphic
additions can be performed.
Based on the three aforementioned encryption schemes, we now describe the
distance computation algorithms that are used in our solution.
3.4.3 Distance Computations
To determine the fair rendez-vous point, we need to ﬁnd the location Lfair,
where fair ∈ {1, . . . , N}, that minimizes the maximum distance between any
user-preferred location and Lfair. In our algorithms, we work with the square of
the distances, as they are much easier to compute in an oblivious fashion using
the homomorphic properties of the encryption schemes. The problem of ﬁnding
the argument that minimizes the maximum distance is equivalent to ﬁnding the
argument that minimizes the maximum squared distance (provided that all dis-
tances are greater than 0). As the squaring function maintains the relative order,
the algorithm is still correct.
Hereafter we propose two distance computation modules that will be used in
our PPFRVP protocol. Each of these modules computes the square of all pairwise
distances between any two user-desired locations, and preserves the privacy of
each user’s preferred location Li, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
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1. Each user i generates
Ei(a) = <ai1|...|ai6> = 
< E(xi2) | E(T-2xi) | E(1) |
E(T-2yi) | E(yi2) | E(1) >
Ei(b) = <bi1|...|bi6> = 
< E(1) | E(xi) | E(xi2) |
E(yi) | E(1) | E(yi2) >
2. Server computes
For i =1...N-1
For j = i+1…N
For k = 1...6
choose random r ? Zn
cij,k = e(aik,bjk)·hr
end for
cijtot = cij,1· ...· cij,6
end for
end for       
Ei(a),
Ei(b)
Users LDS
Figure 3.3: Distance computation protocol based on the BGN encryption scheme.
BGN-distance
Our ﬁrst distance computation algorithm is based on the BGN encryption scheme.
and is shown in Figure 3.3. This novel protocol requires only one round of
communication between each user and the LDS, and it eﬃciently uses both the
multiplicative and additive homomorphic properties of the BGN scheme. The
BGN-distance protocol works as follows. In Step 1, each user ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
creates the vectors
Ei(a) =< ai1| . . . |ai6 >=< E(x2i )|E(T − 2xi)|E(1)|E(T − 2yi)|E(y2i )|E(1) >
Ei(b) =< bi1| . . . |bi6 >=< E(1)|E(xi)|E(x2i )|E(yi)|E(1)|E(y2i ) >
where E(.) is the encryption of (.) using the BGN scheme with the fresh session
key KMvP and Li = (xi, yi) is the desired rendez-vous location of user ui. After-
wards, each user sends the two vectors Ei(a), Ei(b) over a secure channel to the
LDS. In Step 2, the LDS computes the scalar product of the received vectors by
ﬁrst applying the multiplicative and then the additive homomorphic property of
the BGN scheme. For example, in a scenario with two users, one can easily verify
that
Ei(a) • Ej(b) = E(x2i + xj(T − 2xi) + x2j + yj(T − 2yi) + y2i + y2j mod T )
= E(d2ij mod T )
where T is chosen such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, d2ij < T . At this point, the LDS
has obliviously computed E(d2ij), which is the (encrypted) square of the pairwise
distances between all pairs Li, Lj of user-desired locations, where i = j.
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1. Each user i generates Ei(a)
= <ai1|...|ai4> = < Pai(xi2) | ElG(xi) | Pai(yi2) | ElG(yi) >
2.1 Server computes
For i =1...N-1, For j = i+1…N:
choose random rs, rt ? Zn*, find their 
multipl. inv. rs-1, rt-1
rij,s = rs ; rij,sinv = rs-1 ; rij,t = rt   ; rij,tinv = rt-1
cij,s = ai2 · aj2 · ElG(n-2rij,s); cij,t = ai4 · aj4 · 
ElG(n-2rij,t)
end for. end for       
Ei(a)
Users LDS
User 1
User N
1 1
| ... |
N
c c? ? ?? ?
( 2 ) ( 1)
| ... |
N N N N
c c? ?? ?? ?
3. Each user i decrypts the    
received elements c?.. using  
the ElGamal key, obtaining
F?.. = DElG(c?..)
and re-encrypts them using   
the Paillier encryption 
scheme, obtaining Pai(F?..) 
All users
Pai(F?.. )
4.  Server inverts the permutation ? with ?-1 on 
the received encrypted elements Pai(F?)
2.2 Chooses random element-permut. fct.
? = (?1,..,?N(N-1)) and selects cij,. accordingly
4.1 For i =1...N-1. For j = i+1…N: 
cijtot = ai1·Pai(Fij,s)rij,sinv· aj1·ai3·Pai(Fij,t)rij,tinv·aj3
end for. end for
Figure 3.4: Distance computation protocol based on the ElGamal and Paillier
encryption schemes.
Paillier-ElGamal-distance
An alternative scheme for the distance computation is based on both the Paillier
and ElGamal encryptions, as shown in Figure 3.4. As neither Paillier or ElGa-
mal possess both multiplicative and additive properties, the resulting algorithm
requires one extra step in order to achieve the same result as the BGN-based
scheme, i.e., obliviously computing the pairwise squared distances d2ij . The dis-
tances are computed as follows. In Step 1, each user ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, creates
the vector
Ei(a) =< ai1| . . . |ai4 >=< Pai(x2i )|ElG(xi)|Pai(y2i )|ElG(yi) >
where Pai(.) and ElG(.) refer to the encryption of (.) using the Paillier or ElGa-
mal encryption schemes, respectively. Afterwards, each user ui sends the vector
Ei(a) to the LDS, encrypted with LDS’s public key. In step 2.1, the LDS com-
putes the scalar product of the second and fourth element of the received vectors
(as shown in Figure 3.4). In order to hide this intermediate result from the users,
the LDS obliviously randomizes these results with random values rs, rt. At the
same time, the LDS computes the multiplicative inverse of such values, denoted
as r−1s and r
−1
t respectively. These randomized scalar products are denoted as
cij,s and cij,t. In step 2.2, the LDS permutes the order of all cij,s and cij,t with its
private element-permutation function σ = [σ1, . . . , σN(N−1)], and sends N such
distinct elements to each user ui. In step 3, each user simply decrypts the received
elements with the ElGamal private key and re-encrypts them with the Paillier
public key. Then each user sends the re-encrypted elements to the LDS in the
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Users LDS
User 1
User N
B.1 LDS masks pairwise encrypted distances
For i =1...N. If ElG-Pai, then w = n, Else w = T
choose random ri, si ? Zw* ,find ri-1
For j = 1…N,
end for. end for       
1 1 1
* *| ... |
N
d d? ? ? ?? ?
1
* *| ... |
N N N
d d? ? ? ?? ?
B. MAX computations
B.3 Each user i decrypts the received 
values d?* , determines the MAX 
among them and stores its index 
as ?imax
B.4 LDS inverts perm. ? and ?, and removes masking 
For i = 1..N,                                               ,end for
1*max · (( )) imax rii i E gc d s
?? ?
For all i,
?imax
C. ARGMIN MAX computations C.1 LDS masks MAX values
For i =1...N, choose random ri ,si  ? Zw*
end for    
max · (( ) )irmaxi i iEd c s?
* ( · () )irtotij ij id c E s?
For all i, dimaxC.2 Each user i decrypts the received values di
max
and determines the min among them
User 2 2 1 2
* *| ... |
N
d d? ? ? ?? ?
A. Distance computations using any of the two described protocols
C.3 The user with the min dimax  informs  all participants of the final 
meeting place Lopt
B.2 LDS chooses private element-permut. fcts.
? =(?1,..,?N) and ? = (?1,..,?N). LDS permutes dij*
with respect to i with ?, and with respect to j 
with ? 
Figure 3.5: Privacy-Preserving Fair Rendez-Vous Point (PPFRVP) protocol.
same order as he received it. In step 4, the LDS reverts the element-permutation
function σ, and in step 4.1 it ﬁnally computes the d2ij for all i, j, after having
removed the randomizing factors rij,s, rij,t with their inverses rij,sinv and rij,tinv.
At this point, the LDS has securely computed E(d2ij), the (encrypted) square of
the pairwise distances between all pairs of user-desired locations Li = Lj .
As the ElGamal-Paillier based distance computation involves decryption/re-
encryption operations, it may be possible for participants to maliciously change
the masked values. For instance, such an active attack could be performed in or-
der to disrupt the distance computations or to manipulate the result for personal
advantage (such as a personally convenient but generally subfair rendez-vous lo-
cation). We discuss such active attacks in Section 3.4.6.
3.4.4 The PPFRVP Protocol
In the previous subsections, we deﬁned all the necessary operations and crypto-
graphic tools that are required in order to solve the PPFRVP problem. We now
describe our protocol for the PPFRVP problem, as shown in Figure 3.5. The
protocol has three main modules: (A) the distance computation module, (B) the
MAX module and (C) the ARGMIN MAX module.
Distance computations
The ﬁrst module (distance computation) uses one of the two protocols deﬁned in
the previous subsection (BGN-distance or Paillier-ElGamal-distance). We note
that modules (B) and (C) use the same encryption scheme as the one used in
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module (A). In other words, E(.) of Figure 3.5 refers to the encryption of (.) using
either the BGN or the Paillier encryption scheme. Once the distance protocol
has been decided, the next modules (B) and (C) are executed as follows.
MAX computations
In Step B.1, the LDS needs to obliviously hide the values within the encrypted
elements (i.e., the pairwise distances computed earlier), before sending them to
the users, in order to avoid leaking any kind of private information such as the
pairwise distance or desired locations to any user.2 In order to obliviously mask
such values, for each index i the LDS generates two random values ri, si that are
used to scale and shift the ctotij (the encrypted square distance between Li, Lj) for
all j, obtaining d∗ij . This is done in order to (i) ensure privacy of real pairwise
distances, (ii) be resilient in case of collusion among users and (iii) preserve the
internal order (the inequalities) among the pairwise distance from each user to
all other users. Afterwards, in Step B.2 the LDS chooses two private element-
permutation functions σ (for i) and θ (for j) and permutes d∗ij , obtaining the
permuted values d∗σiθj , where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The LDS sends N such distinct
elements to each user. In Step B.3, each user decrypts the received values, de-
termines their maximum and sends the index σmaxi of the maximum value to
the LDS. In Step B.4 of the MAX module (B), the LDS inverts the permutation
functions σ, θ and removes the masking from the received indexes corresponding
to the maximum distance values.
ARGMIN MAX computations
In Step C.1, the LDS masks the true maximum distances by scaling and shifting
them by the same random amount, such that their order (the inequalities among
them) is preserved. Then the LDS sends to each user all the masked maximum
distances. In Step C.2 each user decrypts the received masked (randomly scaled
and shifted) maximum values, and determines the minimum among all maxima.
In Step C.3, each user knows which identiﬁer corresponds to himself, and the
user whose preferred location has the minimum distance sends to all other users
the fair rendez-vous location in an anonymous way.
After the last step, each user receives the ﬁnal fair rendez-vous location, but
no other information regarding non-fair locations or distances is leaked. In the
next section, we analyze our PPFRVP protocols with respect to their privacy and
2After the distance computation module (A), the LDS possesses all encrypted pairwise
distances. This encryption is made with the public key of the participants and thus the LDS
cannot decrypt the distances without the corresponding private key. The oblivious (and order-
preserving) masking performed by the LDS at Step B.1 is used in order to hide the pairwise
distances from the users themselves, as otherwise they would be able to obtain these distances
and violate the privacy of the users.
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complexity aspects. In order to assess the eﬃciency and to know whether the
proposed PPFRVP protocol fulﬁlls the privacy requirements deﬁned in Section
3.3, we present the complexity and privacy analysis in the next subsection.
3.4.5 Privacy Requirements and Deﬁnitions
Informally, the privacy requirements can be stated as follows. After the execution
of the PPFRVP algorithm, any user ui should not be able to infer (i) the preferred
location Lj of any other user uj = ui nor (ii) the relative distances dij between
any two users ui = uj . Likewise, any LDS (and PS) should not be able to
infer (iii) the preferred location Li of any user ui, (iv) the relative distance dij
between any two users ui = uj nor (v) the ﬁnal rendez-vous location Lfair. Such
privacy requirements can be grouped in two components, called as user-privacy
and server-privacy, formally deﬁned as follows.
User-Privacy
The user-privacy of any PPFRVP algorithm A measures the probabilistic ad-
vantage that an attacker a (a user participating in the PPFRVP protocol or an
external user) gains towards learning the preferred location Lj of at least one
other user j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, except the ﬁnal fair rendez-vous location Lfair, after
all users have participated in the execution of the PPFRVP protocol. Clearly,
an external user does not learn about any preferred locations as it does not re-
ceive the output of the algorithm. Therefore, we only consider the non-trivial
case of users participating in the PPFRVP protocol as attackers, i.e., ua where
a ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
We express the user-privacy in terms of three adversary advantages. First,
we measure the identiﬁability advantage, which is the probabilistic advantage of
ua in correctly guessing the preferred location Li of any user ui = ua. We denote
it as AdvIDTa (A). Second, we measure the distance-linkability advantage, which
is the probabilistic advantage of ua in correctly guessing whether the distance dij
between any two users ui = uj , is greater than a given parameter s, without nec-
essarily knowing any users’ preferred locations Li, Lj . We denote this advantage
as Advd−LNKa . Finally, we measure the coordinate-linkability advantage, which is
the probabilistic advantage of ua in correctly guessing whether a given coordinate
xi (or yi) of a user ui is greater than the corresponding coordinate(s) of another
user uj = ui, i.e., xj (or yj), without necessarily knowing any users’ preferred
locations Li, Lj . We denote this advantage as Adv
c−LNK
a . The next observation
follows from the above deﬁnitions.
Observation 3. If an adversary has an identiﬁability advantage over any two
distinct users ui = uj, this implies it has distance- and coordinate-linkability
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advantages over those two users as well. However, the inverse is not necessarily
true.
We semantically deﬁne the identiﬁability and linkability advantages by using a
challenge-response methodology, which has been widely used to prove the security
of cryptographic protocols. We now describe such a challenge-response game
for the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTa (A) of any adversary ua in a PPFRVP
algorithm A. Let U = {u1, . . . , uN , ua} be the set of all users, including the
adversary ua, and let C be the challenger. The game is deﬁned as follows:
1. Challenger setup: C privately collects the preferred rendez-vous locations
Li; Li = Lj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2. Algorithm execution: C executes the PPFRVP algorithm A with all users
U and computes f(Lfair) = g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN ), f(La)). It then sends
f(Lfair) to each user ui ∈ U.
3. Challenge: C chooses a random k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and sends Lk to the adver-
sary ua.
4. Guess: ua chooses a value k
′ ∈ {1, . . . , N} and sends it back to the chal-
lenger. ua wins the game if k
′ = k, otherwise he loses.
The identiﬁability advantage is deﬁned as the probabilistic advantage of the
adversary in winning this game. It is denoted as:
AdvIDTa (A) = Pr[ua wins the game]− 1/N = Pr[k′ = k]− 1/N (3.1)
where Pr(k′ = k) is the probability that ua correctly guesses the value k chosen
by the challenger.
The above notion of identiﬁability is also called weak identiﬁability because
the adversary knows that the challenge belongs to one of the participant. A
stronger notion of identiﬁability can also be deﬁned. In the deﬁnition of strong
identiﬁability, the challenge (in Step 3) is a randomly chosen non-trivial two
dimensional position coordinate, instead of restricting the challenge location to
belong to one of the participating user. The adversary in this game wins if he
correctly guesses if the challenge location belongs to one of the participants or
not. In this work, we focus only on the weak identiﬁability property.
Similarly, we deﬁne the distance-linkability advantage Advd−LNKa (A) of any
adversary ua in a PPFRVP algorithm A by means of the following game.
1. Challenger setup: C privately collects the preferred rendez-vous locations
Li = Lj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2. Algorithm execution: C executes the PPFRVP algorithm A with all users
U and computes f(Lfair) = g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN ), f(La)). It then sends
f(Lfair) to each user ui ∈ U.
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3. Challenge: C chooses a random value s and two distinct users uj , uk, ∀j, k ∈
{1, . . . , N}, j = k. C sends (j, k, s) to the adversary.
4. Guess: ua responds with a value s
∗ ∈ {0, 1}. ua wins the game if s∗ = 0
and dj,k ≥ s, or if s∗ = 1 and dj,k < s. Otherwise, the adversary looses.
The distance-linkability advantage is deﬁned as the probabilistic advantage
of the adversary in winning this game. It is denoted as:
Advd−LNKa (A) = Pr[s
∗ = 0 ∧ dj,k ≥ s] + Pr[s∗ = 1 ∧ dj,k < s]− 1/2 (3.2)
Finally, we deﬁne the coordinate-linkability advantage Advc−LNKa (A) of any
adversary ua in a PPFRVP algorithm A by means of the following game.
1. Challenger setup: C privately collects the preferred rendez-vous locations
Li = Lj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2. Algorithm execution: C executes the PPFRVP algorithm A with all users
U and computes f(Lfair) = g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN ), f(La)). It then sends
f(Lfair) to each user ui ∈ U.
3. Challenge: C throws an unbiased coin to select a coordinate axis b ∈ {x, y}.
C randomly chooses j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, j = k. C sends {j, k, b} to ua as a
challenge.
4. Guess: ua responds with a value r ∈ {0, 1} and sends it back to the chal-
lenger. ua wins the game if:{
r = 0 and bj ≤ bk OR
r = 1 and bj > bk
ua looses the game otherwise. T
The coordinate-linkability advantage is deﬁned as the probabilistic advantage
of the adversary in winning this game. It is denoted as:
Advc−LNKa (A) = Pr[r = 0 ∧ bj ≤ bk] + Pr[r = 1 ∧ bj > bk]− 1/2 (3.3)
For the third-party (LDS) adversary, the game deﬁnitions are similar to those
of the user adversary, except that the LDS does not receive Lfair at the Step
2 of the game. As the LDS obtains no additional information compared to ua
but even less, the probability that it guesses correctly in Step 4 cannot be higher
than that of ua and not lower than a random guess. Thus, the LDS cannot win
the game with non-negligible advantage.
We now deﬁne the user-privacy of any PPFRVP algorithm A on a per-
execution basis in the following way.
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Deﬁnition 3.2. An execution of the PPFRVP algorithm A is user-private if the
identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTa (A), the distance-linkability advantage Adv
c−LNK
a (A)
and the coordinate-linkability advantage Advc−LNKa (A) of each participating user
ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} are negligible in terms of the number of user-preferred rendez-
vous locations Li.
In general, a function f(x) is called negligible if, for any positive polynomial
p(x), there is an integer B such that for any integer x > B, |f(x)| < 1/p(x)
[68]. According to Deﬁnition 3.2, an execution of the PPFRVP algorithm is
user-private if and only if any user ua does not gain any (actually, negligible)
additional knowledge about the preferred rendez-vous locations Lj of any other
user uj = ua, except the value of the ﬁnal fair rendez-vous location Lfair.
Server-Privacy
The server-privacy of any PPFRVP algorithm A measures the probabilistic ad-
vantage that the LDS gains in learning the preferred rendez-vous locations Li
of any user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. As in the case of user-privacy, we express the
server-privacy by means of three advantages. First, we measure the probabilis-
tic advantage of an LDS in correctly guessing the preferred location Li of any
user ui, called identiﬁability advantage and denoted as Adv
IDT
LDS(A). Second, we
measure the probabilistic advantage of an LDS in correctly guessing whether the
distance dij between any two users ui = uj is greater than a given parameter s,
without necessarily knowing any users’ preferred locations Li, Lj . We call this
the distance-linkability advantage and we denote it as Advd−LNKLDS (A). Third, we
measure the probabilistic advantage in correctly guessing whether a given coor-
dinate xi (or yi) is greater than the same coordinate of another user j = i, i.e.,
xj (or yj), without necessarily knowing any users’ preferred locations Li, Lj . We
call this the coordinate-linkability advantage and we denote it as Advc−LNKLDS (A).
Deﬁnition 3.3. An execution of the PPFRVP algorithm A is server-private if the
identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTLDS(A), the distance-linkability advantage Adv
c−LNK
LDS
and the coordinate-linkability advantage Advc−LNKLDS of an LDS are negligible.
However, it is reasonable to assume that in practice users will be able to
perform multiple executions of the PPFRVP protocol, possibly with diﬀerent sets
of participating users at each time. This is particularly true if such a meeting-
location service is oﬀered, for instance, by providers to their subscribers. As a
consequence, privacy of a PPFRVP should be deﬁned over multiple executions.
PPFRVP Privacy
We now formally express the privacy conditions that any PPFRVP algorithm A
has to satisfy, based on the above deﬁnitions. First, we deﬁne a private execution
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of a PPFRVP algorithm as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.4. A private execution of any PPFRVP algorithm A is an execution
which does not reveal more information than what can be derived from the inputs,
the intermediate results and its output.
Based on how memory is retained over sequential executions, we deﬁne two
types of algorithm executions, namely, dependent and independent.
Deﬁnition 3.5. An independent (respectively dependent) execution is a single
private execution of the PPFRVP algorithm deﬁned in Section 3.3 in which no
(respectively some) information of an earlier and current execution is retained
and passed to future executions.
The information that might be transferred from an earlier execution to the
next can include past inputs to the algorithm, intermediate results (on the LDS)
and the outputs of the algorithm. Based on the type of execution, the privacy
conditions of a privacy-preserving meeting-location algorithm can be deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 3.6. A PPFRVP algorithm A is execution (respectively fully) privacy-
preserving if and only if for every independent (respectively all) execution(s)
1. A is correct; All users are correctly able to compute the ﬁnal fair rendez-
vous location Lfair;
2. A is user-private;
3. A is server-private.
A fully privacy-preserving meeting-location (PPFRVP) algorithm is a much
stronger (and diﬃcult to achieve) privacy requirement. In this work, we focus
on achieving execution privacy. The relationship between a fully PPFRVP and
execution PPFRVP algorithm is given by the following observation.
Observation 4. Any PPFRVP algorithm A, as deﬁned in Section 3.3, is exe-
cution privacy-preserving if it is fully privacy-preserving, but the inverse is not
true.
3.4.6 Analytical Evaluation
The proposed PPFRVP protocol, shown in Figure 3.5, is based on the interaction
between users and a third-party LDS. Each of these parties performs operations
on both plaintext and encrypted elements, and the resources available on the user
devices are usually lower than those of the LDS. We now present the privacy and
complexity analysis of our protocols, and then we show the asymptotic complex-
ities of our two distance and PPFRVP protocols, by considering both client and
LDS computation, communication and memory complexities.
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Privacy Analysis
In our analysis, we consider two types of adversaries: Passive (honest-but-curious)
and active adversaries. The passive try to learn as much information as possible
from their inputs, the execution of the PPFRVP protocol and its output, without
maliciously injecting or modifying data. The active adversaries, on the contrary,
try on purpose to manipulate the data in order to obtain private information.
The aforementioned deﬁnition captures the privacy requirements of a single
execution of a PPFRVP algorithm. By repeated interactions among a stable set
of users, Lfair could be used to infer possible Li of other users. The issue of
learning from repeated interaction is inherent to any algorithm that, based on a
set of private inputs, chooses one of them in particular, based on some criterion.
For this reason, in this work we consider privacy for a single execution of the
PPFRVP algorithm, or for repeated executions but with diﬀerent sets of users.
Passive Adversary Under the passive adversary model, we have the following
result.
Proposition 3.1. The proposed PPFRVP protocols are correct and they guar-
antee identiﬁability- and coordinate-linkability privacy. However, they do not
guarantee distance-linkability privacy.
In other words, Proposition 3.1 states that both the proposed algorithms
correctly compute the fair rendez-vous location, given the received inputs, and
that they do not reveal any users’ preferred rendez-vous locations to any other
user, except the fair rendez-vous location Lfair. However, in the following proof
we show that there is at least one case where the adversary can win the distance-
linkability game with non-negligible advantage. Nevertheless, both algorithms do
not reveal information about the location or relationship between the coordinates
of any Li, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The LDS does not learn any information at all about
any user-preferred locations.
Proof. Correctness
Given the encrypted set of user-preferred locations f(L1), . . . , f(LN ), the pro-
posed PPFRVP algorithms compute the pairwise distance between each pair of
users dij , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, according to the schemes of the respective distance
computation algorithms. Following the sequence of steps for such computation,
one can easily verify that the ElGamal-Paillier based distance computation algo-
rithm computes
Pai(d2ij) = Pai(x
2
i ) · Pai(−2xixj) · Pai(y2j ) · Pai(y2i ) · Pai(−2yiyj)
· Pai(y2j ) = Pai(x2i − 2xixj + x2j + y2i − 2yiyj + y2j )
which is the same result that is achieved by the BGN-based distance algorithm.
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After the pairwise distance computations, the PPFRVP algorithm computes
the masking of these pairwise distances by scaling and shifting operations. The
scaling operation is achieved by exponentiating the encrypted element to the
power of ri, where ri ∈ Z∗w is a random integer and r−1i is its multiplicative
inverse. The shifting operation is done by multiplying the encrypted element with
the encryption (using the public key of the users) of another random integer si
privately chosen by the LDS. These two algebraic operations mask the values d2ij
(within the encrypted elements), such that the true d2ij are hidden from the users.
Nevertheless, thanks to the homomorphic properties of the encryption schemes,
the LDS is still able to remove the masking (after the users have identiﬁed the
maximum value) and correctly re-mask all maxima, such that each user is able
to correctly ﬁnd the minimum of all maxima.
In the end, each user is able to determine Lfair, where fair = argminimaxj d
2
ij
from the outputs of the PPFRVP algorithm, and therefore the PPFRVP algo-
rithms are correct.
User Identiﬁability Advantage Hereafter we provide sketches of the proofs
of user-privacy, after a private execution of the PPFRVP algorithm A. A sketch
is usually given to intuitively show how the formal proof can be constructed
with the argument presented in the sketch. In particular, the following sketches
are exhaustive, i.e., they cover all possible cases, and they are used to show
whether the diﬀerent advantages are non-negligible and thus whether a PPFRVP
algorithm A is execution privacy-preserving.
In the identiﬁability advantage, there are only two possible outcomes of the
PPFRVP algorithm, depending on users’ preferred locations Li: The ﬁrst case is
when Lfair = La, i.e., when the fair rendez-vous location is the one proposed by
the adversary; the second case is when Lfair = La, i.e., when the fair location is
diﬀerent from the one proposed by the adversary. Hereafter we split the sketch
of our proof according to these two (and only possible) cases, and show that the
advantage of the adversary is negligible in both these cases:
1. Lfair = La: In this case, the adversary does not learn any additional in-
formation that was not already known to him before the execution of the
protocol, except the order among the maximum distances between the users
and the corresponding indices. Moreover, we consider here the non-trivial
case where the challenger chooses a value k = a, otherwise the correct an-
swer to the challenge is trivial. It should be noted that the challenger cannot
select the trivial case with a probability greater than 1/N (during the chal-
lenge step or step 3). In this non-trivial case, the adversary cannot guess
the value k = a with a higher certainty than he would by a random guess
because only the LDS knows the secret scaling and shifting values used for
the masking operation. In fact, the order among the masked distances does
not reveal any additional information about the actual locations, as there
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could be inﬁnitely many locations at the same masked distance. Thus, the
advantage of the adversary in this case is negligible.
2. Lfair = La: In this case, the adversary learns, after the execution of the
protocol, another preferred location Lfair = La diﬀerent from his own, in
addition to the order among the maximum distances for all users. The ad-
versary is able to compute the distance da,fair between his preferred location
and Lfair. However, thanks to the masking operation on the distances and
to the independence among the users’ preferred locations, the adversary
has no additional knowledge to link da,fair to any other masked d
MAX
i he
knows. For instance, it is impossible for him to even compare da,fair to
any of the dMAXi as only the LDS knows the secret scaling and shifting
values used for the masking operation. Hence, even with the additional
knowledge of the da,fair and Lfair, the adversary cannot guess the value of
k with a probability higher than a random guess. Thus, the advantage of
the adversary is negligible in this case as well.
Considering the previous arguments, we have the following:
AdvIDTa (A) = Pr(k
′ = k|Lfair = La)Pr(Lfair = La)
+ Pr(k′ = k|Lfair = La)Pr(Lfair = La)− 1/N
= 1/N · 1/(N + 1) + 1/N ·N/(N + 1)− 1/N = 1/N − 1/N
= 0
Thanks to the independence of k′ conditioned on the outcome Lfair. Thus, the
identiﬁability-advantage is negligible.
User Coordinate-Linkability Advantage
Similarly to the identiﬁability advantage, there could only be two possible out-
comes of any PPFRVP algorithm A, represented by the two cases Lfair = La and
Lfair = La. Hereafter we show that the advantage of the adversary is negligible
in both cases.
1. Lfair = La: In this case, the adversary does not learn any additional in-
formation about the coordinates of any two users j, k. As the masked and
ordered distances cannot be linked to a speciﬁc coordinate with a success
probability higher than 1/2, the adversary cannot guess whether the coor-
dinate value bj is larger or smaller than bk with a probability higher than
a random guess (1/2). In fact, as the order among the masked distances is
a relative measure between locations that is position-independent, it does
not provide any additional information about the values of the coordinates
of Lj , Lk. Thus, the advantage of the adversary is negligible.
2. Lfair = La: In this case, the adversary can once again compute the dis-
tance da,fair between Lfair and La. As the distance by itself conveys no
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information about the orientation or relative position between Lj and Lk,
∀j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and j = k, the adversary cannot guess whether the co-
ordinate b, randomly chosen by the challenger, is larger or smaller for Lj
with respect to Lk with a higher certainty than a random guess. Thus, his
advantage is negligible.
Similarly to the identiﬁability advantage, we obtain:
Advc−LNKa (A) = Pr(r = 0 ∧ bj ≤ bk|Lfair = La)Pr(Lfair = La)
+ Pr(r = 0 ∧ bj ≤ bk|Lfair = La)Pr(Lfair = La)
+ Pr(r = 1 ∧ bj > bk|Lfair = La)Pr(Lfair = La)
+ Pr(r = 1 ∧ bj > bk|Lfair = La)Pr(Lfair = La)
− 1/2
= Pr(r = 0) · Pr(bj ≤ bk) + Pr(r = 1)
· Pr(bj > bk)− 1/2 = 1/4 + 1/4− 1/2 = 0
Thanks to the independence of the coordinate b from the outcome Lfair. Thus,
the coordinate-linkability is negligible.
User Distance-Linkability Advantage
The PPFRVP algorithm deﬁned in this chapter takes as inputs the preferred
rendez-vous locations Li of each user ui ∈ U and outputs both f(Lfair) and
the set of randomized (but order-preserving) maximum distances dmaxi , ∀ui ∈ U.
By means of an example, we show that there is at least one case in which our
PPFRVP algorithm does not satisfy distance-linkability.
Suppose that, at Step 3 of the distance-linkability game, C chooses a value
s > maxui∈U dmaxi . At Step 4, ua obtains (s, j, k) and it knows that s is larger than
any of the maximum randomized distances that it already possesses. Moreover,
ua also knows that the order-preserving randomization procedure Rand(.) is such
that dmaxi = Rand(c
max
i ) > c
max
i , i.e., the randomization strictly increases the
output compared to the input because the two randomizing factors ri, si are
positive. Hence, if s > maxui U d
max
i , ua knows that for sure s > dj,k, ∀j = k.
Thus, ua can win the game with non-negligible probability by choosing s
∗ = 0,
proving that in this case our PPFRVP algorithm A does not satisfy user distance-
linkability.
Active Adversary We consider three main categories of active attacks against
PPFRVP protocols, namely (i) the collusion among users and/or LDS, (ii) the
fake user generation and/or replay attacks and (iii) unfair rendez-vous location.
Collusion Regardless of the protocol used or the encryption methods, in the
case when users collude among themselves the published fair result (together with
the additional information malicious users may get from colluders) can be used to
construct exclusion zones, based on the set of equations and known constraints.
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An exclusion zone is a region that does not contain any location preferences,
and the number of such exclusion zones increases with the number of colluders.
We are currently working on quantifying this impact on our optimization and
encryption methods. However, in the unlikely case of collusion between the LDS
and the participants, the latter will be able to obtain other participants’ prefer-
ences. In order to mitigate such a threat, the invited participants could agree
on establishing a shared secret by using techniques from threshold cryptography
[139]. The LDS should then collude with at least a given number of participants
in order to obtain the shared secret and learn Li.
Fake Users Generating fake users can be attempted both by the LDS and
by any meeting participant, in order to disrupt or manipulate the computations
of the fair rendez-vous location. However, the security of our algorithms prevents
such attacks from succeeding. In case the LDS generates fake users, it would
not be able to obtain the secret that is shared among the honest users and
which is used to derive the secret key KMvs for each session v. This attack is
more dangerous if a legitimate participant creates a fake, because the legitimate
participant knows the shared secret. In this scenario, however, the LDS knows
the list of meeting participants (as it computes the fair rendez-vous location) and
therefore it would accept only messages digitally signed by each one of them.
Here we rely on the fact that fake users will not be able to get their public keys
signed by a CA. Replay attacks could be thwarted by adding and verifying an
individually signed nonce, derived using the shared secret, in each user’s message.
Unfair RV The last type of active attack could lead to the determination of
an unfair rendez-vous location. Maliciously modifying or untruthfully reporting
the maximum masked values (Step B.3 of Figure 3.5) could deceive the LDS to
accept the false received index as the maximum value, and therefore potentially
lead to the determination of a subfair rendez-vous location. However, this is
rather unlikely to happen in practice. For instance, even if in Step B.3 a user
falsely reports one of his values to be the maximum when actually it is not, this
would cause the algorithm to select a subfair rendez-vous location if and only if
no other user selected a smaller value as the maximum distance.
Complexity Analysis
Table 3.2 summarizes the complexity results for our two protocols, both for the
client devices and for the LDS. As it can be seen, the client complexity is in
general O(N), where N is the number of users. However, there is a notable
exception for the BGN-based scheme; the number of exponentiation required for
a single decryption is O(
√
T ) [24], where T is the order of the plaintext domain. In
Section 3.5, we show how this charateristic impacts the decryption performance.
The LDS complexity for both protocols is in general O(N2), with the notable
exception of BGN, where in addition to multiplications and exponentiations the
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Table 3.2: Asymptotic complexity of the proposed PPFRVP protocols, where
N is the number of participants. The Distance protocol is the one used in the
module A of Figure 3.5, whereas PPFRVP includes modules A,B and C.
CLIENT PROTOCOL BGN (mod n) 
ELGAMAL- 
PAILLIER 
(mod n2) 
LDS 
BGN 
(mod n) 
ELGAMAL- 
PAILLIER 
(mod n2) 
Mult. Distance O(1) O(N) Mult. O(N2) O(N2) PPFRVP Exp. 
Exp. 
Distance O(?) 
O(N) 
Bilinear 
O(N2) ------- PPFRVP O(N??) mapping 
Memory Distance O(1) O(N) Memory O(N2) O(N2) PPFRVP O(N) 
Comm. Distance O(1) O(N) Comm. O(N) O(N
2) 
PPFRVP O(N) O(N2)  
schemes requires additional O(N2) bilinear mappings. These operations are re-
quired in order to support the multiplicative property of the BGN scheme. The
bilinear mappings are not required in the ElGamal-Paillier scheme. Nevertheless,
the exponentiation operations can be pre-computed in BGN (because the h value
is public), as opposed to the ElGamal-Paillier-based approach.
3.5 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the results of the performance measurements using our
implementations of the proposed algorithms on Nokia devices.
The tests were conducted on Nokia N810 mobile devices (ARM 400 MHz
CPU, 256 MB RAM). The operating system on the N810s is the Linux-based
Maemo OS2008, and we wrote our applications using the Qt programming lan-
guage, which is optimized for such OS. The LDS has been implemented on a 2
GHz Intel CPU with 3 GB RAM, running the Ubuntu 9.04 Linux. Figure 3.6
shows the software architecture diagram, where the function of each block is self-
explanatory, whereas Figure 3.7 depicts the prototype application running on a
Nokia N810.
For the elliptic curve BGN-based PPFRVP protocol, we measured the perfor-
mance using both a 160-bit and a 256-bit secret key, whereas for the ElGamal-
Paillier-based one we used 1024-bit secret keys. As BGN is an elliptic curve-based
scheme, much shorter keys can be used compared to ElGamal and RSA. A 160-
bit key in elliptic curve cryptosystems is generally believed to provide equivalent
security as a 1024-bit key in RSA and ElGamal [135]. Readers should note that
we measured only the computation time on the devices, without the message
communication delays. As several wireless interfaces (WiFi, cellular, bluetooth)
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Encrypt (el/pa/bgn) EncryptRSA EncrsaQ
On_startMeetingButton_clicked RequestCommonLocation (el/pa/gm)
Update_Location (el/pa/bgn)
Location
Li
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f(Li)
for LDS
Client names/
Encr. names 
for LDS
Modified Li preference
Selected meeting participants
PPFRVP 
request 
sent to LDS
Client privkey (el/pa/bgn)
Client pubkey (el/pa/bgn)
Figure 3.6: Architecture diagram of the client PPFRVP prototype application.
Lfair Li
Figure 3.7: Prototype PPFRVP application running on a Nokia N810 mobile
device. The image on the left is the main window, where users add the desired
meeting participants. The image on the right is the map that shows the fair
rendez-vous location (green pin) and the user-preferred rendez-vous location (red
pin).
with diﬀerent connection data rates and delays could be used to access these
services, we do not measure time delays here.
LDS Performance
Figures 3.8(a), 3.8(b) and 3.8(c) show the computation time required by the LDS.
We can see that it increases with the number of users, and that the ElGamal-
Paillier algorithm is the most eﬃcient across all computations, requiring 4 seconds
to execute the PPFRVP protocol with 10 participants. The two BGN-based
algorithms are less eﬃcient, but are still practical enough (9 seconds). The CPU-
intensive bilinear mappings in BGN are certainly one important reason for such
delays.
Regarding the subsequent modules B and C of the PPFRVP protocol, we
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Figure 3.8: Performance measurements.
observe a that the BGN-based algorithms outperform the ElGamal-Paillier one
(Figure 3.8(b) and 3.8(c)). The maximum computations on the LDS require 0.5
seconds for the 160-bit BGN algorithm, whereas the ElGamal-Paillier takes al-
most 2 seconds. A similar result can be observed for the minimum computations.
There are two main reasons for this. First, there are no bilinear mappings in-
volved in these modules and second, the BGN-based algorithms use much smaller
key sizes. From a practical perspective, both the ElGamal-Paillier and the BGN
algorithms have good performance in modules B and C of the PPFRVP protocol.
Client Performance
Figures 3.8(d) and 3.8(e) show the diﬀerent computation times on the Nokia N810
mobile device. As it can be seen, thanks to the eﬃcient use of the homomorphic
properties of our BGN-based algorithm, this protocol is the most eﬃcient for the
distance computations, requiring only 0.3 seconds, independently of the number
of users. The alternative protocol, on the contrary, needs 4 seconds with 10
participants. However, in the subsequent phases, the results are not as good, as
the BGN protocol makes intensive use of bilinear mappings.
Overall, we can see that the ElGamal-Paillier protocol has a better perfor-
mance than the BGN-based one, both on the client and on the LDS. Neverthe-
less, both schemes are practical enough and have acceptable time requirements
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in order to be implemented on current generations of mobile devices. Thanks to
the homomorphic properties of BGN, the pairwise distances can be obliviously
computed by the LDS, without involving any decryption/re-encryption operation
from the clients (as opposed to the ElGamal-Paillier alternative). Even with a
comparatively larger security resistance, the BGN scheme is still faster than the
alternative one. It is also important to notice that the design of the proposed
BGN distance algorithm allows it to perform well, independently of the number
of participants.
3.5.1 Discussion
The implementation measurement results of our two PPFRVP algorithms show
that the ElGamal-Paillier based algorithm has a better overall performance than
the BGN-based alternative. On a comparable security level and without con-
sidering communication delays, both the LDS and the client device require less
computation time for the former algorithm compared to the latter. However,
aside from the performance, the BGN-based algorithm presents several advan-
tages. First, it involves three less message exchanges between each client and the
LDS (Figure 3.3) compared to the alternative algorithm. Second, much shorter
security parameters can be used in order to achieve the same resistance to attacks,
and thus lower the memory requirements on the client devices. Third, malicious
users cannot change the masked user-preferred meeting-location coordinates once
they have been sent to the LDS, as there are no decryption/re-encryption oper-
ations in the BGN-based algorithm, as opposed to the ElGamal-Paillier based
one.
3.6 User Study
In this section, we present the methodology and results of the user study we
conducted with our prototype application.
Novel LSB services, such as deals and check-ins, are oﬀered by large service
providers such as Google and Facebook. In order to assess users’ opinions about
the potential and challenges of such services, we conducted a targeted user study
on 35 respondents, sampling a population of technology-savvy college students
(in the age group of 20-30 years) and non-scientiﬁc personnel. The questionnaires
are based on the privacy and usability guidelines from [33, 98].
The entire study consisted of three phases: the purpose of Phase 1, during
which respondents answered a ﬁrst set of 22 questions without knowing the sub-
ject of the study, was to assess the participants’ level of adoption of mobile LSBS
and their sensitivity to privacy issues in such services. The answers to these
questions are either “Yes” or “No”, or on a 4-point Lickert scale (where 1 means
Disagree, 4 is Agree). In Phase 2, the respondents were instructed to use our pro-
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Figure 3.9: Summary of the user-study results for Phase 3.
totype mobile FRVP application. Finally, in Phase 3, the participants answered
the second set of 12 questions, choosing from a 4-point Lickert scale, after having
used our application. The purpose of this phase was to capture users’ opinions
on the usability of our application, and to assess whether privacy undermines
usability or performance in such an application.
Phase 1 The majority of the participants are males, 20-25 years old. Around
86% of them use social networks, and 74% browse the Internet with a mobile
device. When organizing meetings, 54% of the time they involve groups of 4
people and 29% groups of 6 individuals, and participants use their mobile device
for organizing 63% of such meetings. Although only 14% are aware of existing
LSBSs, 51% would be very or quite interested in using a LSBS such as the
FRVP. However, they are sensitive to privacy (98%) and anonymity (74%) in
their online interactions, especially with respect to the potential misuse of their
private information by non-speciﬁed third-parties (88%). Furthermore, most of
the participants (80%) agree that no organization or person should disseminate
their personal information without their knowledge.
These results indicate that, although rare at the moment, LSBSs are perceived
as interesting by the majority of the sampled population, who are also the most
likely to adopt LBS technologies [111]. With respect to privacy, they agree that
it is crucial for the acceptability of such services, and thus LSBSs should work
properly by requiring a minimum amount of personal information.
Phase 2 In this phase, the participants were instructed on the usage of our
PPFRVP prototype application and they used it several times to determine a
fair rendez-vous point. The participants were seated in separate places of the
80 CHAPTER 3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION DETERMINATION
experimentation area and they could not speak to other participants or see their
device screens.
Phase 3 Figure 3.9 summarizes the main ﬁndings of this phase. After using
our application, all participants tend to agree (34%) or agree (66%) that it was
easy to use, and that they could quickly compute the task (97%). Around 80%
feel that it was easy to learn to use such application, and 91% tend to or agree that
the GUI was clearly organized. More than 68% agree that the application was
interesting to use, and if we include those who tend to agree as well, all but one
participant found it interesting. With respect to privacy in such applications, 66%
agree that it is important to reveal only the necessary information to the system,
in order to compute the fair rendez-vous location. More than 71% appreciated
that their preferred rendez-vous point was not revealed to other participants, and
only 8% did not care about the privacy of their rendez-vous location preference.
Only 26% of the participants were able to identify to whom the FRVP location
belonged to, which was to be expected. The users ran our application in groups
of 5 during the experimentation, and therefore there was always one person out
of ﬁve that knew that the FRVP location was his preferred location.
From a software developer’s standpoint, this means that both ease of use
and privacy need to be taken into account from the beginning of the application
development. In particular, the privacy mechanisms should be implemented in
a way that does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the usability or performance. Moreover,
the acceptance of LSBS applications is highly inﬂuenced by the availability of
eﬀective and intuitive privacy features.
3.7 Extension
The PPFRVP protocol deﬁned in Section 3.3 allows each user i to select one
preferred location Li in order to determine the fair rendez-vous location Lfair.
A natural extension of the existing protocol would consist in allowing any user
i to select multiple preferred locations Li,1, . . . , Li,vi, and to associate a personal
priority to any such preference. This way, the users would have more ﬂexibility
in making choices and the output of the PPFRVP algorithm would better reﬂect
the ranking of the location preferences. Moreover, priorities could also be used to
assign weights to location preferences based on their availability and accessibility,
if such information is available. Hereafter, we propose such an extension to our
PPFRVP protocol and discuss its characteristics. Figures 3.10(a) and 3.10(b)
show the new protocol and its preliminary implementation, respectively.
The multi-point preferences are considered by assigning a priority to each
preferred location Li,j for all users i and preferences j. One way to include
them in the distance computations is to assign weighting coeﬃcients pi,j for the
maximum distances c(Li,j , Lk,h) computed at the end of Step 3 in Figure 3.10(a);
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(a) Extension of the existing PPFRVP protocol. (b) Prototype application.
Figure 3.10: Extension of PPFRVP to multiple user-preferred locations.
this way, the highest priority could be deﬁned by using the lowest value of pi,1 = 1,
whereas the lower priorities could be assigned higher values of pi,2 = pi,3 = 2 (as
in Figure 3.10(b)). As a result, the minimum of these maximum meta-distance
is crucial for each client in order to select his own prioritized location in Step
3.1, which will then be sent to the LDS for the continuation of the PPFRVP
computations.
3.7.1 Privacy Discussion of the Multi-Point Extension
The proposed extension to the PPFRVP protocol relies on the same cryptographic
primitives as the original PPFRVP protocol. As the operations performed by
the LDS are the same (oblivious distance computations and randomization), the
extended PPFRVP protocol also inherits the privacy guarantees possessed by
the single-location PPFRVP one. Therefore, the PPFRVP protocol (BGN- and
ElGamal-Paillier-based) with the extension to multiple user-preferred locations
preserves identiﬁability and coordinate-linkability privacy in the passive adver-
sary scenario. However, it retains the same vulnerabilities in the active adversary
scenario.
3.7.2 Performance Discussion of the Multi-Point Extension
With respect to the ElGamal-Paillier-based protocol the BGN-based distance
computations of the extension clearly reduce the number of message exchanges
between each client and the LDS. However, as there is a decryption operation
performed by the clients in Step 3, the distance computation for the extended
protocol with the BGN scheme would put an extra complexity factor, increas-
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ing the overall complexity of the BGN-based extended PPFRVP protocol to
O(N
√
T maxi vi), where vi is the number of location preferences of user i, com-
pared to O(N maxi vi) of the ElGamal-Paillier-based scheme. The communica-
tion complexity would however remain the same for both protocols, which is
O(N maxi vi). Hence, the ElGamal-Paillier-based, extended PPFRVP protocol
would be more preferable from a performance standpoint.
3.8 Related Work
Hereafter, we present some works in the literature that address, without protect-
ing privacy, strategies to determine the optimal meeting location. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst work to address the problem in a privacy-
preserving way, by determining one location among a set of proposed locations.
Santos and Vaughn [138] present a survey of existing literature on meeting-
location algorithms and propose a more comprehensive solution for such a prob-
lem. Although considering aspects such as user preferences and constraints, their
work (or the surveyed papers) does not address any security or privacy issues.
Similarly, Berger et. al [14] propose an eﬃcient meeting-location algorithm that
considers the time in-between two consecutive meetings. However, all private
information about users is public.
In the domain of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), several authors have
addressed privacy issues related to the computation of the distance between two
routes [63] or points [99, 145]. Frikken and Atallah [63] propose SMC protocols for
securely computing the distance between a point and a line segment, the distance
between two moving points and the distance between two line segments. Zhong
et al. [162] design and implement three distributed privacy-preserving protocols
for nearby friend discovery, and they show how to cryptographically compute the
distance between a pair of users. However, due to the fully distributed nature of
the aforementioned approaches, the computational and communication complex-
ities increase signiﬁcantly with the size of the participants and inputs. Moreover,
all parties involved in the computations need to be online and synchronized.
There have also been several research results in the literature that focus on
the problem of privacy-preserving location-based queries and location sharing or
anonymous location check-ins. However, these research eﬀorts attempt to solve
issues that are orthogonal, and uniquely diﬀerent, from the ones addressed in
this paper. Jaiswal and Nandi [91] propose a privacy-preserving platform, called
Trust No One, for privately locating nearby points-of-interest. Their architecture
relies on three non-colluding parties, i.e., the mobile operator, the LBS provider,
and the matching service, for decoupling user locations from user queries. The ar-
chitecture proposed by Jaiswal and Nandi [91] addresses the problem of location-
privacy preserving information retrieval, which is diﬀerent from our focus. In
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another related eﬀort, Olumoﬁn et al. [122] use Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) techniques to preserve user’s location privacy in location-based queries,
e.g., retrieving points-of-interest information related to current location. This
line of work focuses on private information retrieval based on user locations,
whereas we focus solely on private computations based on user provided locations
or location preferences. Besides these, many earlier research eﬀorts [64, 6, 160]
on anonymizing location-based queries employed the k-anonymity approach. In
this approach, for each query issued by a user, a trusted third party generates an
obfuscation or cloaking region containing k− 1 other users. The third party then
forwards the cloaking region, instead of the user’s actual location, in the user
query to the service provider. In our work, the goal is not to simply anonymize
users’ location data, but to hide this data from the service provider and to enable
provider-oblivious computations on it.
In the direction of anonymous location sharing, Pidcock et al. [128] propose a
novel architecture called ZeroSquare where the main goal is to provide a location
hub for privacy-preserving geospatial applications. The main idea of the authors
is to decouple user (proﬁle) information from location information by assuming
two non-colluding entities that store this information. Their work is diﬀerent
from ours because they do not consider the problem of privately computing some
function based on the location data, rather they want to enable privacy-preserving
location sharing in mobile applications. Contrary to the work by Pidcock et al.
[128], Guha et al. [76] propose a privacy-preserving system that allows users
to set location-triggered alarms based on presence at speciﬁc locations, rather
than sharing location coordinates. In another related eﬀort, Herrmann et al.
[80] propose two constructions for privacy-preserving location sharing by using
broadcast encryption techniques. Their construction prevents the service provider
from learning the identity of the user and her location, but allows it to determine
which other users are allowed to know the user’s location. Contrary to our work,
which focuses on eﬃcient computation of some common function based on shared
user locations while keeping these locations private (from the service provider),
they focus on keeping both the identities and the shared locations private from
the service provider. Carbunar et al. [30] also propose a set of privacy-preserving
protocols, using well-known cryptographic constructs, which anonymously proves
to a venue that a user checked-in (her location) a certain number of times. In
our work, we do not consider the problem of anonymously proving presence at
a particular location. Rather, our goal is to hide the user’s location claim (or
location preference) from other users and the service provider.
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3.9 Summary
Novel LBS applications are taking advantage of the numerous technological ad-
vances in order to provide a better and more eﬃcient user experience. Major
online providers are leveraging on the enthusiasm for such services in order to
deliver increasingly sophisticated location-based applications, such as location-
sharing-based (LSB) applications. However, the existing users’ concerns about
privacy in such services need to be eﬀectively considered from the beginning, as
they are essential for the success and adoption of such services.
In this chapter, we have addressed the problem of privacy in the FRVP prob-
lem by providing practical and eﬀective solutions based on homomorphic prop-
erties of well-known cryptosystems. We have designed, implemented on real mo-
bile devices and evaluated the performance of our privacy-preserving protocols
for solving the fair rendez-vous problem in a privacy-preserving manner. Our
solutions are proved to be eﬀective in terms of privacy, have acceptable perfor-
mance, and do not create additional overhead for the users. Moreover, we have
extended the proposed solutions to include more realistic scenarios where users
have several preferred and prioritized locations preferences. Finally, our user-
study showed that the proposed privacy features are crucial for the adoption of
any such application, which reinforces the need for further exploration in privacy
of LSB services.
Publications: [20, 19]
Part II
Network-Layer Privacy
Exposure
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Chapter 4
Privacy of Social Communities in
Pervasive Networks
Wireless network operators increasingly deploy WiFi hotspots and low-power,
low-range base stations in order to satisfy users’ growing demands for context-
aware services and performance. In addition to providing better service, such
capillary infrastructure deployment threatens users’ privacy with respect to their
social relationships and communities, as it allows infrastructure owners to infer
users’ daily social encounters with increasing accuracy, much to the detriment of
their privacy. Yet, to date, there are no evaluations of the privacy of commu-
nities in pervasive wireless networks. In this chapter, we address the important
issue of privacy in pervasive communities by experimentally evaluating the ac-
curacy of an adversary-owned set of wireless sniﬃng stations in reconstructing
the communities of mobile users. During a four-month trial, 80 participants car-
ried mobile devices and were eavesdropped on by an adversarial wireless mesh
network on a university campus. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
study that focuses on the privacy of communities in a deployed pervasive network
and that provides important empirical evidence on the accuracy and feasibility
of community tracking in such networks.
Chapter Outline In Section 4.1, we introduce the privacy issue in pervasive social
networks, and in Section 4.2 we detail the experimental trial framework together
with its system and network models. In Section 4.3, we outline the community
and privacy analysis. In Section 4.4 we present the results of the analysis of
communities and their privacy vis-a`-vis the external adversary. We present the
related work in Section 4.5, and we summarize the chapter in Section 4.6.
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4.1 Introduction
Every day, mobile operators collect large amounts of users’ data that is mined
for commercial and performance goals, such as billing, throughput, coverage and
usage statistics. In addition to the explicit information (such as cost, duration,
location) that can be derived from the communications, operators and infrastruc-
ture owners are able to gain additional knowledge based on the communication
and contextual patterns, without any action from the user for this regard [75, 81].
Users’ home/work locations [75, 81], activities [107], interests [120] and social net-
works [38, 105] can be inferred from their location and social interactions, much
to the detriment of not only their own privacy, but also to that of their peers.
More recently, telecom manufacturers have also added support for seamless,
low-cost, wireless device-to-device communications, such as Nokia Instant Com-
munity [36], AirDrop by Apple [4] and FlashlinQ by Qualcomm [37], thus comple-
menting existing infrastructure-based communications. The possibility of real-
time data sharing among devices, without the need for infrastructure, enables
people to form localized and short-lived groups or communities of users, which
can emerge in scenarios where the infrastructure is inadequate, expensive, un-
trusted or hostile [132, 55]. Although still an emerging research subject in the
wireless domain [161], pervasive communities and their structured networks of
interactions are able to signiﬁcantly improve the performance of opportunistic
networks [85, 31], by leveraging on the structural properties and patterns of the
evolving user interactions. In the literature, there are several routing and packet-
forwarding algorithms [83, 86, 31] that exploit the underlying evolving social in-
teractions to improve the network performance, mostly based on the frequency of
recorded Bluetooth encounters. Similarly, social communities have been studied
from the behavioral perspective [38, 48, 72], in order to analyze people’s prefer-
ences and group formation characteristics. The undisputed value of friendship
networks and social ties to service providers such as Facebook and Twitter has
also dramatically increased their monetary value [28], as more and more targeted
advertisements and tailored services are proposed to groups of users with similar
attitudes and interests.
In spite of the soaring interest for the analysis and exploitation of perva-
sive communities in the wireless domain, in terms of privacy very little has been
achieved. Privacy of communities and their members is a major concern in regions
where the ability to keep such information from being inferred by unscrupulous
third-party providers or suppressive governments is critical [132, 55]. Even in
developed countries, where each person has (on average) more than one mobile
subscription [88] and where small and pervasive base stations (femtocells) al-
ready outnumber conventional base stations [54], the issue of community privacy
is extremely relevant. Furthermore, the increased availability of public WiFi
hotspots and the rapid deployment of low-power and low-range cellular base sta-
4.2. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 89
tions (femtocells) [54] makes such inference even more accurate, as more precise
user proximity data can be collected, regardless of the kind of upper-layer pro-
tocols and applications. The risks of unsolicited user proﬁling, data censorship,
racial discrimination and political repression, based on users’ physical proximity
derived from short-range communications, are a major concern. Because most of
the existing literature on communities in wireless networks has been primarily fo-
cused on performance or human behavior, to the best of our knowledge there is no
single empirical work that has addressed the issue of the privacy of communities
in deployed wireless networks.
In this chapter, we address the problem of community privacy by taking a
comparative analysis of the exposure of social relationships and encounters in a
deployed wireless peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Over a four-month trial (March-
June 2011) with 80 participants, we studied and quantiﬁed the extent of leakage of
private community information by users, by providing empirical evidence about
the network or infrastructure owner’s accuracy of reconstruction of the social
communities of people. Our work is unique in three respects:
• We provide the ﬁrst privacy analysis of the exposure of community infor-
mation in a deployed wireless network.
• We experimentally evaluate and compare the wireless sniﬃng stations owner’s
accuracy of reconstruction of the social communities of people, based on the
observed traﬃc patterns, with the local proximity and the encounter data
that is collected by the mobile devices.
• We characterize the evolution of the social interactions among the partici-
pants, and we evaluate the strength of their interactions by implementing
three diﬀerent social interaction measures that take into account the num-
ber, the proximity, the recency and aging eﬀects of social relationships in
the underlying wireless network.
4.2 System Architecture
During four months (March-June 2011), we conducted a large-scale trial with
80 participants on the EPFL university campus, in order to collect encounter
and proximity data. Similarly to previous data collection campaigns [71, 78, 47],
we programmed and distributed 80 Nokia N900 smartphones to the volunteering
participants, sampling a coherent population of master’s students and instructors
of two classes taught during the spring semester. The participants were asked
to carry their device with them as frequently as possible, and they were allowed
to use it as their primary phone. At the end of the trial, we obtained useful
information from 66 devices, amounting to almost ten GBs of collected log data
and over 8 million packets captured by the adversarial network. The remaining
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(a) Trial network architecture.
66 m
186 m
(b) Deployed wireless mesh network of 37 APs controlled
by the adversary.
Figure 4.1: Trial setup and deployed eavesdropping network controlled by the
adversary.
14 devices were either not used regularly or did not collect the data properly,
hence they were excluded from the analysis.
4.2.1 Device Conﬁguration
The Nokia devices were conﬁgured with both standard infrastructure-based com-
munications, such as cellular and WiFi, as well as with a novel WiFi-based P2P
technology, called Nokia Instant Community or NIC [36]. Users could connect
to both standard Internet services using the WLAN or cellular interface of the
device, as well as to an experimental context-aware wireless P2P messaging plat-
form − in order to exchange information with their physical neighbors in a P2P
fashion (Figure 4.1(a)). Moreover, several campus and course-related applica-
tions were developed in order to stimulate and encourage the usage of the devices
throughout the duration of the trial. In order to enhance the context-awareness
of the pre-installed applications, the devices were running background services
that collected and stored, at regular intervals of [1-30] seconds, information such
as the list of neighbors, the associated Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
and the time stamp in the local memory. Whenever a participant connected to
the Internet with the device, the new encounter logs were uploaded on a central-
ized database storing all device logs. To preserve users’ anonymity, we removed
all personal identiﬁer information (such as the mapping between MAC address -
IMEI - participant ID) from the database.
4.2.2 Adversarial Model and Infrastructure
We emulate a practical adversary who monitors a ﬁxed area using a limited num-
ber of wireless sniﬃng stations. Speciﬁcally, the adversary is the owner of a
deployed wireless mesh network of 37 APs (Asus WL-500gP APs running Open-
WRT Linux) in a speciﬁc region of the campus [8], covering one level of six
interconnected buildings which have a very high user (student) density (Figure
4.1(b)). The coverage area includes the classrooms in which the two classes that
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Figure 4.2: Flowchart of the pervasive community privacy evaluation process.
the students attended took place. We assume that the adversary passively eaves-
drops on the participants’ communications, and that he1 periodically uploads the
eavesdropped data to a centralized server, populating a uniﬁed log database for
each AP.
In order to perform the pervasive community reconstruction attack discussed
in the following section, we assume that the adversary collects the 3-tuple (Time
stamp, Source MAC, RSSI) from the messages sent by the participants’ smart-
phones. As encryption is sometimes used to protect the conﬁdentiality of network
and application-layer data in real networks, we assume that the adversary does
not have access to such data. This reinforces the practicality and better em-
bodies real-world limitations that an external adversary might have, being much
weaker than the omniscient Dolev-Yao adversary [44]. Moreover, the information
collected by the adversary is present in almost all kinds of wireless networks and
technologies (such as Bluetooth, WiFi and cellular), which enlarges the appli-
cability and scope of the results. In this work, we assume that the adversary
does not have direct access to any information stored on the mobile devices, and
that all devices are honest (i.e., not colluding with the adversary). As part of
our future work, we will consider a stronger adversary that can collude and gain
access to some of the mobile devices as well.
4.3 Community Analysis
In order to evaluate the extent of community information leakage in our setting,
we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the analytical framework that captures the pervasive com-
munity information from the collected data. In this section, we introduce some
background on communities in wireless networks and describe how we evaluate
communities and their privacy in our trial. A ﬂowchart of the entire process is
depicted in Figure 4.2.
1For conciseness and without loss of generality, we refer to the adversary in the masculine
form, although both masculine and feminine forms apply.
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4.3.1 Background
In society, people tend to organize themselves in social groups or communi-
ties, such as family, work colleagues and hobby groups, where members usu-
ally have stronger similarity traits with other members than with non-members
[57]. From a graph-theoretic perspective, people and their relationships can be
represented by an undirected graph G = (V,E,W ), where the vertex set V cor-
responds to people, the edge set E expresses the existence of a relationship be-
tween people, and the weight function W quantiﬁes the intensity of such relation-
ship. In their simplest form, communities can then be represented as subgraphs
{Ci = (Vi, Ei,Wi, )}Mi=1, where Ci ⊆ G and M is the number of communities Ci.
Several community detection (or clustering) algorithms are present in the
literature, and they work on either unweighted/weighted and undirected/directed
graphs. Although hierarchical clustering [77] and modularity-based algorithms
[115] − surveyed in [57] − have been applied to community detection, most of
them lack a fundamental characteristic that is intrinsic to social communities.
People are often members of several communities at the same time, such as
friends, family members and work colleagues, and most of the aforementioned
algorithms assign a single vertex to only one community. In order to allow a
vertex to be assigned to multiple (possibly overlapping) communities, Palla et al.
[126] developed a technique, the Clique Percolation Method (CPM), which allows
diﬀerent communities to share vertices. The idea is that communities are formed
by the union of adjacent k-cliques (complete graphs with k vertices), where two
k-cliques are adjacent if they share k−1 vertices. Due to the social nature of our
trial and the experimental setting, we use the CPM algorithm to detect pervasive
communities based on physical proximity and encounter data.
After the pervasive communities have been discovered, several privacy-sensitive
statistics can be obtained from the community structure, their overlap and their
members. We describe the relevant statistics in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Trial Framework
In order to model the collected encounter data using a graph, hereafter we de-
scribe the type of information that is used in order to deﬁne the existence and
intensity of relationships between users.
Trial Data
In our trial, we have two sources of proximity information: (i) the local device
logs collected by the mobile devices and containing encounter (list of neighbors,
the time stamps and the RSSI values of received packets), and (ii) the adversarial
(sniﬃng) logs containing the headers of the packets sent by the mobile devices,
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which include the time stamps and RSSI values of received packets at the sniﬃng
stations, as well as the device ID of the sender.
We use these two data sources in order to formulate the “strength” or intensity
of the social relationships between users and to deﬁne the weights of the edges
connecting the respective vertices in the social graph G = (V,E,W ). There
are two types of proximity information in our network: device-to-device RSSI
data (collected on the devices) and device-to-AP RSSI data (collected by the
adversary). From the local device logs, we can directly obtain the device-to-device
proximity information because the recorded RSSI values on the receiving device
depend on the real distance to the sending device. However, this is not exactly
the case for the RSSI values recorded by the adversarial network, as they depend
on the distance between the sending device and the receiving sniﬃng station,
and not the receiving mobile device. Therefore, the adversary needs to derive
the device-to-device proximity information from the device-to-AP RSSI values.
Hence, we ﬁrst need to estimate the position of a device, and then compute the
device-to-device proximity information in order to determine the weights between
vertices of the social graph.
To this end, we developed a robust localization algorithm based on RSSI
trilateration [23], which determines the estimated position of a received packet
based on the RSSI at all sniﬃng stations that received that packet. Using the po-
sition estimate, we then compute the distance and RSSI between mobile devices,
as described later in this section.
Social Interaction Intensity
We deﬁne three distinct weight functions {w(d)i,j }3d=1 between the vertices i, j ∈ V ,
taking progressively into account the proximity, the intensity and the aging and
recency of the relationships between users. We divide the timeline of the trial
into discrete time intervals {Tk}Nk=1, where N = 120 days, and for each day Tk
we deﬁne the weights wi,j(Tk)
(d) between users i, j.
The ﬁrst and simplest weight function is the (shifted, non-negative) average
of the RSSI value between a pair of users i, j for each day Tk, deﬁned as
wi,j(Tk)
(1) =
⎛
⎝ 1
ci,j(Tk)
·
ci,j(Tk)∑
q=1
RSSIi,j(Tk, q)
⎞
⎠− rmin
where ci,j(Tk) is the sum of the number of packets received by i (and sent by j)
and received by j (and sent by i) during the day Tk, RSSIi,j(Tk, q) is the RSSI
value of a packet q received by a user i (and sent by j) or received by j (and sent
by i) during the day Tk, and rmin is the minimum RSSI value that was recorded
during the trial. For instance, we ﬁx rmin = −100 dBm as no RSSI values lower
than −100 dBm have been recorded by any device. Apart from the intensity, this
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weight function does not consider the duration of the encounters (as it normalizes
the intensity by the number of packets) between users or any aging or recency
eﬀect.
The second weight function takes into account the duration of the encounters
through the sum of the (shifted, non-negative) RSSI values between users i, j, for
each day Tk. It is deﬁned as
wi,j(Tk)
(2) = ci,j(Tk) · wi,j(Tk)(1) =
ci,j(Tk)∑
q=1
(RSSIi,j(Tk, q)− rmin)
As the devices who are in continuous radio contact automatically exchange more
context messages than the non-connected devices, this weight function takes into
account the duration of the contacts, in addition to their intensity.
As communities of mobile devices are dynamic and evolve over time, the
third weight function captures the natural evolution of social relationships be-
tween individuals, where past experience, recency and current state determine
the intensity of interactions among people [125]. In this way, two users that have
spent much time together in the past, but have not met on a given day, would
still keep a relationship during that day (which is not the case for wi,j(Tk)
(1) and
wi,j(Tk)
(2)), even if its intensity is lower due to the aging eﬀect − thus avoiding
strong temporal ﬂuctuations. Inspired by the formulations in [125, 157], we deﬁne
the third weight function as
wi,j(Tk)
(3) = 1ci,j(Tk)>0
(
τ · w(3)i,j (Tk−1) + (1− τ) · γi,j(Tk)
)
(4.1)
+ (1− 1ci,j(Tk)>0) ·
(
w
(3)
i,j (Te) · θi,j(Tk, Te)
)
where
γi,j(Tk) =
1
α
· wi,j(Tk)(2)
θi,j(Tk, Te) = exp
(
− λ(Tk − Te)
1 +
∑min(Tk−Te,Te)
r=0 mi,j(Te − r)
)
mi,j(Tk) =
{
1 if γi,j(Tk) > β
0 otherwise
and 1ci,j>0 is the indicator function, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is the aging coeﬃcient, α > 0 is
the normalization factor, 0 < λ ≤ 1 is the temporal decay value, 0 ≤ Te ≤ Tk−1
is the last day before Tk when users i, j exchanged messages, mi,j(Tk) ∈ {0, 1}
is the recency factor that indicates whether a meeting took place during Tk or
not, and β ≥ 0 is the meeting threshold value. The idea behind the formulation
is the following: If users i, j exchanged at least one message on a day Tk, then
the weight of their edge is an exponential moving average of the aged weight
− accumulated up to the day before (Tk−1) − and the recent day’s weight; on
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Figure 4.3: Users’ positions estimates by the adversary. In this example, the
adversary has the position estimate of user u at z = 1 but not at subsequent
subintervals. In this case, u’s last position estimate (at z = 1) is assumed to be
valid in f subsequent subintervals. Here f = 1.
the contrary, if i, j did not exchange any message on day Tk, the current day’s
weight is a function of the previously accumulated weight, the frequency of their
encounters just before the last encounter and the amount of time between the
last time i, j had exchanged messages (Te) and the current day Tk.
The weight functions can be directly applied to the local-device proximity
information, as the available proximity information (time stamps, RSSI values
from neighboring devices and their IDs) are suﬃcient for their computations.
However, an intermediate step is required in order to compute the weights by
using the external (adversarial) proximity information (time stamps, RSSI values
from devices to sniﬃng APs and device IDs). In the following we show how to
use the external proximity information in order to compute the edge weights.
User-Distance Estimation by the Adversary
As the adversary does not have access to device-to-device proximity data, he can
decide to only use the estimated positions of a user i in a day Tk, deﬁned as
Pi(Tk) = {pi(Tk, 1), . . . , pi(Tk, b)}, where b is the number of subintervals of a day
Tk and pi(Tk, z) = (xi(Tk, z), yi(Tk, z)) ∈ R2 is the estimated position of user i
in the subinterval z of day Tk. Moreover, because there is a possibility that a
user’s packet may not be detected in each subinterval z, due to mobility or radio
interference, we assume that the last position estimate pi(Tk, zlast) of a user i is
valid in f subsequent subintervals, if no {pi(Tk, zlast + 1), . . . , pi(Tk, zlast + f)}
are available (Figure 4.3).
With such information, the adversary computes the edge weights as follows:
(1) ∀z ∈ {1, . . . , b}, compute pi(Tk, z) for all users i observed on day Tk.
(2) ∀z ∈ {1, . . . , b}, compute the estimated Euclidian distance di,j(Tk, z) =
||pi(Tk, z)− pj(Tk, z)|| between any two users i, j observed on day Tk.
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(3) ∀z ∈ {1, . . . , b}, compute the estimated RSSI value according to the adapted
Haka-Okumura model for indoor radio propagation [26]
R̂SSIi,j(Tk, z)[dBm] = Pt + 20 log
(
λ
4π
)
+ 10n log
(
1
di,j(Tk, z)
)
where Pt = 20 [dBm] is the transmission power of the mobile device, λ =
0.125 [m] is the wavelength, n = 4.8 is the path-loss exponent suited for
oﬃce environments such as the university buildings under observation. The
R̂SSIi,j(Tk, z) value replaces RSSIi,j(Tk, q) in the weight functions w
(d)
i,j (Tk),
where z ∈ {1, . . . , b}.
Weight Distributions
Due to the diﬀerent features of a social relationship that each weight function
models, their numeric values fall in diﬀerent domains. For example, if α = 100,
β = 1, λ = τ = 0.5 we have 0 ≤ w(1)i,j < rmin, 0 ≤ w(2)i,j < 2.5 · 105 and
0 ≤ w(3)i,j < 600. It is therefore necessary to put them on the same scale for
the identiﬁcation of communities, as simply comparing the absolute values of
the three weight functions is pointless. Hence, rather than comparing absolute
values, we compare the weight distributions relative to the maximum of each
weight function for each day Tk. To this end, we select an equal number of bins
I(d) for each weight function w
(d)
i,j (Tk). We then count the number of weight
values that fall inside each such bin for all weight types, and we compare the
distributions.
Figure 4.4(a) and Figure 4.4(b) show the relative edge weight distribution for
a day Tk, by using the internal (local device) and external (adversarial estimate)
input data, respectively. We see that, compared to the adversarial data, the local
device data yields more pronounced characteristics for all three weight types and
provides a more discriminating information set for the subsequent community
detection phase, whereas the external data is less feature-rich due to the presence
of uncertainty in the estimates of the proximity between users. This means that
the adversary will likely struggle to infer with high accuracy the community
characteristics for that day. We quantify such inaccuracies in Section 4.4.
Next, we describe the method we adopted to evaluate the extent of community
information leakage and the related privacy measures.
4.3.3 Communities and Privacy
Having quantiﬁed the social interaction intensity as edge weights between any two
trial participants, we now outline the community detection process, the suitable
community statistics and privacy measures used to evaluate community privacy
in our work.
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(a) Using internal (local device) input data.
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Figure 4.4: Relative edge weight distribution for diﬀerent input data sets.
Community Detection
In its simplest form, the CPM community detection algorithm is deﬁned for
undirected and unweighted graphs [125], thus requiring only connectivity be-
tween vertices in order to discover communities. However, in order to consider
the “strength” of the interactions between vertices, it was extended to work on
weighted graphs by the use of a threshold weight w∗. In its weighted version, the
CPM algorithm considers the existence of an edge ei,j between two vertices i, j if
and only if the weight w
(d)
i,j > w
∗. In order to determine the threshold weight w∗,
Palla et al. propose to choose a value such that “the largest community becomes
twice as big as the second largest one”[126], which is below the critical value w∗crit
for which a giant connected component arises [42].
In our experiment, we calibrated the {w∗q}Tq=1 threshold values on a per-day
basis, instead of keeping the same w∗ throughout the trial. Because most of the
participants followed one speciﬁc class that took place on Wednesdays, and the
remaining days they might or might not have followed any common classes, we
registered high RSSI proximity values on course days and more sparse values on
non-course days. Hence, the per-day threshold {w∗q}Tq=1 was better suited for
such bi-modal proximity patterns.
To illustrate the output of CPM, Figure 4.5(a)2 and 4.5(b) show an example
of the detected communities on a given day, based on the internal data and the
observations of the adversary respectively. As it can be seen, some communities
detected by the adversary are not present in the internal case; there is however an
overlap between the members (the larger vertices) of the two sets of communities.
We discuss and quantify this diﬀerence in Section 4.4.
2The ﬁgure is obtained by using the CFinder application developed by the authors of the
CPM algorithm, freely available on www.cﬁnder.org.
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(b) Reconstructed communities by the adver-
sary.
Figure 4.5: Detected communities on a day Tk based on internal (local device)
and external (adversarial estimates) data, respectively. The larger vertices are
present in both community sets.
Community Statistics
In addition to detecting communities and their members, we compute ﬁve privacy-
relevant and common community statistics {S(i)(Tk)}5i=1 that will be compared
in the accuracy evaluation process. In particular, for each day Tk of the trial
we compute and compare the following statistics: S1 is the community degree
(the number of edges shared between two communities), S2 is the distribution
of the community size (the number of members of each community), S3 is the
community density (proportion of edges out of all possible edges relative to the
sparsest set with |Ci| − 1 vertices), S4 is the ratio of total out- and in-degree of
communities and S5 is the community membership value (the number of com-
munities a vertex belongs to). The diﬀerence between the results obtained using
the internal and external input data is deﬁned by Eq. (4.2) as the ratio between
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the absolute diﬀerence of the observed statistics over the maximum value
ΔSi(Tk) =
|Sexti (Tk)− Sinti (Tk)|
max
∀Tk
(
Sexti (Tk), S
int
i (Tk)
) (4.2)
We have ΔSi(Tk) = 0 when the adversary’s statistics is exactly the same as the
statistics obtained using the internal proximity data, and ΔSi(Tk) = 1 when the
two statistics have the largest discrepancy (or lowest similarity). We deﬁne the
adversary’s accuracy in inferring the community statistics as 1−ΔSi(Tk).
Community Privacy
In addition to the diﬀerences in statistics ΔSi(Tk), it is crucial to assess the
similarity of the community composition in order to ascertain in a comprehensive
way the privacy leakage of community information. To this end, we compute
the well-established Jaccard index measure [89] for community similarity on each
day Tk, which is a statistic that computes the similarity between two sample sets
(or communities) Ci, Cj , where values close to zero mean that the adversary did
not accurately infer the communities and their members, whereas values close to
one indicate a very good adversarial accuracy in inferring the same communities.
The Jaccard index is deﬁned as
J(Ci, Cj , Tk) =
|Ci(Tk)
⋂
Cj(Tk)|
|Ci(Tk)
⋃
Cj(Tk)| (4.3)
In order to evaluate the adversary’s accuracy of reconstruction of the com-
munities in our pervasive network, we compute the Jaccard index on each day
Tk between the communities Ci(Tk), detected using internal device data, versus
the reconstructed communities Cj(Tk), detected using the adversarial estimated
proximity information. Given J(Ci, Cj , Tk) for each i, j on a day Tk, we deﬁne the
Jaccard index matrix JMat(Tk), where each element of the matrix is deﬁned as
JMat(Tk)i,j = J(Ci, Cj , Tk), i.e., the Jaccard index for all pairs of communities
Ci and Cj . Without having access to the internal data, the adversary has no
prior knowledge about which community Ci corresponds to which reconstructed
community Cj . Therefore, in order to consider the best possible match for any
pair of internal/reconstructed communities for each day Tk, we choose the match
(Ci(Tk), Cj(Tk)) that maximizes JMat(Tk)i,j . We then compute the aggregated
Jaccard index over all such best matches as
JI(Tk) = avg∀i
(
max
∀j
(JMat(Tk)i,j)
)
(4.4)
for each day Tk of the trial where there is at least one community detected by
using both the internal and adversarial proximity information.
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In the next section we quantify the community privacy leakage by computing
the accuracy measure 1 − ΔSi(Tk), and similarity JI(Tk) for each day Tk and
weight function {w(d)i,j }3d=1, comparing the results obtained using the internal
(local device) and external (adversarial) input data respectively.
4.4 Results
In this section we provide the experimental evaluation of the privacy of pervasive
communities through a comparative analysis of the adversary’s accuracy of recon-
struction of both community statistics and memberships. First, we evaluate the
privacy across the three weight functions {w(d)i,j }3d=1 (inter-weight accuracy), by
comparing the similarity between communities and the accuracy of their statis-
tics obtained by using the internal (local device) proximity information with the
external (adversarial estimates) data collected by the set of wireless sniﬃng sta-
tions. This will allow us to observe the evolution of the accuracy while increasing
the sophistication of the weight functions, taking progressively into account sev-
eral features of human and social behavior such as proximity, intensity, aging and
recency of social relationships. Second, we perform an intra-weight comparison
for the more realistic weight function w
(3)
i,j , in order to characterize the eﬀect of
the aging factor τ on the similarity and accuracy of community reconstruction
attained by the adversary.
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show the adversarial reconstruction similarity and accuracy
results with respect to the communities detected using internal data, for the inter-
weight and intra-weight scenarios respectively. For Figure 4.6(a) and 4.7(a), a
value of JI(Tk) = 0 means that on day Tk there were no communities detected
either using the internal proximity data or the external one. The complete list of
the experimental parameters − selected in order to provide as much information
as possible − can be found in the Appendix, which is provided as a supporting
ﬁle to this document.
4.4.1 Inter-Weight Accuracy
By observing Figure 4.6(a), we ﬁrst notice that the adversary is able to cor-
rectly reconstruct communities and identify their members in 20%− 40% of the
cases, compared to the communities detected by using internal proximity data.
In general, we observe that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of similarity
results between the ﬁrst two weight functions w
(1)
i,j , w
(2)
i,j and the third function
w
(3)
i,j . The former two functions are solely based on the observations made on
each particular day and independently of what happened in the previous days.
Therefore one noticeable characteristic is the increased ﬂuctuations in the simi-
larity from one day to the other, which is a much less visible aspect for the latter
weight function. As w
(1)
i,j , w
(2)
i,j are very exposed to the periodicity of the course
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Figure 4.6: Adversary’s accuracy of reconstruction of the pervasive communities
for the three weight functions.
schedule of the participants, the adversary’s similarity of reconstruction of the
actual communities and their members greatly depends on the amount of data
collected by his wireless mesh network. We notice that for the days when most
students attended a particular class, the reconstruction similarity is higher (up
to 40%) than for days in which students do not attend classes together. Hence
even the two basic weight functions are able to provide a sensible similarity to
the adversary when the users’ movements are tracked by several sniﬃng stations
simultaneously.
Contrary to w
(1)
i,j and w
(2)
i,j , w
(3)
i,j is able to capture more proximity information
and allow the CPM algorithm to detect communities on the days in which the
other two weight functions were unable to provide a suﬃcient amount of data.
At the same time, however, the peaks of similarity tend to be much lower (25%)
compared to the other functions. This suggests that w
(3)
i,j , while being able to
produce more community information with scarce data, performs worse in the
identiﬁcation of the members in each community.
Regarding the diﬀerence in community statistics, depicted in Figure 4.6(b),
we observe a better accuracy for w
(3)
i,j compared to w
(1)
i,j and w
(2)
i,j . In four out
of ﬁve community statistics, w
(3)
i,j has an almost 40% better accuracy compared
to the other functions, which indicates that the former function provides better
results on a higher structural community level rather than on an lower, individual
community member level.
In general, we observe that all three weight functions are better able to pro-
duce accurate community statistics (Figure 4.6(b)) than to identify the correct
community members (Figure 4.6(a)). In particular, w
(3)
i,j shows that it is possi-
ble to achieve very accurate community statistics only by relying on externally
collected data, thus shrinking the discrepancy between the community statistics
based on internal data and adversarial’s estimates down to 9%. This result indi-
cates that, by collecting and analyzing radio information passively and without
access to the devices themselves, an adversary is able to breach the privacy of
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Figure 4.7: Adversary’s accuracy of reconstruction of the pervasive communities
for three diﬀerent values of the aging factor τ .
community information very successfully, although the more ﬁne-grained identi-
ﬁcation of members of any given community remains a more challenging task.
4.4.2 Intra-Weight Accuracy
Figure 4.7(a) shows the adversary’s performance in correctly identifying the com-
munities and their individual members when using w
(3)
i,j with three diﬀerent values
of the aging factor τ = {.25, .5, .75}. According to its deﬁnition in Eq. (4.3.2),
we assign an increasing coeﬃcient to the past accumulated weight information
w
(3)
i,j (Tk−1) in the computation of the current day’s weight function w
(3)
i,j (Tk). The
goal is to study the eﬀect of the “retention” of the intensity from the past on the
privacy (or lack thereof) of community information.
One recurring characteristic, present also in the inter-weight comparison, is
that the CPM algorithm detects communities in all days of the trial, indepen-
dently of the amount of information available to the adversary on each particular
day, even for a small value of τ . When τ = .25, as expected the similarity ﬂuc-
tuates more when compared to τ = .5, especially at the beginning of the trial.
However, Figure 4.7(a) shows that the stabilization of the similarity is not
achieved by simply increasing the value of τ from .25 to .75; in fact, for the
intermediate value of τ = .5, we notice that the ﬂuctuations are less pronounced
than for a smaller or larger value. This suggests that, for relatively small or
large values of the aging factor, the similarity achieved by the adversary tends to
diverge more frequently from steady values, indicating that a stable value for the
aging factor is more likely to be in the middle of the possible values [0.25,0.75],
rather than at any of the extremes. When τ = .75, the adversarial similarity
increases sharply as the time passes, especially towards the end of the trial. This
is somewhat surprising, as we would expect that by increasing the emphasis on
the past − rather than on the current weight information − the similarity would
be more stable when going through the trial. This is an interesting aspect to
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consider in further studies on our community data.
When observing the results on the accuracy of the community statistics, as
shown in Figure 4.7(b), we notice that, among the three considered values of τ ,
τ = .5 is the least accurate, compared to smaller or larger values of τ . Moreover,
in four out of ﬁve statistics, the largest value of τ = .75 produces the best accuracy
on average over the trial duration. This suggests that, although not converging
towards a stable interval for the accuracy in identifying the communities and
their members, putting more emphasis on the past accumulated information does
increase (on average) the adversary’s accuracy in computing correct community
statistics using only passively collected data from ﬁxed WiFi access points.
Overall, the results indicate that although less stable and more accurate at
inferring community structures, emphasizing the past yields better accuracy for
both community detection, identiﬁcation of their members and for generic com-
munity statistics. This ﬁnding in particular is concerning in regard to privacy, as
the amount of individual and community data that is collected by external par-
ties might provide very accurate statistics, especially for group and community-
targeted services. These results are signiﬁcant, as they show how the message
source ID, contained in almost any kind of radio message, not only is enough to
provide accurate social community statistics, but it is also suﬃcient to success-
fully infer almost half of the members of such communities.
4.5 Related Work
The structural properties of short-lived communities in pervasive networks have
been recently investigated from the performance [85, 31] and routing [83, 86, 31]
perspectives; the authors of [38, 48, 72] investigated similar issues on the socio-
behavioral level while studying people’s preferences and group formation char-
acteristics. For instance, it is shown that performance of packet-forwarding al-
gorithms could greatly beneﬁt from the human mobility and sporadic nature of
inter-contacts [85], as the diﬀerent connection frequencies between members of
the same community with respect to members of other communities could sig-
niﬁcantly improve intra-community packet-forwarding while not disrupting inter-
community communications. Similarly, [86] shows how forwarding performances
similar to state-of-the-art algorithms could be achieved at a sensibly lower re-
source utilization if structural properties of communities are considered.
With respect to privacy, several works on location privacy address the risk
and propose protection mechanisms for users’ locations [13, 82, 90]. These con-
tributions focus mostly on individual mobile users and their current neighbors.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior study on the increasingly
important issue of pervasive community privacy and its evaluation on a deployed
network. This work constitutes the ﬁrst building block for analysing community
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privacy issues in pervasive networks.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed the important aspect of community privacy
in pervasive networks. We conducted an experimental analysis of the adversary’s
accuracy of reconstruction of the communities. In particular, we focused on iden-
tifying the individual community members and on inferring the generic commu-
nity statistics that are less dependant on the correct identiﬁcation of individual
users inside such communities.
Through a ﬁne-grained characterization of the intensity of social contacts
among people, we quantiﬁed the accuracy in both community reconstruction and
community statistics for the whole duration of the trial, showing that even basic
social intensity functions capture very accurately the generic statistics, such as
the degree of a community, its size and density of links. However, reconstructing
more speciﬁc information about the composition of each community and their
individual members remains more challenging, even when using a more com-
prehensive model for characterizing the intensity of social relationships, which
considers recency, ageing, and contact frequency in addition to proximity and
duration. As a result, there is a substantial risk that accurate community infor-
mation could be easily collected, inferred and misused by external third-parties,
much to the detriment of users’ community privacy.
Our results provide empirical evidence about the two distinct levels of com-
munity information leakage to external observers, who could be able to infer with
high accuracy the diﬀerent social groups and generic communities of people in
pervasive networks, while being much less accurate in determining the aﬃliation
of any particular individual to a community.
Publication: [22]
Chapter 5
Privacy of Social Relationships in
Pervasive Networks
WiFi base stations are increasingly deployed in both public spaces and private
companies, and the increase in their density poses a signiﬁcant threat to the
privacy of connected users. Prior studies, including the one presented in Chap-
ter 4, provide evidence that it is possible to infer the social relationships and
communities of users from their location and co-location traces, but they lack
one important component: the comparison of the inference accuracy between an
internal attacker (e.g., a curious application running on a mobile device) and a
realistic external eavesdropper in the same ﬁeld trial. In this chapter, we experi-
mentally show that, for some social relationships, such an eavesdropper is able to
infer the type of social relationships between mobile users better than an internal
attacker. Moreover, our results indicate that by exploiting the underlying social
community structure of mobile users, the reliability of the inference attacks in-
creases by a factor of three. Based on our ﬁndings, we propose countermeasures
to help users protect their privacy against eavesdroppers.
Chapter Outline In Section 5.1, we introduce the social relationship inference
problem and present our goals. In Section 5.2, we introduce the experimental
setup and system architecture. In Section 5.3, we detail the characterization of
the social interactions and communities. We describe our relationship inference
framework in Section 5.4 and its application to the experimental data. In Sec-
tion 5.5, we present the results of the inference framework and their implications
on the privacy of users’ social relationships. We also discuss the limitations and
perspective of this work, as well as countermeasures to help users protecting their
privacy. We present the related work in Section 5.6 and we summarize the chapter
in Section 5.7.
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5.1 Introduction
Innovative Internet mobile services and products, such as location-based ser-
vices and information-sharing platforms, enable users to enjoy a multitude of
applications to easily stay in touch, work, have fun and exchange data. Be-
side online services accessed through infrastructure-dependent communications
(e.g., WiFi hotspots and cell towers), upcoming near-ﬁeld [116] and peer-to-peer
(P2P) technologies, such as Nokia Instant Community (NIC)[36] and Qualcomm’s
AllJoin [131], allow for direct device-to-device connections, thus creating a new
form of localized and context-aware interactions. For instance, Apple’s AirDrop
enables users to exchange ﬁles between mobile devices by creating an ad-hoc WiFi
network. All in all, the amount of data exchanged wirelessly by mobile devices,
be it in an infrastructure or P2P ad-hoc mode, has consistently increased over
the past few years.
The information that can be inferred only by observing the data exchange
patterns and users’ (co-)location traces is of great importance and very sensitive:
Home/work locations [81], activities [107], and social networks [38] are often data
that people would prefer not to reveal publicly. Users’ social relationships are
no exception either, as several studies on ubiquitous computing have shown that
location and co-location traces alone can reveal the presence and type of social
relationships among people [47, 48]. Most of the existing works that evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of the inference of social relationships from location and prox-
imity data are based on a single source of information: either proximity logs
stored on the mobile devices or WiFi/cellular connection data obtained from the
network operators. Although the existing results are signiﬁcant and necessary
for an initial attempt at tackling the issue of social relationship inference, they
lack an important characteristic: data-source diversity for the same experimental
settings. In other words, they lack the simultaneous access to proximity data
present on both the mobile devices and in the operators’ logs. Having access to
these two data sets is paramount, as this enables us to evaluate and compare the
accuracy in inferring the social relationships between an internal attacker, who
has access to the data on the device, and an external eavesdropper who does not.
In this chapter, we address the problem of social relationships inference by
carrying a comparative analysis of the exposure of such relationships and encoun-
ters in a deployed, peer-to-peer and infrastructure-based wireless network. We
gathered communication and proximity information from 80 participants carry-
ing smartphones during a four-month experiment. We collected complementary
encounter information both from the smartphones and from the WiFi sniﬃng net-
work, comprised of a set of access points (APs) passively intercepting communi-
cations between the participants; thus our study is the ﬁrst to possess data-source
diversity for the same experimental setting. These two sources reﬂect accurately
the information that can be gathered by (i) a curious application running on a
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smartphone or an experimenter and (ii) a network infrastructure owner such as
a company which seeks to infer the social relationships between its employees or
a network of compromised (community) access points; both of them represent
realistic and practical adversarial scenarios. By exploiting such complementary
data, we design a statistical inference framework to evaluate the accuracy of the
inference of social relationships in localized and pervasive networks. This eval-
uation provides empirical evidence about the diﬀerence between an adversary’s
accuracy and that of a curious application in determining the type of social rela-
tionships between people. More speciﬁcally, our contribution is two-fold:
• We provide the ﬁrst analysis, to the best of our knowledge, of the exposure
of social relationships, based on proximity data, in a deployed adversarial
WiFi network with data-source diversity.
• We design a statistical inference framework for relationship classiﬁcation
and use it to evaluate the success of the owner of the WiFi sniﬃng stations in
inferring the type of social relationships between users and we then compare
it against a curious application.
Our experimental results show that the infrastructure operator is able to infer
some types of relationships between users better than a curious application that
uses on-device proximity data. This is partially due to the fact that the external
adversary has location information about the encounters between users. In addi-
tion, when exploiting the social community structure, the inference accuracy of
the attacker is signiﬁcantly higher. To put our results in perspective, we com-
pare the strength of the considered adversary, in terms of the density of sniﬃng
stations, to some existing hotspot networks.
5.2 System Architecture
In this section, we describe the methodology and experimental setup of our ﬁeld
experiment, along with the network model and the adversarial model.
5.2.1 Experiment Setup
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the same experimental data
collected in the summer 2011 on the EPFL campus. The detailed description of
the experimental settings and the network model are can be found in Chapter 4
(Section 4.2).
5.2.2 Adversarial Model
The adversary considered in this chapter makes use of the same infrastructure
presented in Chapter 4. However, the goal of the adversary in this chapter is
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diﬀerent. In order to infer the social relationships, the adversary collected the 3-
tuple (Timestamp, Source MAC, RSSI) from the sniﬀed NIC messages. Note that
at no time did the participants connect to the Internet through the adversarial
APs, that were used only for passively sniﬃng the NIC packets. Due to the
localized nature of the NIC message exchanges, they can be captured only by
a local adversary. Such data arguably leaks an amount of personal information
lower than the data that ﬂows through the infrastructure. Because application-
layer encryption was sometimes used to protect the message conﬁdentiality, we
assume that the adversary did not have access to such data. All adversarial
knowledge is built from the analysis of the NIC data, passively collected by the
sniﬃng APs.
In summary, the adversary performed the following: (1) Captured the NIC
message exchanged by the participants’ devices; (2) Built a social graph repre-
senting the presence and intensity of the encounters among users, based on the
estimated physical proximity between their mobile devices; (3) Inferred the social
communities of the participants, based on the social graph and the intensities of
their pairwise interactions; (4) Inferred the type of social relationships between
participants by using our inference framework (presented in Section 5.4, the lo-
calized communities and the trained relationship inference framework. Note that
the adversary usually has some background knowledge about the types of social
relationships to be inferred, based on the targeted population and context (in our
case, students on a campus).
5.3 Social Interactions and Communities
In this section, we describe the methodology used to model the user interactions
during the experiment. The social graph representing the user interaction is used
to infer the community structure, which is subsequently used to reﬁne the social
relationships inference mechanism, as explained in Section 5.5.
Following the notation for social communities deﬁned in Chapter 4, we repre-
sent people and their relationships by an undirected weighted graphG=(V,E,W ),
where the vertex set V corresponds to people, the edge set E expresses the ex-
istence of a relationship between people, and the weight function W :E → R+
quantiﬁes the intensity of such relationships. In their simplest form, communi-
ties can be represented as subgraphs {Ci = (Vi, Ei,W )}Mi=1, where Ci ⊆ G and
M is the number of communities. As people are usually members of several
communities, diﬀerent community subgraphs can share vertices.
5.3.1 Experimental Data
We model the collected encounter data from the experiment as a social graph G.
Hereafter, we describe the type of information that is used to deﬁne the existence
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and intensity of relationships between users. In our experimental data, we have
two sources of proximity information: (i) the internal data, constituted by local
device logs collected by the mobile devices themselves and containing encounter
data (list of neighbors’ MAC addresses, the timestamps and the RSSI values of
received packets), and (ii) the adversarial data, containing the headers of the
sniﬀed packets (sent by the mobile devices), which include the timestamps and
RSSI values of received packets at the sniﬃng APs, as well as the device ID of
the sender.
We use these two data sources to formulate the ‘strength’ or intensity of the
social relationships between users and to deﬁne the weights of the edges that
connect the respective vertices in the social graph G = (V,E,W ). From the local
device logs, we can directly obtain the device-to-device proximity information
because the recorded RSSI values on the receiving devices are correlated with
the real distances to the sending devices. However, this is not the case for the
RSSI values recorded by the adversarial network, as they depend on the distance
between the sending device and the receiving sniﬃng station. Following a similar
approach as in Chapter 4, we estimate the position of a mobile device that sent
a packet based on the RSSI at all sniﬃng stations that overheard the packet.
In our social graph, we consider three distinct weight functions {w(d)i,j }3d=1
for the edges between vertices i, j ∈ V to quantify the intensity of their social
interactions. The three weight functions [22] progressively take into account
the proximity, the intensity, and the aging/recency of the relationships between
users. Moreover, to investigate the eﬀect of community detection on the accuracy
of the inference attack, we apply the well-suited CPM method[126] to extract
community information from the social graph G.
5.3.2 Relationship Labels
In addition to the strength of social relationships, we also characterize the type of
relationship between users. More speciﬁcally, we consider three labels (i) friends,
(ii) classmates and (iii) others. The possibility of associating multiple labels to a
single relationship is crucial in social networks, as people can be simultaneously
classmates and friends. To construct the ground truth data, each relationship is
assigned one (or more) labels based on (i) the participants’ answers to the survey
questionnaires (for friends) and (ii) the database of academic course registration
provided by the university (for classmates). For instance, if two participants
followed the same class during the experiment, their relationship was catego-
rized as classmates; furthermore, if one of the same participants also listed the
other as friends in the questionnaires, their relationship was categorized as both
classmates and friends. We note here that for the friendship label, due to the
lower number of declared friendships, we considered asymmetric relationships as
symmetric because of the subjective nature of the friendship relationship that
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could be perceived by one person and not by the other. From our ground truth
data, we observed that 25% of all the 3,160 possible relationships were tagged as
classmates and 2% as friends. We tagged the remaining as others.
We choose these types of relationships for two reasons. First, we followed the
approach of [25] and selected the types of relationship relevant to our context.
For instance, as our population was comprised almost exclusively by students on
a university campus, we considered the two relationship types aforementioned,
as well as the estimated user location. For a more diverse on-campus population,
including researchers and instructors, we would have had to consider the role of
the hierarchy as well. Second, it was possible for us to collect the ground truth
for these two types of relationships.
5.4 Relationship Inference Framework
In this section, we introduce our relationship inference framework by which we
evaluate the accuracy of the attacker’s reconstruction of users’ social relationships
on our data sets. First, we describe the method we adopt for characterizing a re-
lationship from the internal and adversarial (estimated) proximity data. Second,
we describe each component of the framework and we explain how it exploits the
two diﬀerent data sets.
Pathways
Public places
Classrooms
Figure 5.1: Partition of the map (in which the experiment was conducted) into
three types of areas: pathways, public places, and classrooms.
5.4.1 Relationship Characterization
The relationships between two users are characterized by their interactions. To
characterize and classify relationships, we ﬁrst formalize the notion of encounter :
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it captures a signiﬁcant interaction between two users. A relationship is deﬁned
by a set of encounters.
Encounter Detection
We deﬁne an encounter between any two users as a continuous time interval
that meets a threshold, both on its duration and on the proximity of the two
involved users. Typical values of these thresholds are a few minutes and a few
dozens of meters, respectively. The proximity between users is computed in two
ways, according to the source of the data. From the internal device logs, we
use the RSSI values of messages exchanged between users (in a P2P fashion)
in order to determine their distance, whereas from the adversarial sniﬀed data,
the proximity is determined by computing the Euclidian distance between the
estimated location coordinates of each user, based on device-to-AP RSSI values.
A number of features are extracted from the internal/adversarial logs, either
at the granularity of an encounter or of a relationship. For instance, we extract
the duration of each single encounter and the total number of encounters between
the two users for each relationship. The extracted features are then fed to the
classiﬁcation algorithm. In order for the adversary to accurately classify the
relationships based on speciﬁc features, these features must vary signiﬁcantly from
a category (such as friends) to another. Typical discriminating features include
encounter duration, the proximity of users during encounters, inter-encounter
time, and the number and periodicity of encounters [159].
Training set
feature extraction
Internal logs /
adversarial
estimates
Parameters 
optimization
(EM, AIC)
Trial Data
Survey relationship labels
Training Data
Gaussian Mixture Model
Test set feature extraction
Test Data
Maximum Likelihood 
Classifier
True / False Positive 
Rate
Synthetic pdfs
Figure 5.2: Overview of the inference framework.
5.4.2 Relationship Classiﬁcation
In order to select the set of possible relationship classes, we use the ground-
truth collected through (i) survey questionnaires at the beginning of the trial
and (ii) the oﬃcial university course-registration database. We then designed
an inference framework (Figure 5.2) based on the features extracted from the
internal/adversarial data.
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The classiﬁcation algorithm operates as follows. First, we extract the features
of a small subset of the encounters and relationships, namely a training set. From
the survey and administrative records, we know the category of each encounter
and relationship in the training set. Then, for each of the three categories of
relationships, we compute the experimental probability density function (pdf) of
the various features and plot the corresponding histograms. We ﬁt each exper-
imental probability density function with an appropriate parametric model, the
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [47], and determine the parameters according
to two optimization criteria. The obtained synthetic pdfs are subsequently used
to classify the encounters of the rest of the data set, i.e., the test set. Based on
the synthetic pdfs, for each encounter and for each category of relationships, the
likelihood that the encounter belongs to this category is computed from the val-
ues of its features. The likelihood that a relationship belongs to a given category
is computed by taking into account the diﬀerent features of the relationship and
those of its encounters.
Encounter Location Classiﬁcation
In our context, the location where encounters take place is a key feature of rela-
tionships. This information is only available in the adversarial data and is com-
puted from the users’ locations estimated by the adversary. More speciﬁcally, the
region of the experiment covered by the adversarial network is partitioned into
diﬀerent areas classiﬁed in three types: pathways, public spaces and classrooms
(Figure 5.1). We expect such a classiﬁcation to be discriminating, with respect to
the types of relationships the adversary wants to infer. For instance, classmates
are expected to experience frequent encounters mostly in classrooms, whereas
friends might hangout more frequently in public spaces and pathways. Because
users can move during a given encounter, for each encounter, we compute the
proportion of the time spent in each type of location. In this way, we can capture
the fact that an encounter that started in a pathway continues through public
spaces.
Feature Extraction
We detect encounters based on interaction duration and proximity between users.
With the internal data, we assume that an encounter occurred if at least two
messages are exchanged within an interval of 5 minutes and the average RSSI
of the exchanged messages is greater than -80 dBm (to account for radio noise,
interference and fading), which corresponds to a distance of at most 18 meters.
These threshold values have been determined empirically. The encounter spans
from the ﬁrst exchanged message to the last. For example, if two users exchange
messages, all with RSSI values of -50 dBm, at times 1, 3, 7, and 15 minutes, an
encounter is detected and it spans from 1 to 7 minutes With the adversarial data,
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we ﬁrst need to estimate the users’ locations. In order to reduce the noise on
the users’ estimated locations, we divide the trial timeline in small sub-intervals
of 30 seconds and we average user locations over each sub-interval. First, we
consider that an encounter occurs if at least two messages are exchanged within
an interval of 5 minutes and the distance between the two users’ locations is
consistently lower than 5 meters (i.e., lower than 5 meters in each sub-interval
between the times at which the messages were exchanged). A distance of 5 meters
between two devices translates to an RSSI value of around -53 dBm. To compare
the results with the internal data, we also considered distance thresholds of 10,
20, 30, and 40 meters, corresponding to RSSI values of -68, -82, -91, and -97 dBm,
respectively.
At the granularity of an encounter, we extract the following features: (i) the
encounter duration (the time elapsed between the ﬁrst and last message ex-
changed during the encounter), (ii) the inter-encounter time (the time elapsed
since the end of the previous encounter and the beginning of the current en-
counter), and (iii) the average encounter RSSI value (the average of the RSSI
values of the messages exchanged during the encounter). For the adversarial data,
we further consider (iv) the encounter location, characterized by the fraction
of the encounter time that takes place at each type of location, such as pathways,
public places and classrooms. The location of an encounter is deﬁned as the
midpoint of the two users. At the granularity of a relationship, we consider an
additional feature: the total number of encounters over the whole trial.
Supervised Learning
In order to train our inference framework, we use a subset (the training set) of
all the relationships, which account for approximately 30% of the whole data
set. We divide the relationships in the training set into three categories, i.e.,
friends, classmates, and others according to the labels obtained from the surveys
and the university database. Because two users can simultaneously be friends and
classmates, a relationship can belong to both categories. Note that an alternative
way to proceed would be to divide the training set into four categories: friends,
classmates, others, and friends and classmates. However, as in our data set
the latter category does not contain enough relationships to perform a proper
training, we consider the former three categories. For each category, and for
each feature, we compute the experimental distribution of the feature for all
the relationships in the category, by means of histograms composed of 100 bins.
We denote by f˜ featcat , cat ∈ {friends (f), classmates (c), others (o)} and feat ∈
{encounter duration (ed), inter-encounter time (iet), average RSSI (rssi), and
number of encounters (ne)} (and encounter location (el) for the adversarial data),
the functions corresponding to the histograms. For example, f˜ edf (x) gives the
proportion, in the training set, of encounters between friends that last between
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x and x + δx minutes. These functions can be thought of as indicators of the
likelihood that a given encounter belongs to a given category, based on the value
of one of its features, and will be used as such by our classiﬁcation algorithm.
Intuitively, it can be expected that the pairs of users whose relationships are
classiﬁed as friends and classmates would experience more frequent encounters
than users belonging to the category others. Similarly, classmates are expected
to meet according to a ﬁxed pattern (e.g., every Monday for a particular class),
whereas on-campus encounters between friends are not expected to follow a ﬁxed
pattern. This intuition is conﬁrmed by our observation of the data, as shown
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The former depicts the experimental distribution of two
features: the encounter duration (at the granularity of an encounter) and the
number encounters (at the granularity of a relationship), whereas the latter shows
the location feature. It can be observed that, as expected, these features discrim-
inate the three categories of relationships, therefore we foresee a high potential
for classiﬁcation. For instance, friends meet more than classmates and others
and classmates meet for longer times (classes). Also, classmates meet mostly
in classrooms. Note that the aforementioned intuitions are given for the sake of
information, the inference algorithm is based on the rigorous techniques that we
describe.
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Figure 5.3: Encounter location feature for the adversarial data (distance threshold
of 40 meters).
As it can be observed in Figure 5.4, the experimental distributions are noisy
and thus cannot be used as is for classiﬁcation purposes: For instance, we can
observe in the histograms that there are no relationships between friends com-
posed of exactly 35 encounters in our training set. Therefore, if the histogram of
the number of encounters is used as is to determine the likelihood of two users
being friends, two users who meet 35 times during the trial would be assigned a
null likelihood for the friends category. For this reason, we ﬁt the experimental
histograms with parametric pdfs, namely multi-dimensional Gaussian mixture
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Figure 5.4: Experimental distributions (histograms) and ﬁtted GMM pdfs
(dashed lines) of two features extracted from the adversarial data (distance
threshold of 40 meters): encounter duration and number encounters. From top
to bottom, we show the GMM pdfs for the class labels friends, classmates and
others, repectively.
models of the form:
p(x; θ) =
K∑
k=1
πk
1√|Σk|(2π)d/2 e−
1
2
(x−μk)Σ−1k (x−μk),
where
∑
k πk = 1 and d is the dimension of the feature vector. The set of
parameters is denoted by θ = ((π1,μ1,Σ1), . . . , (πK ,μK ,ΣK)), and x is the value
of a feature. We use one-dimensional GMMs for scalar features, e.g, encounter
duration, and multi-dimensional GMMs for the encounter location (fractions of
time spent in pathways, classrooms, and public places).
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The number K of Gaussian components, and their respective weights (πk),
means (μk), and covariance matrices (Σk) are free parameters and must be cho-
sen to best ﬁt the experimental distributions. For a given value of K, we deter-
mine the other free parameters of the Gaussian components through expectation
maximization (EM). We choose the values of the parameters that maximize the
likelihood that the n values {xi}i=1..n of the features (observed in the training set)
have been drawn from a Gaussian mixture with these parameters. The likelihood
function is given by
(θ;x1, . . .xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi; θ),
and the estimated value of the parameters is θˆ = argmaxθ (θ;x1, . . .xn). We
repeat this estimation step for several values ofK, and we subsequently determine
the most appropriate value ofK according to the Akaike information criterion [1]:
AIC = 2k′ − 2 ln (θ), where k′ is the number of parameters of the GMM.
The learning phase produces a likelihood function featcat for each category cat ∈
{f, c, o} and for each feature feat ∈ {ed, iet, rssi, ne} (and el for the adversarial
data).
Relationship Classiﬁer
Our classiﬁcation algorithm is based on likelihood maximization and operates
in two steps. We ﬁrst determine if the two users are actually involved in a
relationship (friends or classmates) or not (others) based on the likelihood of a
relationship, with respect to each category. This likelihood is computed from
the value of the features and from the synthetic distribution obtained from the
training set. If users are believed to have a relationship, we reﬁne the classiﬁcation
by discriminating between friends and classmates.
More speciﬁcally, the algorithm operates as follows (see Figure 5.5 for illus-
tration). If the likelihood is maximized for the others category, the relationship
is classiﬁed as others and the classiﬁcation ends. If it is maximized for the friends
category, the relationship is assigned the friends label and a second step is per-
formed to decide whether the classmates label is assigned as well. This second
step is based on a threshold: If the likelihood of the relationship for the cate-
gory classmates is higher than the likelihood of friends multiplied by a factor
γ ∈ [0, 1], the relationship is assigned the classmates label as well. The same
process applies in the case the likelihood is maximized for the classmates cate-
gory. The classiﬁcation process can be summarized by the decision tree depicted
in Figure 5.5.
The likelihood cat of a relationship, with respect to each category cat, is
given by
cat(r) =
∏
e∈r
edcat(ed(e))·ietcat(iet(e))·rssicat (rssi(e))× cat(ne(r)) (5.1)
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f ≥ max (c, o)
friends and classmates
c ≥ γ · f
friends
c < γ · f
o > max (f , c)
others
c ≥ max (f , o)
classmates
f < γ · c
friends and classmates
f ≥ γ · c
Figure 5.5: Decision tree used by the classiﬁer.
where m ∈ r denotes the encounters between the two users concerned by the
relationship r. For the adversarial data, the factor el(el(e)) must be inserted in
the product in Eq. (5.1) to take location into account.
5.5 Results
In this section, we present the performance results of our relationship classiﬁ-
cation inference framework. First, we describe the metrics used to evaluate the
inference accuracy of the adversary, then we discuss the performance of the classi-
ﬁer and the eﬀect on the users’ relationship privacy. Finally, based on our results,
we discuss possible countermeasures to mitigate the success of the adversary in
inferring social relationships. We evaluate his success by using both pairwise-only
and community-enhanced proximity information.
5.5.1 Pairwise Relationship Inference
The performance of a classiﬁer is usually evaluated in terms of its true positive
rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR). Hereafter, we present the accuracy
of the adversary’s relationship inference on our data set, where the adversary
considers only the estimated pairwise proximity information between users, i.e.,
without taking into account the underlying community structure. Figure 5.6(a)
shows the TPR and FPR for the three classes for diﬀerent distance thresholds.
Internal Proximity Data
By using the internal proximity information between users, the performance of
our inference framework is, in general, satisfactory, given the limited amount
of training samples (30% of the total). This means that we have a high TPR
and a moderate FPR. For the class friends, we observe the best TPR (84%)
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(a) Pairwise-based classiﬁer accuracy.
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Figure 5.6: Accuracy of the external adversary in inferring social relationships.
The horizontal lines correspond to the accuracy of the classiﬁer when the internal
(local device) proximity data is used.
and a moderate FPR (27%), which means that the actual proximity data and
the encounter features we selected for the classiﬁcation are quite discriminating
for this class. Classmates and other relationship classes have a TPR/FPR of
56%/18% and 37%/13% respectively, which are lower than for friends. As a result,
the actual proximity data works well for the friends and classmates relationships
inference, whereas it has a more limited success in classifying other types of
relationships. This is not surprising, as proximity information, without taking
into account the actual location of the interaction, is intuitively tied to inferring
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close and periodic interactions more than sporadic encounters.
Adversarial (Estimated) Proximity Data
In general, the adversary’s accuracy in inferring users’ social relationships has a
bi-modal behavior with respect to TPR and FPR. First, at a lower encounter-
distance threshold (5-10 meters), the adversary has a very high TPR rate for
classmates and friends (79% and 74% respectively) while it suﬀers from an ele-
vated FPR as well (53% for friends). The accuracy for others is relatively low at
28%, meaning that the prediction suﬀers from a signiﬁcant number of false pos-
itives that negatively aﬀect the successful recognition of friends and classmates.
Whereas, for larger encounter-distance thresholds (20-40 meters), the accuracy
for others doubles and is consistently larger than for the friends.
Internal vs. Adversarial
For low encounter-distance thresholds, on one hand the external adversary has a
similar or higher accuracy in correctly inferring the relationships of participants
compared to the case of the internal adversary (i.e., using the actual proximity
data). On the other hand, the FPR is also substantially higher, which renders
the relationship prediction much less reliable at low distance thresholds. As
the adversary can estimate, in addition to users’ proximity, some contextual
information (location of the encounter), it is easier for him to infer the type of
relationship given this additional feature, but it is also easier to wrongly include
other types of relationships in the friends class.
When increasing the distance threshold (20-40 meters), we can see that the
success in inferring friendships from external data decreases by at least 50%
compared to the case where internal data is used. Meanwhile, there is a two-
fold increase in TPR for the others category. In other words, the larger the
allowed distance between users is, the better the inference accuracy for the others
category. And the classmates performance stays at comparable levels for the
diﬀerent distance thresholds. Figure 5.7 shows the ROC surface (TPR vs FPR)
of our statistical inference framework for diﬀerent distance thresholds, considering
pairwise-only (left) and community-enhanced (right) interactions.
Overall, we observe that the increase of the encounter-distance threshold for
the adversary is highly beneﬁcial for the detection of non-friendships. By adjust-
ing such a threshold based on the target relationship class, the external adversary
obtains an inference performance comparable to that of the internal adversary
who uses the actual proximity information available on the devices.
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Figure 5.7: Receiver Operating Characteristic curve. On the left chart, the
TPR/FPR values are based on pairwise-only proximity data. On the right chart,
the TPR/FPR values are based on the community-enhanced proximity data.
5.5.2 Community-Enhanced Relationship Inference Results
Hereafter, we describe the performance of the relationship inference framework
when the adversary relies on the underlying structure of user communities. This
pre-processing step will enable us to observe the eﬀect of such information on
the accuracy of the adversary’s inference compared to the previous case without
community information. The results are shown in Figure 5.6(b).
Internal vs. Adversarial
For low-distance threshold values (5 meters), we see that the external adversary
has a TPR comparable to the case where no community information is extracted
(for most weight functions). However, the FPR values are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent:
The false-positive rate for friends and classmates relationships is three to four
times lower when using community structure than when not. When inferring the
others class of relationships, the TPR is three times better than the community-
less counterpart, with only a comparable FPR. These results indicate that by
using the community structure of social relationships among users, the adversary
is able to signiﬁcantly increase his performance (both in terms of TPR and FPR)
across all relationship types, especially in terms of false positives. With respect
to the weight functions we deﬁned for the CPM community detection algorithm,
we can see that the ﬁrst two functions w(1) and w(2) have a slightly better per-
formance for friend and classmate relationships and are twice as good for the
others class. This suggests that by modeling the interactions of non-friends or
classmates with memory-less weight functions, the detected community structure
is better suited for distinguishing between such types of relationship, as they did
not exhibit most of the periodic and close interactions during our experiment as
friends or classmates.
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5.5.3 Discussion
The results we have presented so far show that, even without any additional pre-
processing by the adversary, the estimated location and proximity among mobile
users is often enough to make predictions about the kind of social relationship
between any two users (Figure 5.6(a)). Even if the users rely on encryption for
their communications, the considered external adversary can distinguish users as
friends, classmates or neither by capturing their identiﬁers and by correlating
them over time and space.
Even more striking is the fact that by adding an extra step in the inference
process, both the accuracy (TPR) and reliability (FPR) are improved signiﬁ-
cantly. In particular, the dynamic social community structure of people and
their behavior over time leak a substantial amount of additional private infor-
mation to the adversary. By pre-processing the proximity data and detecting
communities, in most cases the adversary is able to double his performance when
inferring the types of relationships between users inside communities, much to the
detriment of the privacy of users and their communities. This suggests that even
a simplistic characterization of human encounters, based on memory-less and
time-independent functions, GPS-less data and standard tri-lateration position-
ing algorithms, is enough to enable a wireless infrastructure owner to successfully
detect communities and to determine the type of relationships among users inside
each community.
Finally, by transposing our results to existing wireless networks, we hypoth-
esize that similar ﬁndings can be obtained by self-interested or curious third-
parties, such as commercial service providers and cellular network operators. The
increasing deployment of low-range cellular base stations [54] and the increased
availability of public WiFi hotspots [56] severely undermine people’s ability to
resist or opt-out from unwanted scrutiny.
5.5.4 Countermeasures and Limitations
Countermeasures
A solution for limiting the success of the inference attack, which is speciﬁc to
the threat presented in this chapter, consists in reducing the information avail-
able to the adversary and his conﬁdence in this information. To achieve this,
technical solutions include the use of changing pseudonyms as wireless identiﬁers
and sending dummy messages. With pseudonyms, users can change their MAC
address every day while oﬀ-campus or, upon encounters, collectively interrupt all
communications for a certain time and reconnect with fresh random pseudonyms
(i.e., mix-zones [13]). The use of pseudonyms makes it diﬃcult for the adversary
to link and track identities of users over time. It reduces the learning period to a
few hours instead of a the whole trial timespan, therefore decreasing the success of
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the inference. However, such a mechanism has a negative eﬀect on the usability of
the communication features, e.g., Bluetooth pairing and MAC ﬁltering. Another
technical countermeasure is to dynamically change the transmission power to con-
fuse RSSI-based triangulation and limit the eavesdropping possibilities. However
this comes at the cost of decreased networking performances. Finally, injecting
dummy messages would artiﬁcially increase the intensity of the encounters, thus,
biasing the results of the inference.
Limitations
The results and discussions presented in this study are based on a large-scale
experiment conducted on a university campus, where most of the participants
are students. The characteristics of such a population are rather homogeneous,
with respect to the utilization of technology and the age. As in several other
university-based ﬁeld experiments, the results of our study might apply – to a
lower extent – to scenarios involving a more diverse population with respect to
education, age, gender and technology usage habits. In order to mitigate this, as
part of our future work we would like to extend our experiment to a more diverse
population, and therefore to assess the eﬀectiveness of the inference attacks in a
more mixed environment. Finally, as oﬀ-campus interactions are more insightful
with respect to social relationships – for instance, the larger variety of location
types (e.g., bars, cinemas and residential areas instead of just public places and
classrooms) – we expect a greatly improved performance of the inference when
considering oﬀ-campus interactions as well. This would enable us to consider
ﬁne-grained social relationships, such as close friends and relatives.
Strength of the Adversary Regarding the relative strength of the adversary con-
sidered in the chapter, in terms of the number of APs, we studied the density of
three deployed WiFi AP networks for comparison. We looked at the FreeWiﬁ [60]
and SFRWiﬁ [141] hotspots networks that consist of the wireless modems and
set-top boxes of the subscribers of two major ISPs operating in France. Such
networks of hotspots constitute concrete examples of an adversary as they are
operated by a single entity. For the Paris area, the average density is 564±270
APs/km2 (resp. 853±346 APs/km2), and goes up to 1450 APs/km2 (resp. 1560
APs/km2) in populated areas for Free (resp. SFR). For comparison, the adver-
sarial network of sniﬃng APs we considered has a density of 1138 APs/km2 (37
APs deployed over a region of size 130m×250m). Another example is that of
a company exploiting its WiFi stations to infer the social relationships between
its employees. For instance, our university has ∼880 WiFi APs deployed over a
region of 500m×800m, that is a density of 2200 APs/km2. These statistics show
that our results are realistic and applicable to existing networks.
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5.6 Related Work
Eagle et al. [48, 47] studied complex social systems by collecting Bluetooth en-
counter data from 94 students equipped with mobile phones. In particular, they
identiﬁed proximity patterns between devices and performed relationship infer-
ence on the data by comparing the results with the ground truth obtained from
surveys and answers to questionnaires. Similarly to other user studies [43, 117],
the authors could only compare their ﬁndings (based on Bluetooth encounters
between devices) with the ground truth, without having access to a network in-
frastructure that would allow them a more thorough analysis by comparing these
results with those obtained by a passive third-party adversary. However, oﬀ-
campus location data was collected in [48, 47] and it signiﬁcantly improved the
quality of the inference results. A recent study [9], performed on a group of 27
participants, shows that it is possible to accurately infer the social relationships
between people based on Bluetooth encounters, phone calls, SMSs and cell-tower
IDs, without any prior knowledge about the participants. Nevertheless, these
ﬁndings are based on data that is available only on the local devices, therefore it
is unclear to what extent the results apply to the inference success of an external
adversary. Other studies focused on inferring the social relationships from co-
presence of users, as in the case of Flickr [38], and on dynamics of inter-encounter
times [159]. A large user study, involving 168 participants over 2 years, was con-
ducted in [94] in order to study people’s behavior with respect to mobile phone
usage, activity and location.With regard to location privacy in pervasive wireless
networks, [23] studied the eﬃcacy of dynamic allocation of pseudo-random IDs
in speciﬁc regions called mix-zones [13], showing that in deployed networks such
a mechanism provides only limited success in protecting users’ location privacy.
By relying on the graph-theoretic analysis introduced and evaluated in [22],
our work uses weight functions and community structures that are well suited for
the analysis and inference of social relationships in a pervasive wireless network.
In contrast to the former work, in this chapter we focus on the accuracy of the
adversary in classifying the type of social relationships among users, and we
study the eﬀect of using the community structure on the performance of the
classiﬁcation.
5.7 Summary
In this work, we have experimentally evaluated a practical adversary’s accuracy
in inferring the type of relationship of users in ubiquitous networks. The avail-
ability of source-diversity in our experiment enables us to compare the accuracy
of an external adversary with that of an internal adversary (e.g., a malicious ap-
plication) who has access to actual proximity information stored on the devices.
Our results show the following two aspects. First, social relationships are exposed
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to a signiﬁcant inference threat by an external adversary, who can quite accu-
rately infer the type of social relationships (friend, classmate and other) between
users simply by relying on location estimates and encounter characteristics, com-
pared to a curious application running on the device (or to the experimenter).
Second, by applying a well-suited community detection algorithm, the adversary
can double his inference accuracy on the same data set.
Publication: [17]
Part III
Cross-Layer Approach for
Privacy and Information
Sharing
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Chapter 6
Adaptive Information-Sharing in
Mobile Social Networks
Personal and contextual information is increasingly shared via mobile social net-
works. Users’ locations, activities and their co-presence can be shared easily
with online “friends”, as their smartphones already access such information from
embedded sensors and storage. Yet, people usually exhibit selective sharing be-
havior depending on contextual attributes, thus showing that privacy, utility,
and usability are paramount to the success of such online services. In this
chapter, we present SPISM, a novel information-sharing system that decides
(semi-)automatically whether to share information with others and at what gran-
ularity, whenever they request it. Based on active machine learning and context,
SPISM adapts to each user’s behavior and it predicts the level of detail for each
sharing decision, without revealing any personal information to a third-party.
Based on a personalized survey about information sharing involving 70 partic-
ipants, our results provide insight into the most inﬂuential features behind a
sharing decision. Moreover, we investigate the reasons for the users’ decisions
and their conﬁdence in them. We show that SPISM outperforms other kinds of
global and individual policies, by achieving up to 90% of correct decisions.
Chapter Outline In Section 6.1, we present the topic and formulate the goals
of this chapter. In Section 6.2, we introduce the SPISM information-sharing
platform, including the system architecture, the operating principles and the
decision-making core. In Section 6.3, we present our user-study and the method-
ology. We then evaluate SPISM and present the results from the study in Section
6.4. We discuss the related work in Section 6.5, and we summarize the chapter
in Section 6.6.
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6.1 Introduction
Mobile social networks are becoming extremely popular. Every month, more than
250 million people use their smartphones in order to get the latest updates from
their favorite social networks1. Having access to users’ personal data and physical
context (through an increasing number of embedded sensors), mobile devices
represent a simple means to quickly share information with others; location and
photos are just two examples of data that can be easily shared. In addition to the
user-triggered sharing decisions, applications such as FourSquare and the now-
closed Gowalla enable users to conﬁgure their smartphones to share their location
and co-presence automatically. With a small set of default information-sharing
policies, users have the possibility to adjust the settings in order to match their
sharing behaviors with their privacy concerns.
Prior studies on sharing behavior in mobile social networks have investigated
the issues related to contextual information-sharing [144, 152, 12, 136]. By ana-
lyzing people’s sharing behaviors in diﬀerent contexts, they show that it is pos-
sible to determine the features that most inﬂuence users’ sharing decisions, such
as the identity of the person that is requesting the information and the current
location[152]. For instance, tools such as the location-sharing systems Locaccino
[153] and PeopleFinder [136] have been used to gain signiﬁcant insight into the
beneﬁts of providing users with the ability to set personnal sharing policies. Two
recurrent ﬁndings in UbiComp studies are that (i) users are not particularly good
at eﬀectively articulating their information-sharing policies (compared to their
actual behavior) [136] and (ii) that sharing policies evolve over time [153, 136].
In order to overcome these two issues, machine learning techniques have been
applied to improve to some extent the decision-making process [40, 53, 136]. The
advantage of such systems is that they can decide in a (semi-)automatic fashion
whether or not to share information. Most existing schemes, however, enable
users to share only a speciﬁc kind of information (e.g., location). Moreover, they
only make binary decisions on whether to share the requested information. In
particular, this last issue is often mentioned as a crucial catalyst for overcom-
ing concerns related to privacy [148] and for encouraging a more open, sharing
behavior.
In this chapter, we perform a comprehensive study of information-sharing
in mobile social networks by tackling, all at once, the issues related to context,
user-burden trade-oﬀs, and privacy. First, we develop a novel information-sharing
system (SPISM) for (semi-)automatic decision-making in mobile social networks:
It enables users to share diﬀerent types of information (location, activity and
co-presence of other people) with other users or services in a privacy-aware fash-
ion. The decision-making core is supported by an active learning method that
1Social networking statistics, http://www.statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/
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enables SPISM to either decide automatically – whenever the conﬁdence in the
decision is high enough – or to rely on the user’s input otherwise. Second, we
conduct a personalized online study involving 70 participants where, in addition
to collecting data about their sharing behaviors, we provide insight into two other
crucial factors in UbiComp studies [10]: the reason behind a decision to share
and the conﬁdence that the user has in her decision. Third, we evaluate SPISM
with respect to the amount of training data (provided by the user) and its per-
formance, and we compare it against two policy-based mechanisms. Our results
show that SPISM signiﬁcantly outperforms both the individual user-privacy poli-
cies and several consolidated ones that are based on statistical analysis [3, 152],
and it achieves up to 90% of correct sharing decisions. We also demonstrate the
advantages of active learning techniques in our setting.
6.2 The SPISM Information-Sharing Platform
In this section, we describe the functionality, the operating principle, the archi-
tecture and the design of the SPISM information-sharing platform.
In order to better understand the following, we need to distinguish between
two diﬀerent kinds of subscribers to SPISM: (i) the requester, who wants to know
something about other subscribers by sending information requests, and (ii) the
target, who receives requests for information.
The SPISM platform is composed of the SPISM application, that runs on
mobile devices (as for now it is implemented only for the Android platform), and
the SPISM Information Sharing Directory (ISD), that runs on a dedicated server.
6.2.1 Overview
The SPISM application enables subscribers, who can be users, third-party online
services or mobile apps, to request information about other subscribers. The in-
formation that can be requested includes contextual data (the geographic location
and the wireless identiﬁers of physically co-located devices) and the time-schedule
availability. The features that are currently implemented are the following. The
geographic location is determined by processing data obtained from the embed-
ded GPS sensor (if available) or by WiFi tri-lateration (which relies on the Google
localization service). The list of devices that are physically co-located with the
target subscriber is obtained through periodic scans of the Bluetooth and WiFi
interfaces. If a MAC address in the vicinity of the target is a known MAC ad-
dress (there exist an entry associated with a subscriber in the contact list of the
target), the name of the contact is displayed. Finally, the schedule availabil-
ity is obtained from the subscriber’s calendar (accessed through the on-device
calendar application). Subscribers can specify a level of detail for the requested
information: low, medium or high. The information sent by the target subscriber
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Figure 6.1: SPISM mobile application interfaces. From left to right, the diﬀer-
ent windows allow users to register and log in, check other subscribers’ current
location, the other devices around them, their availability. The subscribers can
access other features such as the record of past activity and their contacts’ lists.
is provided with a level of detail lower or equal to the requested level. For the
location, the coordinates are truncated; for the neighboring devices, the presence
(i.e., some devices/no devices), the number, or the identiﬁers of the devices are
provided; for the schedule availability, the availability (i.e., busy/available), the
title or the detailed record of the calendar activity is provided. Figure 6.1 shows
the main application windows, where subscribers can log in and register, request
the location, the co-located devices and the availability of their contact, as well as
enjoy additional features such as visualizing the past activity and their contacts’
list. At the time of this writing, we are implementing the possibility for users to
audit and change a past decision, which will be then taken into account for the
subsequent requests.
6.2.2 System Model
The SPISM platform is composed of the ISD and the subscribers of the service,
who can be either users or third-party online services. The roles of the ISD and
of the subscribers are as follows:
• ISD: Its main purpose is to allow users to discover the current IP addresses
of their contacts when they want to send them information requests. The
ISD stores the list of registered SPISM subscribers, their credentials, their
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contact lists and the MAC addresses of the Bluetooth interfaces of each
user’s mobile devices. The subscribers interact with the ISD in the regis-
tration phase (once per user), during the log-in phase (once per application
start), when downloading the contacts lists, when periodically reporting
their IP addresses and updating their online status, and when sending in-
formation requests to one of their contacts.
• Subscribers: A subscriber, either an online service or a mobile user, can
be a requester (when she sends queries to another subscriber) or a target
(when she receives queries from other subscribers). In order to inform
the ISD of her online status, each subscriber connected to the ISD sends
periodic keep-alive messages. Requesters can see, at any time, the list of
online and oﬄine contacts, and they can choose to send queries to the online
subscribers in their contacts list, in order to know their location, the devices
around them and their availability. The requests that target subscribers
receive and process are based on several features of their current physical
and social contexts, including their current location, the time of the day
and the people that are currently close by.
To enhance the security of the communications, all messages exchanged be-
tween the subscribers and the ISD are encrypted with a public-key certiﬁcate
obtained from a trusted Certiﬁcation Authority (CA). In order to protect users’
privacy with respect to the ISD, no information requests or replies are tunneled
through the ISD. This is a crucial aspect of our platform, as it prevents the service
provider from learning the information sent by a subscriber about her location,
physical context and availability. This approach has, however, two shortcomings
as well: (i) The target knows the IP address of the requester (if no proxies are
used), and therefore she may be able to infer the coarse-grained location of the
requester (based on IP-geolocation), and (ii) the target may be able to infer the
co-location of other users if they share the public IP address with the some of
the requesters (when connected to a WiFi hotspot for example).
6.2.3 Operating Principle
SPISM works as follows. A user ﬁrst logs in to the ISD with her username and
password. She can subsequently report her online status and obtain the online
status (and IP addresses) of her contacts from the ISD. In a typical scenario, the
user requests some information from one of her (connected) contacts. To do so,
the user ﬁrst chooses the type of information she wants to request, by selecting the
corresponding icon in the main window (See Figure 6.1), and then she selects the
target subscriber from the list of her connected contacts. Finally, the user speciﬁes
the level of detail for the requested information and the request is prepared and
sent directly to the target subscriber’s device. If the reply is received within a
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ﬁxed amount of time (typically a few seconds) it is automatically showed to the
user, together with the requested information if shared by the targeted requester
(See Figure 6.1); otherwise, the user is redirected to the main window and she
will be notiﬁed when the reply is received. At the targeted subscriber’s device,
the request is processed automatically when it is received: (1) The requested
information is stored and (2) the information linked to the request (i.e., the
time, the type of information requested and the requester) is combined with
various contextual features (periodically collected in the background by SPISM
from the various data sources and sensors available on the device) and fed to
the information-sharing framework that we describe in detail in the next section.
If SPISM can make the decision with enough conﬁdence, based on the target
subscriber’s past decisions, the request is processed automatically. Otherwise,
the target subscriber is notiﬁed and asked to decide; Her decision is then stored
(note that the target subscriber can postpone her decision). Once a decision is
made, it is sent back to the requester together with the requested information if
the decision is positive. Before being sent, the requested information is processed
to match the level of detail speciﬁed by the decision. All the sent and received
requests are stored and can be accessed by the user by selecting the corresponding
icon in the main window. In particular, the user can audit automatic decisions
and correct those she disagrees with (to avoid similar errors in the future).
6.2.4 Decision Making
The SPISM information-sharing decision-making core processes each incoming
information request. In order to make the decision, several contextual features are
taken into account by the target device. Features such as the identity of and the
social ties with the requester, the current location and the activity of the target,
the people around the target and the time of the day were extensively studied in
the past; several independent pieces of work show (with statistical signiﬁcance)
that they are strongly correlated with the information-sharing behavior of mobile
users [152, 3, 27, 144, 35]. With these ﬁndings, we incorporated 18 such features
in the SPISM decision-making core; the list of all the features we included is
shown in Table 6.1. Due to the diﬀerent natures of the features, some of them
are deﬁned as categorical (they are in a ﬁnite and pre-deﬁned set of values, such
as the social ties with the requester) or numerical (ﬂoating or integer values for
the time and location coordinates).
Some of these 18 features can be extracted from the request itself or the target
mobile device, such as the time, the current schedule availability or the requester
ID, whereas other features require more information, e.g., the social ties with the
requester and the semantics of the current location of the target subscriber. To
obtain such information, SPISM takes advantage of the existing social networks,
such as Facebook, and other data available on the phone (e.g., call logs). In ad-
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Feature Type Feature Type
Person
Familiarity Float 
When?
Time Int. 
Social tie Cat. Weekday Cat. 
User ID Cat. Daytime Cat.
Service Servicecategory 
Cat. Activity Cat. 
What? Request type Cat. With  
whom? 
Neighbors Int. 
Details Float Neighbors 
Type Cat.
Location 
Latitude Float 
Longitude Float 
Last
interact. 
Time last 
request
Float 
Semantic 
location 
Cat. Details last 
request
Float 
Table 6.1: Features used by the SPISM machine learning framework to decide
whether or not to share information and with what accuracy.
dition, other third-party services (such as Google Maps, OpenStreetMap and the
Android application store, i.e., Google Play) are used to obtain more information
about the location and type of application (in the case where the requester is a
mobile application). In some cases, the extraction of the features requires access
to the sensors embedded on the device; GPS and Bluetooth scans usually require
a non-negligible amount of time and resources [130], and a per-request access
to such sensors can drain the battery. For this reason, some time- or energy-
consuming features (such as the GPS coordinates and Bluetooth MAC addresses
of the nearby devices) are obtained periodically and cached, so that they can be
polled by the device at any time instant without incurring resource-consuming
operations. Note that the location, the list of nearby devices and the schedule
availability are all used to make the decision and to be shared.
After all 18 features have been extracted from the request and determined
from the context, they are aggregated into a feature vector and fed to a classiﬁer.
The output space of the classiﬁer comprises a binary classiﬁer that outputs a
“share/not share” decision, followed by a linear regression function to estimate
the level of detail. All machine learning components used by SPISM are imple-
mented in the WEKA2 Android library. Hereafter we detail the binary classiﬁer
and the linear regression components of SPISM.
2http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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SPISM Stage I: To Share or not to Share
The ﬁrst decision-making block of the SPISM framework consists of a logistic
binary classiﬁer, based on a logistic function deﬁned as:
yω(φ(x)) =
1
1 + e−(ωTφ(x))
=
1
1 + e
∑M
i=1 ωiφi(x)
= p(S|φ(x)) (6.1)
where ω is the weight vector that is optimized during the training phase, M
is the total number of elements of the feature map vector φ(x), S is the class
that represents the “share” decision (whereas NS is the “not share” class), and
p(S|φ(x)) is the probability of the “share” decision given the input feature map.
We chose the logistic regression module for binary classiﬁcation because (i) it
does not penalize correct instances that are far from the classiﬁcation hyperplane,
(ii) it performs reasonably well with a small number (up to a few hundreds) of
training instances and (iii) it outputs a value ∈ [0, 1] that is also the posterior of
the “sharing” class in our case.
At the ﬁrst execution of the SPISMmobile application, this classiﬁer is trained
on a set of instances derived from the results of past research in information-
sharing behavior [3, 152]. The sharing rules extracted from these works allow
us to build a set of default sharing policies that reﬂect the tendencies that were
observed with statistical signiﬁcance. For example, people are usually less willing
to share their information when they are sleeping or eating, and when they are
at or close to their own home or to that of their friends. However, they are more
likely to share when they are with friends and family, when they are alone or
during the afternoon on weekdays (but not weekends).
After computing the probability of sharing p(S|φ(x)) for each received query,
we distinguish between three possible outcomes:
p(S|φ(x))
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
> τS then Share
< τNS then Not share
otherwise Ask user
where 0 ≤ τNS < τS ≤ 1 are the thresholds for the conﬁdence sharing decision
that can be set for each subscriber. If p(S|φ(x)) > τS then SPISM will automat-
ically share the information, whereas if p(S|φ(x)) < τNS the information will not
be shared. In case SPISM is not conﬁdent enough to make an automated shar-
ing decision (when τNS ≤ p(S|φ(x)) ≤ τS), the subscriber will be prompted to
manually decide whether she would like to share and to what extent. This weak
form of active learning [140] is important as it allows the classiﬁer’s parameters
to be recomputed each time there is a new manual sharing decision.
Currently, SPISM has three pre-deﬁned levels of the conﬁdence thresholds
τS , τNS that can be selected by each subscriber: Low, medium and high conﬁ-
dence. The three levels of information-sharing thresholds have been adapted from
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Figure 6.2: Diagram of the SPISM decision framework, which consists of a two-
stage process that ﬁlters information requests and estimates the precision of the
shared information to be included in the reply, based on the request, the context
of the target and her past behavior.
prior works on the privacy attitudes of people in online scenarios [96, 121, 87].
When the low conﬁdence threshold is selected (τNS = 0.45, τS = 0.55), SPISM
will make most sharing decisions autonomously, without asking the subscriber,
even when the conﬁdence in the decision is quite low. The medium settings
(τNS = 0.3, τS = 0.7) requires a slightly higher conﬁdence in the decision in
order not to ask the subscriber, whereas the high conﬁdence settings (τNS = 0.1,
τS = 0.9) would make the automated decision only if very conﬁdent, and would
ask the subscriber otherwise. SPISM allows the subscriber to audit past sharing
decisions (both automated and manual) and modify them for subsequent requests
if she feels that the decisions do not reﬂect her preferences in that speciﬁc con-
text. When a past decision instance is modiﬁed, the SPISM framework takes this
modiﬁcation into account for subsequent requests.
SPISM Stage II: How much to share?
If the decision of the ﬁrst stage classiﬁer is to “share”, SPISM invokes the sec-
ond stage which computes the extent of detail that is going to be shared, and
consequently the level of obfuscation to be applied. For instance, subscribers
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may want to share their location information at diﬀerent resolutions with dif-
ferent requesters depending on the context [100]; they may want to share their
geographic coordinates at the street, city or country level. Similarly, one may be
willing to share the fact that she is currently not alone in some cases, whereas in
other instances she may want to reveal the identity of the people nearby to the
requester. Based on a linear regression function (Figure 6.2), SPISM determines
the optimal accuracy of the information to be shared, according to the target’s
past behavior in similar contexts. After the obfuscation, the information is sent
back to the requester.
6.3 Study and Data Collection
In order to better understand how users share information and to evaluate the
eﬃcacy of the SPISM framework with a large use sample, we ran an online user
study in early 2013. The participants were not asked to use our proof-of-concept
mobile application; however, their responses were fed to the actual decision-
making core that is implemented in the application, so that the results of the
study would reﬂect the actual behavior of the mobile application when making
decisions. The study consists of an online survey that puts the participants in
realistic, personalized and contextual UbiComp sharing scenarios where they are
asked to answer a set of questions regarding their willingness to share private
information, the conﬁdence in and reason for their decisions.
6.3.1 Participants and Remuneration
We recruited people directly from four large university campuses (in the US,
Canada and Europe), and indirectly via the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform
(MTurk)3. The latter allowed us to draw participants from a pool of non-student
population, in order to limit the bias towards academic and student behaviors.
To advertise our study, we used dedicated mailing-lists and we ran a media cam-
paign through Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+ and oﬃcial university websites, co-
ordinated by our academic media oﬃce. We screened participants according to
the following prerequisites: (i) aged between 18 and 80 years, (ii) with an active
Facebook account with at least 50 friends and (iii) uses a smartphone. Such
criteria were selected so as to sample people that are active in social networks
and are aware of the information-sharing possibilities linked to the use of smart-
phones. Furthermore, we screened the MTurk workers who could access our
survey based on their past Human Intelligence Task (HIT) approval rate (>95%)
and the number of past approved HITs (>100). This was only a preliminary step
for preventing non-serious and inexperienced MTurk workers from accessing our
survey.
3https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
6.3. STUDY AND DATA COLLECTION 137
The survey requires access to private information of the participants (such
as names of their friends on Facebook4) and it demands a signiﬁcant amount of
time (40 - 60 minutes). To provide incentives for the completion of the survey, we
implemented two separate reward schemes: (i) the chance for one participant to
win an Apple iPad and (ii) a ﬁxed amount of money (US$4.5/HIT [106]). The ﬁrst
option was proposed to the participants recruited at the universities and through
the academic media, whereas the second option was oﬀered to the workers of
the Amazon Mechanical Turk. We chose not to oﬀer the second option to the
academic participants due to our experience gained from previous on-campus
studies: It appeared that the motivation for ﬁnancial rewards was lower than for
the possibility of winning a popular gadget.
6.3.2 Online Survey
We structured our survey in ﬁve parts: With a total of 94 questions, the ﬁrst 19
are ﬁxed (the same for each participant) and the last 75 are personalized (based
on each participant’s Facebook friends). In the very ﬁrst part, the participants
were required to log in to their Facebook account and grant our application access
to their friend list.
In the ﬁrst 15 questions, the participants were asked about their demograph-
ics, technology usage and privacy attitudes, in particular with respect to online
social networks.
In the next question (16), the participants were asked to assign some of their
friends to social groups, and we presented them with ﬁve distinct categories
(based on [156]): (1) school colleagues, (2) friends, (3) family members, (4) work
colleagues and (5) acquaintances. Each participant could assign one Facebook
contact to at most one category. It is possible, however, that one such contact is
a member of several categories (a school colleague that she works with currently).
In this case, the participants were instructed to assign the contact to the most
appropriate category.
In questions 17 through 19, the participants were asked to enter a set of information-
sharing rules in free-text. The sharing rules are entered as a set of logical ex-
pressions that are based on the following features: (1) the participant’s current
location, (2) people nearby, (3) social group of the requester, (4) time of the day
and (5) weekday/weekend. They can put conditions on these features (such as
=, <,>, =,∈ or categorical values). For example, a location-sharing rule could
be deﬁned as:
4Before beginning the survey, the participants are informed that they would need to reveal
the names of their Facebook friends for the purpose of this study. They approve a data retention
and processing agreement, informing them that all data collected in our study is used solely for
the purpose of our academic research project, and that we will not disclose or use it in any other
way than what explicitly mentioned. Once the survey is completed, the name of the Facebook
friends are replaced with anonymous identiﬁers.
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Figure 6.3: Histograms of the information-sharing decisions by (a) information
type, (b) social group of the requester and (c) the time of the day.
“I am at a friend’s place AND with acquaintance AND the re-
quester is a work colleague: do not share”
In the last 75 questions, the participants were presented with sharing scenarios
and they were asked to decide whether they want to share the speciﬁc information
in the given context, their conﬁdence in the decision and the level of detail. A
typical scenario is “Would you share your location with John on Saturday at
11:PM, assuming you are at an event with work colleagues?” (where the requester
name is chosen from the participant’s Facebook friends and the other features
are chosen at random). We use these six features (shown in italic in the previous
sentence) for the classiﬁcation task. In the actual mobile application, we will be
able to use all 18 features as presented in Table 6.1.
Depending on their answers (“Yes”, “No” and “Uncertain”) to the questions
in this part, participants were presented with sub-questions. More speciﬁcally,
“Yes” and “No” answers were followed by a set of additional questions asking
the participants about the conﬁdence in their decisions (i.e., “not so conﬁdent”,
“conﬁdent”, “very conﬁdent”) and the features that inﬂuenced the most their
decision (i.e., “requester”, “day of the week”, “time”, “location” or “neighboring
people”). For “Yes” answers, the participants were also asked about the level of
detail of the shared information (“low”, “medium” or “high”). Similarly, “Un-
certain” answers were followed by sub-questions regarding the reasons for being
uncertain, such as a conﬂict between some features (in this case, the participant
can specify the features that motivates her the most to share and to not share,
and then specify in free text the reason they conﬂict) or simply a lack of infor-
mation (in this case the participant can specify which information would have
helped her reach a decision).
In order to detect sloppy answers (e.g., random answers or bots), we included a
number of “dummy” questions that require human understanding to be correctly
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answered [106, 127]. These are questions such as simple computations (e.g.,
“3 + 4”) or general-knowledge questions (e.g., “How many days are there in one
week?”). Based on the answers to these questions and on the survey timing data
(explained below), we ruled out dishonest participants from the dataset.
6.3.3 General Statistics and Validation
A total of 194 participants took part in our survey. 78 (40%) of them did not
complete it, leaving 116 (60%) complete questionnaires. Out of these, 56 (48%)
came from the university advertisement campaign (UNI) and 60 (52%) were re-
cruited via MTurk. The average age of all the respondents is 27y±7 (Mturk avg.
31y±6, UNI avg. 25y±6), and 74% of them are male. 42% of all participants
are students, 25% work in the IT industry and 8% in the education sector. It
took 44±15 minutes on average to complete the survey (MTurk avg. 42 minutes,
UNI avg. 47 minutes). We observed a sharp contrast, with respect to privacy
concerns, between the two groups of participants: Most MTurk participants were
not, or slightly, concerned about their privacy whereas most UNI participants
were concerned about it.
Based on internal survey tests and detailed timing statistics, only the ques-
tionnaires that meet the following four validation criteria were retained.
• All answers to the dummy questions are correct;
• At least one diﬀerent Facebook friend is assigned to each of the 5 social
groups;
• The survey completion time is greater than 30 minutes.
• At least three of the following four timing conditions are met5: (1) Facebook
friends assignment to groups time>5 minutes, (2) location sharing scenarios
time >4 minutes, (3) activity sharing scenarios time >4 minutes, (4) nearby
people sharing scenarios time >4 minutes.
All participants correctly answered the dummy questions. Based on timings, 46
(40%) of them were ruled out and 70 (60%) were kept for the analysis (33 MTurk
and 37 UNI). The demographics remained mostly unaltered.
6.4 Analysis and Evaluation
In this section, we present three sets of results. First, using descriptive statistics
of the survey questionnaire, we discuss the eﬀect on the sharing decisions of
diﬀerent contextual features, of the requester, of the information type, and the
5These timing conditions were determined based on the observed timing distributions among
all participants and on sample executions performed by test users.
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main reasons behind the decisions. Second, we compare the performance of the
SPISM automated decision-making process against that of the users’ own policies
and an established default policy. Third, we discuss the eﬀects of the increase
of user-involvement on the performance of SPISM, by using active learning with
diﬀerent conﬁdence thresholds.
6.4.1 Survey Statistics
Based on the survey data, we computed the proportion of “Yes/No/Uncertain”
decisions for the diﬀerent values of each contextual feature we considered, such as
the participant’s current location, the social group of the requester, the time of
day, day of week, and the type of information requested. We found that the two
that have the largest eﬀect on the decision are the social group of the requester
and the type of information that is being requested.
Regarding the type of information being asked, Figure 6.3a shows that users
disclose their location in 64% of the cases (the sum of the “yes (low)”, “yes
(medium)” and “yes (high)” bars, aggregated over the 70 participants and for all
the 25 location-sharing questions – out of the 75 questions – that is a total of
1,750 answers), and only 8% of the time at a coarse granularity (“Yes (low)”).
The information about activity and people nearby is disclosed 50% of the time.
People tend to be slightly more willing to share their location than to share other
information6: Location, contrary to the activity and the co-presence of other
people, is widely shared information in most mobile social networks. In addition,
this was conﬁrmed by self-reported privacy concerns about information sharing
on OSNs (not shown in the chapter).
Figure 6.3b shows the percentage of disclosure of information based on the
social ties with the requester. We can see that, in accordance with previous Ubi-
Comp studies, there are substantial diﬀerences7 between the close ties (“family”
and “friend”) and the more distant ones (“acquaintances” and “colleagues”). For
instance, the close ties are granted access to any type of information (70%-80%)
more than twice the times compared to the more distant ones (30%). Moreover,
the level of detail of the shared information is much higher for the close ties (up
to 45% of “yes (high)”) compared to the distant ones (down to 8%). In fact,
the proportion of “Yes (low)” and “Yes (medium)” does not vary signiﬁcantly.
Hence, the results indicate that users tend to exhibit a more tailored sharing
behavior depending on the type of information, the social ties and closeness with
the requester[156]. As illustrated in Figure 6.3c, the time at which the request is
sent does not substantially inﬂuence the decision: users are slightly less willing
to share in the evening but exhibit the same behavior in the morning as in the
6With statistical signiﬁcance, based on global and pair-wise χ2 homogeneity tests with
p < 0.01.
7Ibid.
6.4. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 141
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
No Yes (low) Yes
(medium)
Yes (high)
Current location
Time of request
Social group of
requester
Information type
(a)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
No Yes (low) Yes
(medium)
Yes (high)
Very confident
Confident
Not so confident
(b)
Figure 6.4: Histograms of users’ responses to the survey questionnaire regarding
(a) their main reasons for (not) sharing and (b) the conﬁdence in their decisions.
afternoon8. Our ﬁndings are aligned with those obtained in [15], where the time
of day and the location do not appear to be inﬂuential factors when sharing per-
sonal information such as location, as opposed to the type of social ties with the
requester.
We also looked at the reasons for (not) disclosing information and at the
users’ conﬁdence in their decisions. First we observe that the social ties with
the requester is by far the most frequent reason for sharing (or not) informa-
tion (45%-67%), followed by the type of information (15%-28%) and the current
location (11%-21%). Second, we see again that the higher the level of detail (Fig-
ure 6.4(a)), the more important the social ties with the requester (on average).
Unsurprisingly, the conﬁdence that the participants have in their decision (Fig-
ure 6.4(b)) is lower for the intermediate level of detail: It can be observed that
the proportion of “Very conﬁdent” is signiﬁcantly lower for “low” and “medium”
levels of detail than for “No” and “Yes (high)”. In addition, the proportion of
“Not so conﬁdent” is more than doubled for the most borderline decision, i.e.,
“Yes (low)”. This could be explained by the fact that users try to minimize the
risk by limiting the level of detail when their conﬁdence is low.
6.4.2 Static Policies
We compared the performance of our SPISM decision framework with two other
policy-based approaches. For the following comparisons, we used 10-fold cross
validation and a logistic regression binary classiﬁer. In order to be consistent with
the policy-based approaches, we only compare the binary (“Yes/No”) decisions
here as the participants were instructed to only specify share/not share policies
8Ibid.
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in the survey. The ﬁrst policy-based approach, called AT studies, is inspired from
the ﬁndings presented in [3, 152], and is derived by the following two rules:
1. Do not share any information while sleeping (12 AM - 6 AM) or eating (12
PM - 1 PM).
2. Do not share any information when you are around people that are not
your family members or friends, except when you are at an event.
The second policy-based approach is derived from the individual policies that each
participant speciﬁed in free text in the survey. We selected a random sample of
19 participants and we manually transposed their free-text policies to a format
suitable to be evaluated against their own decisions. The participants speciﬁed
between 1 and 15 policies (avg. 6.9).
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Participant ID 
Participant's policy AT studies SPISM(ML)
Figure 6.5: Histograms of the proportion of correct sharing decisions for three
diﬀerent sharing policy approaches. The AT studies’ policies are derived from [3,
152], the participants’ individual policies are derived from their free text answer
in the survey and the SPISM approach is based on machine learning (without
active learning).
The results of the three-way comparison are shown in Figure 6.5 where the
results are sorted in descending order, based on the performance of the partici-
pant’s individual policies. First, we can observe that the SPISM machine-learning
approach consistently outperforms the other two approaches (this holds for all
users when compared only to the AT policies deﬁned earlier). The SPISM perfor-
mance rate is between 53% and 100%, with an average of 71%. Compared to the
participant’s policy (avg. 22%) and the AT studies (avg. 12%), SPISM is signif-
icantly better at adapting itself to the user’s sharing behavior. We also observe
that usually where the participants’ own policies correctly represent their actual
behavior, the AT policies exhibit the worst performance (left side of Figure 6.5).
The inverse appears to be true as well, as the policies inspired by the AT studies
perform better for the participants whose own policies do not particularly match
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Figure 6.6: Performance of the machine learning-based decision making algo-
rithm.
their actual behavior. This points out an interesting question, which is outside
of the scope of this work: Are people who are not able to articulate well their
sharing policy better suited to not trying to modify the default policies at all?
For the individual policies, we also observed the correctness of the decisions
as a function of the number of policies, and found that a small number of policies
(1-5) achieved up to 41% of correct decisions, followed by a slightly better perfor-
mance for the number of policies between 6 and 9 (up to 45%), and then a much
worse performance (up to 28% of correct decisions) for the highest number of
policies (10 - 15). This suggests that there is an advantage in having a moderate
number of sharing policies (up to 9) but not higher; With a larger number of
policies, the risk of having overlapping but contradicting policies is higher, which
could result in a worse overall performance.
6.4.3 Machine Learning
In order to assess the potential of (semi-)automatic information-sharing decision
making, which constitutes the core of SPISM, we evaluate the performance of
a logistic classiﬁer in predicting the users’ sharing decisions. To do so, we use
the survey data comprised of 75 scenarios for each of the 70 participants: Each
scenario corresponds to a feature vector and the decision made by the participant
constitutes the ground truth. We considered only the “Yes” and “No” decisions.
We evaluate the performance of the classiﬁer in terms of the proportion of correct
predictions (i.e., that match the user’s decision), the proportion of cases where
the information is incorrectly shared (whereas the user would have not shared
it), thus compromising the user’s privacy, and the proportion of cases where the
information is incorrectly not shared (whereas the user would have shared it),
thus reducing the utility of the system.
Firstly, we consider the case where the users ﬁrst manually make n decisions to
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train the classiﬁer, and then the classiﬁer makes the remaining decisions automat-
ically. For several values of n, and for each participant, we compute the average
proportions of correct and incorrect decisions following a 20-fold cross-validation
approach. For each value of n, we obtain one data point (i.e., a proportion of
“correct”, “share less”, and “share more” decisions) for each user and each fold,
that is 1,400 data points. We represent the results across the diﬀerent users
and folds by showing the median, the ﬁrst and third quartiles, and the 5 and
95-percentiles, as depicted in Figure 6.6(a). It can be observed that the median
proportion of correct decisions increases from 60% and reaches 70% for a training
set of only 30% of the data, which correspond to ∼25 scenarios. The proportion
of correct decisions then quickly stabilizes around 74% after approximately 40
decisions (i.e., ∼50% of the data). The third quartile and the 95-percentile show
that for more than 25% of the users, the proportion of correct decisions goes up
to 80% and for some of them, it is consistently higher than 96%. The propor-
tion of incorrect decisions is evenly distributed between sharing and not sharing
the information, yet slightly biased towards incorrectly sharing the information.
Should a user favor her privacy over the utility of the system, she could assign a
higher error-penalty to this type of errors in order to make decisions in a conserva-
tive way. Without penalties and active learning, over-sharing happens in 10-20%
of the cases, in line with the results reported in [15] and obtained with diﬀerent
classiﬁers. Note that the size of the training set (represented on the x-axis) rep-
resents the burden of the user as she has to manually make the corresponding
decisions.
Secondly, we consider the case of active learning in which the user is asked to
manually make the decision when the conﬁdence of the classiﬁer is low. The clas-
siﬁer outputs a distribution over the possible decisions; we deﬁne the conﬁdence
as the normalized entropy of this distribution. The classiﬁer is ﬁrst initialized
with 10% of the data. For each user, we run the active learning-based classiﬁer
for several values of the conﬁdence threshold (under which the user is asked to
make the decision). Each experiment gives one data point comprised of (1) the
proportion of decisions (including the ﬁrst 10%) the user has to manually make
and (2) the proportions of correct and incorrect decisions (among the decisions
that are made automatically). In order to represent the data in a form that is
comparable to that of Figure 6.6(a), we group the data points in bins of size
5% (on the x-axis as represented in the ﬁgure) based on the proportion of man-
ual decisions. Note that the number of data points varies across the diﬀerent
bins. Within each bin, we compute the median and the relevant percentiles. The
result are depicted in Figure 6.6(b). It can be observed that active learning out-
performs training-only learning in most cases (i.e., for a given number of manual
decisions, it provides a higher proportion of correct decisions). The proportion
of manual decisions remains lower than 50% which shows that the classiﬁer can
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make the decision with very high-conﬁdence for at least half of the scenarios.
For some users, the proportion of manual decisions remains low (∼20%), regard-
less of the conﬁdence threshold, and the proportion of correct decisions is high
(∼80%). This corresponds to the users whose decisions are highly predictable.
With active learning, we observe a signiﬁcantly improved performance in terms of
over-sharing compared to the absence of active learning. We posit that, coupled
with cost-sensitive classiﬁers, active learning can be used to improve the correct-
ness of the sharing decisions while maintaining a signiﬁcantly lower over-sharing
rate.
6.5 Related Work
A substantial research eﬀort has been made on the topic of privacy and infor-
mation sharing in mobile social networks, notably with respect to the attitudes
of people when sharing static and contextual data with other peers. The studies
that are most related to our work can be grouped, from a high-level perspective,
into two categories: (i) contextual information sharing and privacy [144, 152, 12]
and (ii) machine learning for information sharing [40, 53, 133, 112, 2, 136].
Contextual Information Sharing and Privacy Smith et al. [144] provide an early
investigation on technologies that allow people to share their contextual informa-
tion, such as location, in mobile social networks. In addition to allowing users
to manually decide when to share their location with others, the authors imple-
mented a system called Reno that can automate the process based on a set of
pre-deﬁned regions. By allowing Reno to automatically send notiﬁcations when-
ever the user entered or exited such regions, the authors show that there is both a
value and a cost associated with automatic information disclosure. In particular,
they show that static rules for location sharing in pre-deﬁned regions are inef-
fective in accurately expressing the users’ actual behavior when other contextual
elements change, such as the time of the day or the day of the week.
More recently, Toch et al. [152] study the eﬀect of the type of locations
visited by the users on their willingness to share them with others. By considering
simple statistical models that take into account factors other than the geographic
location, the authors showed that the semantic category of the location being
shared (such as a shopping center or a hospital) and the social group of the
person asking for the location are signiﬁcant factors in deciding whether to share
the location. These results support earlier eﬀorts [3, 104, 136] in providing a set
of contextual features that have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the location-
sharing behavior of mobile users.
In an attempt to capture the cost of mistakenly revealing a location due
to ineﬀective sharing policies, in addition to sharing preferences, Benisch et al.
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[12] compare simple access control policies (white lists) to more sophisticated
ones (based on time, day and location). They found out that (i) the accuracy
of the sharing policies increases with their complexity (or ﬂexibility), and that
(ii) the accuracy beneﬁts are the greatest for the highly sensitive information.
This suggests that the notion of the cost of mistakenly revealing information to
unauthorized parties (in particular contexts) is an important factor in designing
and optimizing automated information-sharing mechanisms.
Wiese et al. [156] investigate the eﬀect of physical and perceived social close-
ness on people’s willingness to share information with others. Among the main
results of the study, the authors show that social closeness and the frequency of
communication are better predictors of sharing than physical proximity. More-
over, these two factors were also shown to have a capacity to predict sharing
better than the social groups of the people asking for the information. Thus, the
authors suggest that automatic methods for inferring social closeness could be
suited for accurate information-sharing decisions more than physical co-location,
in the case automated mechanisms (such as in [147, 84, 149, 113]) are envisaged.
Machine Learning and Information Sharing Whereas studies on information-sharing
attitudes and privacy shed light on the behavior of people and the factors that in-
ﬂuence their decisions, they are mostly concerned about understanding the causes
and eﬀects of such behavior. Meanwhile, there has been a substantial eﬀort in
devising methods that help and nudge the users to make information-sharing deci-
sions, or even make decisions on their behalf. We present some of these methods,
including both supervised and unsupervised approaches for decision-making.
In [136], Sadeh et al. compare the accuracy of user-deﬁned sharing policies
with an automated mechanism (case-based reasoner) and a machine learning ap-
proach (random forests), showing that these approaches have an accuracy better
than the user-deﬁned policies. Owing in part to the greater ﬂexibility of the
supervised machine-learning approaches compared to the more coarse-grained
user-deﬁned policies, the automated methods also beneﬁted from the fact that
users appeared to not be able to create sharing rules consistent with their own
choices. On the contrary, the feedback provided by the users to the machine-
learning methods did however appear to be consistent with their actual sharing
behavior, which helped the automated methods to achieve better accuracy re-
sults.
Unsupervised or semi-supervised methods, which reduce the initial setup bur-
den of the default sharing policies for each user, are investigated in [40, 53]. For
instance, Danezis [40] proposes a method for automatically extracting privacy
settings for online social networks; the method is based on the notion of a lim-
ited proliferation of information outside of a given social context. The proposed
method, which determines cohesive groups of users where users belonging to a
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group have stronger ties to the users outside of the group, shows promising re-
sults on a limited set of evaluation samples. This study also shows that the social
groups, and especially methods for their automated extraction, are a key factor
to sharing private information in social networks.
Fang and LeFevre [53] propose a novel approach to the inference and deﬁnition
of access control policies for personal information on online social networks. They
enable the supervised learning mechanism to learn the sharing preferences of a
user by asking her a limited number of questions about her sharing behavior with
some of her friends; these speciﬁc friends are the most “informative”, i.e., those
for which the classiﬁer is most uncertain about. The authors show that their
approach of iteratively asking questions about the most uncertain case (active
learning with uncertainty sampling) reduces the eﬀort required by the users and
maintains a high accuracy compared to the ground truth (based on a 45-user
study on Facebook).
Bigwood et al. [15] evaluate diﬀerent machine learning algorithms for infor-
mation sharing in terms of information over-exposure and correct decisions. Al-
though their work is focused exclusively on binary (yes/no) location-sharing, the
authors provide a machine-learning-based determination of the most inﬂuential
features for the sharing decisions; moreover, they take into account cost-sensitive
classiﬁers to reduce over-exposure.
An interesting approach towards the assessment of the privacy risks in online
social networks is proposed by Liu and Terzi [102], who introduced a novel method
for computing the privacy score of a user. Based on two values, the sensitivity and
the visibility of the personal information, their score captures both the role of the
user’s own preferences for sharing (sensitivity of the released information to the
individual) and her role (or visibility) in the network; the greater the sensitivity
of the information item, the higher is her privacy score. Similarly, the greater the
number of people who know a particular information item about a user (visibility
of the information), the higher is her privacy score. Furthermore, when coupled
with probability estimation techniques used in Item-Response Theory (IRT) [103],
such privacy scores can be comparable across diﬀerent social networks (such as
Facebook, MySpace, Twitter). The latter property is important whenever users
may have online accounts on diﬀerent social networks, as it may be possible to
link information shared on diﬀerent social networks to reconstruct the information
about the user [114].
6.6 Summary
Mobile social networks enable users to share an increasing number of contex-
tual information, such as their location, their activity and their co-presence with
others. To simplify the sharing process and improve usability, the research com-
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munity has been studying sharing preferences and developing applications that,
based on several contextual features, can automate to some extent the sharing
process. Machine-learning approaches have been developed and evaluated for
speciﬁc instances of information (mostly location) or for online social network
(without the notion of context).
In this chapter, we have presented and evaluated a novel privacy-preserving
information-sharing system (SPISM) that decides in a (semi-)automated fashion
whether or not to share diﬀerent types of contextual information and to what
level of detail. Using a personalized online user-study involving 70 participants,
we show that SPISM signiﬁcantly outperforms both individual and general user-
deﬁned sharing policies, achieving up to 90% of correct sharing decisions, with
only a limited cost for the user in terms of initial setup thanks to active learning.
We also show that the system has a slight bias towards incorrectly sharing the
information, which could be mitigated by introducing a penalty for this kind
of errors. Furthermore, our results provide signiﬁcant insight into two other
crucial aspects of UbiComp studies: the reasons behind sharing decisions and
the participants’ conﬁdence in them. We show that the type of the requested
information, in addition to the social ties of the requester, is an inﬂuential feature
in the decision process.
Publication: [16]
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have focused on the privacy of mobile users in context-aware
networks. From the application to the link layer of the ISO/OSI stack, we have
performed information leakage analysis and designed privacy-preserving protocols
in order to enable users to beneﬁt from added security and privacy while executing
common tasks and using social and context-aware services. In our studies, we
involved a large population of external participants in both online and in-situ
experiments, in order to assess the challenges they face with respect to privacy
and to evaluate our protocols.
In Part I, we have studied two privacy problems that arise on the application-
layer: meeting scheduling and optimal meeting location determination for mobile
devices. For these two problems, we designed and evaluated privacy-preserving
protocols that enable users to privately determine common meeting times and to
choose, among a set of private preferred places, the optimal one among them. By
means of targeted user studies and prototype applications, we have demonstrated
that our protocols can be eﬃciently run on current mobile devices and that
they fare better, with respect to computational and communication complexity,
compared to existing centralized and distributed approaches. Furthermore, our
proof-of-concept applications scored well with the users, who found them easy
to use and provided us with input to formulate design guidelines for application
developers.
In Part II, we have investigated the issues of social community and relation-
ship privacy in pervasive networks. First, we conducted the ﬁrst large experiment
in which we compared the accuracy in inferring social communities of an exter-
nal eavesdropper, who did not have access to the data stored on the mobile
devices, with that of a malicious application or an experimenter who had access
to such data. Our results showed that the eavesdropper could infer, with high
accuracy, generic statistics of social communities of users, even by using a basic
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characterization for the weight functions of the underlying social graph of users’
encounters. With a more comprehensive weight function, such an adversary can
achieve positive results also with respect to the identity of the members of the so-
cial communities. Moreover, we have studied the eﬀect of exploiting the inferred
social community information in reconstructing the social ties of the mobile users.
In particular, we have shown how the false positives can be reduced by a factor
of three while doubling the true positive rate of social ties inference for speciﬁc
types of relationships. By adjusting the inference parameters, it is possible to
achieve high success rates for speciﬁc target social relationship classes.
In Part III, we have focused on cross-layer approaches for privacy protec-
tion in mobile social networks. The context-awareness of current mobile devices
and the possibility of sharing such information with almost anyone on the social
network represent two important aspects to consider when developing privacy-
aware information-sharing mechanisms. We designed a novel and automated
information-sharing mechanism that enables users to share diﬀerent kinds of per-
sonal and contextual information with each other and third parties. Our decision-
making core is developed with both privacy and ease of use in mind, as it mimics
the users’ behavior with respect to information sharing – by learning from the
past behavior and the current context – and it relieves the users from having
to decide manually and once and for all whether they want to share personal
information. In addition to the sharing decision, our system is also able to in-
fer the level of granularity for each information request. Our results indicate
that our proposed mechanism is able to make better sharing decisions than both
the existing systems and users’ own sharing policies. Furthermore, by choosing
the appropriate questions when user input is required – by actively choosing the
question that yields the most information to the classiﬁer – we can minimize
the number of interruptions for the users while maximizing the gain in terms of
conﬁdence in the decision by the mobile device.
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